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The global rate of annual net forest loss has slowed from 7.8 mio hectares in the 1990s to 4.7 mio 
hectares between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, the area of the world’s forests continues to 
decrease specifically in the tropics. Improved governance has come into the focus as a means to help 
reversing trends of tropical deforestation. Yet, “good governance” remains a normative, broad and 
often unspecified concept consisting of a wide range of elements and implicit value judgements. 
Specific knowledge is missing on the relative importance of single governance elements, on their 
interdependencies and their specific effects on deforestation. Forest governance research to date 
has a strong focus on qualitative approaches. 
This study aims to (i) elaborate on and implement mixed methods for forest governance 
measurements, (ii) determine functional relationships between forest governance elements based 
on quantitative data, and to (iii) substantiate and quantify governance effects on tropical 
deforestation. 
The presented research develops a new method called quantitative content analysis with 
standardized scores. The method is applied in a literature review comprising 28 reviewed 
publications. This review classifies governance elements based on the framework of the World 
Resource Institute. It quantifies effects on deforestation for single elements by Likert scores. 
In addition, this study presents a harmonized landscape level governance assessment methodology 
which is developed and implemented in research areas covering approximately 500,000 hectares in 
Ecuador, Zambia and the Philippines. Both methods combine qualitative and quantitative approaches 
and are shown to be applicable and operational.  
In order to analyze functional relationships between governance elements, principal component 
analysis (PCA) is applied to all data sets. The results show two general main mechanisms. Firstly, 
there is a joint positive loading of governance elements on the first principal component for all data 
sets. Governance elements thus function synchronously. They are expressions of a similar underlying 
mechanism. Secondly, results show that for the review data structural and agency related 
governance elements are grouped on specific principal components. These components together 
describe 38% of the variation of governance elements. For the first time, governance functioning is 
described by these two aspects based on an empirical data set. However, for neither of the 
landscape level data sets such a functional structure - agency description is possible. Instead, country 
specific governance elements have major importance in the landscape level data sets. 
Effects of governance on deforestation are analyzed by multiple regression analysis for the data sets 
from Ecuador and Zambia. Deforestation rates are calculated based on satellite data and are used as 
target variable. In addition to governance elements, context data on deforestation drivers are 
assessed in the landscapes and used as explanatory variables. The different models explain approx. 
50% of the variation in deforestation. Direct drivers such as agriculture and infrastructure explain 
largest shares of deforestation. However, an additional positive effect of single, country specific 
governance elements can be substantiated. 
  
 






The study concludes that for forest governance research mixed method approaches need stronger 
consideration. Data transformation into quantitative scores enables generalization of knowledge 
based on a multitude of case studies. Existing studies thus gain added value and should be 
considered before new field research is implemented. New policy requirements and research 
questions, however, will necessitate new field studies. These studies need to rely on harmonized 
approaches to which this study makes an important contribution. 
The synchronous function of different governance elements is encouraging for development work 
and policy. The joint positive loading of governance elements on the first principal components can 
motivate to concentrate on governance core features that are relevant in the specific context. 
Possible synergies between governance elements need to be further researched. The structure - 
agency approach can help to select relevant elements. The study shows that both, structure and 
agency aspects need to be considered. The REDD+ approach is a prominent example for this. Within 
REDD+, structural measures - in so-called readiness phases, as well as agency related incentives - 
through so-called results based payments need to complement each other. 
The structure - agency dualism only became visible within the pan tropical review data set. This can 
imply that the landscape level is not sufficient to tackle governance issues. Multilevel governance is 
obviously required spanning from international, to national and local levels. 
Direct deforestation drivers like agriculture and infrastructure had stronger effects on deforestation 
as compared to governance measures, which are regarded as underlying factor. A governance focus 
alone can thus not compensate effects of direct drivers. However, without governance measures 
work on direct drivers may not be successful. 
Compared to a normative “good” governance approach, the presented analytical approach explores 
causalities. It is outcome oriented. Based on such an approach, measures can rely on jointly agreed 
aims instead of input and value oriented principles. This can facilitate development work, because 
specifically the informal values often differ between actors. 
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Even though the pace of net forest loss has slowed, the area of the world’s forests continues to 
decrease. The rate of annual net loss of forest has slowed from 7.8 mio hectares in the 1990s to 4.7 
mio hectares between 2015 and 2020 (FAO, 2020). Improved governance has come into the focus as 
a general mechanism that might be a promising tool to reverse globally observed trends of tropical 
deforestation. Therefore, in international forest policy, governance is increasingly taken into account 
(Singer and Giessen, 2017), even though it is clear that forest governance alone is certainly not 
sufficient to address drivers of deforestation and degradation (Larson, 2011; Busch and Ferretti-
Gallon, 2017). After periods of first state-centered and then market-oriented development 
perceptions (Ansell and Torfing, 2016; Brass, 2016) the recent governance paradigm (Arts and 
Visseren-Hamakers, 2012; Broekhoven et al., 2012; Brass, 2016) is understood as an approach that 
does not only take these both aspects into account, but also relies on civil society inputs, as well as 
on interrelations of all these actors and which also considers the bio-physical effects. The modern 
forest governance approach thus provides a wider and more comprehensive basis for sustainable 
development. However, a theoretical understanding of the complex interactions of its multiple 
elements is challenging. In addition, instead of simply postulating “good” governance as a value-
driven and thus political concept (Broekhoven et al., 2012), governance needs to be measured 
against outcomes, in order to evaluate if the approach is effective. To date, such information is only 
partially available: governance remains a normative, broad and often underspecified concept 
consisting of a wide range of elements and implicit value judgements (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014). 
There are numerous forest governance definitions and catalogues of indicator frameworks for its 
assessment (see section 2.1.3) which are applied with either qualitative or quantitative methods. 
Mixed method approaches are hardly available (see section 2.4). Indications of positive effects of 
single governance elements on deforestation have been published, mostly based on case studies (see 
section 2.1.5). Systematic and comprehensive evaluations have only recently been published (Fischer 
et al., 2020; Fischer et al., submitted; Nansikombi et al., submitted), but are needed in order to 
advance the scientific understanding of forest governance functioning and of its effects as a basis for 
efficient policy measures. Only if the interrelations and functioning of single elements are 
understood, and only if their specific effects on deforestation are substantiated, decision makers and 
practitioners in the field can select, decide on and implement targeted action. 
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2. Background and theoretical foundations 
 
2.1 Governance  
 
2.1.1 Political relevance 
Governance has gained importance as a general paradigm for sustainable development (Arts, 2014; 
Ansell and Torfing, 2016). Within the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals a governance 
agenda is not only seen as “a goal in itself, but also an essential enabler for the achievement of all 
other goals” (UN, 2020). It is one out of six UN Forest Goals (UN, 2019) and plays a core role in 
international programs aiming to reverse the global deforestation trend, such as the REDD+ 
(“Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation”) process and the European 
Union’s FLEGT (“Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade”) program to which it lends its 
name. It has an undoubted significance on the international forest policy agenda and has 
consequently come into the focus of related research activities. 
 
2.1.2 Theoretical basis 
The main theoretical basis of forest governance has been claimed to consist of two mainstream 
models: rational choice and neo-institutionalism, otherwise described as agency - structure concept, 
which provides a theoretical basis to better understand and describe governance approaches (Arts et 
al., 2014). The agency approach postulates that it is mainly self-interested actors, with their specific 
motivations, intentions, goals, actions and resources, that take active agency (Archer, 2003) and, 
hence, drive land use decisions. Land users are assumed to take rational choices in order to maximize 
their economic or political benefits. Broadly, this school of thought assumes that “man’s natural 
proclivity is to pursue his own interests” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985) and follows the logic of 
consequences of behavior (March and Olsen, 2004). On the other side, laws, regulations, plans, 
cultural conventions and norms shape land use decisions providing a structural frame. Hence, this 
approach broadly follows the logic of appropriate behavior (March and Olsen, 2004). It has to be 
taken into account that usually neither structure nor agency alone drive human behavior. (March and 
Olsen, 1998) consider the need to study “which settings in practice enable the dominance of one 
logic over all others” and (Giddens, 1984b) formulates that agents - groups or individuals - draw upon 
structures to perform social actions but at the same time structure is the result of these social 
practices. This “feedback-feedforward” system has been adapted to forest governance by (Arts et al., 
2014) in a so-called practice based approach described by the metaphor of a dance or theatre 
performance in which actors are on one side driven by scripts (structures) which they on the other 
hand constantly re-interpret.  
 
2.1.3 Definitions 
Numerous definitions have been proposed for forest governance (Larson and Petkova, 2011; 
Broekhoven et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2013b; Giessen and Buttoud, 2014; de Graaf et al., 2017; 
Mansourian, 2017). The recent definitions all understand governance as a broad and comprehensive 
concept that goes far beyond governments. For (Larson and Petkova, 2011) and (Broekhoven et al., 
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2012) forest governance is centered around decisions on forest management. (de Graaf et al., 2017) 
emphasize rules and decisions. (Wehkamp et al., 2018) and (Davis et al., 2013b) focus on different 
dimensions by introducing levels and horizontal dimensions or components and principles. Taking 
into account the numerous definitions that have been proposed for governance, a conceptual study 
needs a wide governance perspective (Mansourian, 2016), because it should not exclude specific 
results only because of different definitions. Such a broad definition is formulated by (Giessen and 
Buttoud, 2014) according to which “forest governance comprises a) all formal and informal, public 
and private regulatory structures, i.e. institutions consisting of rules, norms, principles, decision 
procedures, concerning forests, their utilization and their conservation, b) the interactions between 
public and private actors therein and c) the effects of either on forests”. The following study is based 
on this definition because it is broad enough to comprise specific aspects that are in the focus of the 
other definitions and it has a clear classification into structures (part “a”), agency described as actors 
and their interactions (part “b”) and their effects (part “c”). This reflects the current theoretical 
understanding of the concept. 
 
2.1.4 Elements and indicators for “good governance”? 
Whatever definition applied, governance comprises a multitude of different elements specified by 
numerous indicators. Handbooks and toolboxes list governance indicators but without substantiation 
of effects for each of them. (de Graaf et al., 2017) provide a methodology for landscape level 
assessments based on four performance criteria that are specified by 18 indicators. The performance 
indicators include (i) inclusive decision-making in the landscape, (ii) culture of collaboration in the 
landscape, (iii) coordination across landscape sectors, levels and actors, (iv) sustainable landscape 
thinking and action. (Worldbank, 2006) provides six aggregate indicators aiming to describe national 
governance, including (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability and absence of violence, (iii) 
government effectiveness, (iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law, (vi) control of corruption. (Kishor 
and Kenneth, 2012) provide an assessment tool designed for forest sector governance assessments 
at country of subdivision level. Data are structured into 130 indicators under three pillars, including 
(i) policy, legal institutional, and regulatory frameworks, (ii) planning and decision-making processes, 
(iii) implementation enforcement and compliance. (Davis et al., 2013a) is the basis for the 
methodology developed in this study. This framework provides a description of 126 indicators 
structured under 24 sub themes, which are referred to as elements in this study, and 6 thematic 
areas.  
In practice, such indicator frameworks are inherently normative, with “good sores and bad scores” 
(Kishor and Kenneth, 2012). “Good governance” in this context is a normative concept. It is based on 
principals such as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, legitimacy, lack of 
corruption, stability, empowerment, social justice, equity, environmental and social sustainability of 
impact (Ansell and Torfing, 2016). In this normative approach the principal question of “who has the 
right to define them” remains open (Secco et al., 2011). In practice, the views reflect formal 
international agreements. The United Nations’ Global Forest Goal No 5 (UN, 2019) is an important 
source in this respect requiring e.g. “enhanced” law enforcement and “strengthened” institutions, 
that implicitly are perceived as “good”. “Good governance” thus becomes the promotion of reform 
of the public sector and/or of corporate management, as among others advocated by the European 
Union, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
In contrast, analytical studies are concerned with the mere reflection of these phenomena and their 
explanation and strive for developing value-free methodological frameworks (Giessen and Buttoud, 
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2014). In this sense, the following study is understood as an analytical study. This does not mean that 
assessment frameworks cannot be applied. On the contrary, the study applies (Davis et al., 2013b) 
because this framework comprises a broad spectrum of elements that are understood to make up 
forest governance. However, these elements are used to study interrelations between them and are 
analyzed with respect to an outcome, namely effects on deforestation. Their high or low 
performance is not a priori understood as good or bad. 
Previous studies also rely on such indicator descriptions and analyze effects of single governance 
components on deforestation (see section 2.1.5), but an understanding of the inherent structure of 
different governance components and how they interact is missing until today. It is also not clear 
which of the multiple components are the most decisive ones with regards to effects on 
deforestation. This, however, would be important for the scientific understanding of governance 
functioning. It would also have practical implications, as policy requires information on which of the 
multiple components to concentrate and practitioners need to know if additional governance 
components are affected when they are working on one of them. 
 
2.1.5 Governance effects on deforestation 
Scholars have produced an increasing number of (i) case studies analyzing governance effects on the 
ground (Andersson et al., 2014; Schusser et al., 2015; Subhan Mollick et al., 2018) (ii) statistical 
evaluations of governance effects using regional or global panel data sets (Umemiya et al., 2010a) 
and (iii) reviews of existing research results (Bhagwat et al., 2017; Wehkamp et al., 2018; Fischer et 
al., 2020). Existing results on governance effects show positive relations between improved 
governance and reduced deforestation (Bottazzi and Dao, 2013; Ceddia et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2016); 
(Kanninen et al., 2007; Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014; Stickler et al., 2017) and the prevailing conclusion 
in such studies is that improved forest governance will at least contribute to reduced deforestation. 
However, as there is no common definition of governance and as each study has an individual focus, 
such effects are reported for individual governance elements only. It is not clear if there are most 
decisive governance elements with respect to deforestation outcomes or if elements are functionally 
related in their effects. 
 
2.2 The context of deforestation drivers and interventions and their 
interactions 
Theories about what drives deforestation date back as far as Johann Heinrich von Thünen’s 
quantitative spatial model, in which economic returns determine how land is allocated between 
forests and agriculture (von Thünen 1826 cited after (Busch and Ferretti-Gallon, 2017). Research on 
causes of deforestation specifically in the tropics has been intensified in recent years. (Geist and 
Lambin, 2002) group drivers of deforestation into three key categories (i) proximate (direct), (ii) 
underlying causes and (iii) other drivers. The proximate drivers are the human activities that directly 
affect the environment like infrastructure, agriculture and wood extraction. Governance is 
understood as underlying cause. More recent scholars have as well used this framework (Umemiya et 
al., 2010b; Hosonuma et al., 2012; Fischer et al., submitted; Nansikombi et al., submitted). Another 
theoretical framework for analyzing the relations of context factors and governance effects has been 
developed by (Fischer et al., 2020). It specifies governance effects on deforestation and then relates 
context factors to these effects. In addition to governance elements and direct drivers, interventions 
are assumed to affect deforestation. Actions explicitly undertaken to counter land use changes have 
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been classified as such interventions (Agrawal et al., 2014; Fischer et al., 2020). Summarizing these 
concepts, context factors for studying governance effects on deforestation can be understood as 
comprising direct drivers, other underlying causes and interventions. The classification of context 
factors can benefit from numerous publications that name and identify possible deforestation drivers 
(Geist and Lambin, 2002; Hosonuma et al., 2012; Wehkamp et al., 2015; Busch and Ferretti-Gallon, 
2017) and interventions (Agrawal et al., 2014). The situation is, however, more complex than such a 
simplified scheme may suggest, because context factors as well as governance elements not only 
affect deforestation but interact between themselves. Also, the effects of a number of governance 
elements are controversially discussed. This includes e.g. tenure security and public participation 
which on one side may motivate sustainable management, but on the other can stimulate 
exploitation of forest and land conversion under short term economic interest (Ostrom, 1999; 
Agrawal et al., 2014). Such complexity of governance effects made (Wehkamp et al., 2018) exclude 
governance variables with “different directions of causality” from the analysis and only evaluate 
those that had a clear causal direction, even though that in their data base such complex cases 
accounted for one fifth of all reported cases. This shows the need for evaluating interacting context 
factors and governance effects on deforestation.  
 
2.3 The landscape context 
Deforestation depends on the scale that is under consideration, because in multifunctional 
landscapes with a mosaic of land uses and land cover types, different stakeholders with differing 
interests are involved (Watts and Colfer, 2011). (Agrawal et al., 2014) emphasize the interspersed 
nature of agricultural and forest land uses and the potential for different pathways of land cover 
change. Whereas a number of context factors and governance elements may be of direct local 
importance, others are effective across larger spatial scales. Therefore, the so called landscape 
approach has been proposed in order to research and manage areas where agriculture, mining, and 
other productive land uses compete with environmental and biodiversity goals. A landscape has been 
defined as an arena in which entities, including humans, interact according to rules that determine 
their relationships (Sayer et al., 2013). Even though that landscapes are thus understood in broad 
conceptual terms rather than simply as a physical space (Farina, 2000) it implies that larger areas 
need to be considered in most cases in order to capture interactions between governance elements, 
different drivers, interventions and deforestation. 
 
2.4 Qualitative and quantitative methods as a basis for harmonized 
assessments 
Both, quantitative and qualitative approaches have been applied in forest governance research. 
Quantitative data is any data that is in numerical form and analyzed by the use of statistics and that 
can on this basis be generalized (Given, 2008). Qualitative research, on the other hand, inquires 
deeply into specific experiences, describing and exploring meaning and functioning through text or 
observations, but which develops themes exclusive to a specific sample population (Glesne, 2011) 
(Ratner, 2002; Austin and Sutton, 2014). The ongoing debate on methodological issues in forest 
governance research is not conclusive. At least for the so-called practice based approach, (Arts et al., 
2014) favor qualitative methodologies and postulate that at the core for deeper understanding “we 
need qualitative interpretative methodologies”. (Stevanov et al., 2016; Maryudi et al., 2018) 
recommend a stronger focus on quantitative methods. (Krott et al., 2014; Kleinschmit et al., 2016) 
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argue for a more balanced application and state that both, “quantitative and qualitative methods are 
capable of producing rigorous, realistic empirical findings”. Integrated mixed method approaches 
have hardly been followed (Schusser et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2020). Instead, recent research and 
methodological reviews focus on either qualitative (Laraswati et al., 2020) or quantitative studies 
(Stevanov et al., 2016).  
Standardized methods for forest governance assessments that can be and have been applied in a 
larger number of cases are rare. (IFRI, 2011) provides a standardized approach to assess forestry 
resources and institutions based on the research approach of (Ostrom, 1999) on a cross country 
scale. This approach, however, has a focus on single forests and is largely qualitative descriptive. 
(Ravikumar et al., 2015) and (CIFOR, 2015) provide governance interview guidelines for a cross 
country study of the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). These are as well largely 
qualitative descriptive. 
 
2.5 Hypothesis and research aims 
The research presented is based on two main hypotheses 
(i) The structure - agency concept provides a basis for the functional understanding of complex 
interactions of governance elements (Giddens, 1984a; March and Olsen, 2004; Arts et al., 
2014). 
(ii) Specific governance elements are related to reduced deforestation (Umemiya et al., 2010b; 
Bottazzi and Dao, 2013; Ceddia et al., 2014; Stickler et al., 2017). 
Under these hypotheses three specific aims with research questions are subsumed. 
Aim 1: Analyze and further elaborate on methods for forest governance assessments. 
What are appropriate qualitative and/or quantitative methods to provide a basis for 
generalization relevant information from the multitude of existing case studies, reviews and 
theoretical governance studies? Can an operational and harmonized method for landscape 
level governance assessments be developed, that provides a basis for policy relevant cross 
country comparisons and input to further scientific analysis of governance elements? 
Aim 2: Determine functional relationships between forest governance elements. 
Can theoretical foundations of governance - as postulated in the agency and structure 
concept - empirically be substantiated through results of applied governance research? Are 
there other independent factors that summarize and explain patterns in the complex 
structure of governance elements? Are single governance elements more predominantly 
characterizing overall governance than others?  
Aim 3: Substantiate and quantify governance effects on tropical deforestation. 
Does the hypothesized relation between governance and deforestation hold true? Are there 
most decisive governance elements that have an effect on reduced deforestation? What is 
the relation between context factors, including interventions and direct drivers, and 
governance as underlying cause on deforestation? 
  
 





3.1 Content analysis as a basis for knowledge extrapolation methods  
The development of a method for extrapolating knowledge from a multitude of case studies (see 
section 4.1.1) builds on qualitative content analysis as a method for analyzing text from various 
sources that is then extended by quantitative components (Mayring, 2014). The central idea of 
qualitative content analysis is to assign categories to text passages as an interpretive act. These are 
then combined with elements of quantitative content analysis - mainly by counting frequencies. 
Within deforestation research the method has been used by (Geist and Lambin, 2002). Within the 
presented research, the quantitative part of the method was expanded by not just counting 
frequencies but by applying standardized Likert scores to findings within the categories (see section 
3.3.1). This can increase comparability and statistical power (Rudel, 2008; Magliocca et al., 2018). 
 
3.2 Participatory mapping and focus group discussions 
Participatory mapping, elsewhere referred to as public participatory GIS (PPGIS) (Martin et al., 2012), 
was used to produce maps at the landscape level from the perspective of individuals on topics such 
as land use and governance. Participatory mapping was included as a module for the development of 
a field governance assessment method (see section 4.1.2). This mapping method has been widely 
used in geography to provide a voice to marginalized communities, such as indigenous peoples, and 
to document members’ perspectives on different places or spaces (Elwood and Ghose, 2011; Martin 
et al., 2012; Freund et al., 2016). Letting community members produce maps through a participatory 
approach, creates a collaborative research-participant dynamic. Mapping was carried out in 
workshops assembling representatives from the research landscapes. In order to prepare workshops, 
scoping visits were conducted that enabled to establish contact to representatives from communities 
and major stakeholder groups. Participants comprised men, women, young people and long-term 
members of the community. PPGIS has been described to include (i) appreciative interviewing prior 
to the mapping, aiming to familiarize participants, create awareness and build confidence (ii) create 
sketch maps with the main contents (iii) transferring the contents to Google maps (iv) and verifying 
the data (Martin et al., 2012). Within the study this approach was modified as instead of sketch maps 
and digitizing on Google maps, polygons were delineated on print outs of satellite images of 
approximately 80*120 cm. All mapped information was digitized by project staff after the workshops 
using QGIS 2.18 (QGIS, 2018).  
 
Focus group discussions for collecting land use and governance data were used as one module of the 
field governance assessment (see section 4.1.2). For the focus group discussions the approach of 
(Nyumba et al., 2018) was applied. Focus group discussions were conducted in the same workshops 
as the participatory mapping. This had the advantage that participants were already familiar with the 
project context and a trustful atmosphere had already been created. Facilitators were team leaders 
of the project field campaign that were familiar with the local ethnic, socio economic and biophysical 
conditions. The moderators were responsible for the discussions not only by managing existing 
relationships but also by creating a relaxed and comfortable environment for participants. The 
assistant’s role was observing non-verbal interactions and the impact of the group dynamics, and 
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documenting the general content of the discussion. The main methods of data collection during a 
focus group discussion included audio and tape recording, note-taking and participant observation. 
The discussions were split into sessions no longer than 1- 1.5 hrs as participants are likely to suffer 
from fatigue when discussions are longer. 
 
3.3 Statistical analyses 
 
3.3.1 Likert scores and gap filling 
Likert scores (Likert, 1932) were used to quantify results of the qualitative content analysis. Mean 
governance effects on deforestation and mean effect of context factors per study as well as mean 
governance scores in the field assessments were calculated as the arithmetic mean of the Likert 
scores of all original governance elements and context factors for each of the reviewed studies or for 
the assessed governance arrangements in the field. Likert scores were treated as ordinal, 
respectively metric values in principal component analysis and multiple regression analysis following 
(Manley, 2005) and (Leard, 2020). 
Gaps in the data sets of the review study occurred because not all elements and context factors, 
occurred in each of the studies. For conducting principal component analysis and multiple regression 
analysis, gaps were filled with the mean Likert scores for governance elements, drivers and 
interventions respectively following (Dray and Josse, 2014). 
 
3.3.2 Principal component analysis 
Principal component analysis (PCA) (Dunteman, 1989; Jolliffe, 2002 ) reduces the dimensionality of a 
multivariate data set by producing linear combinations (principal components) of the original 
variables (e.g. governance elements) that summarize the predominant patterns in the data (Peres-
Neto et al., 2003). Principal components are determined (‘loaded’) by several original variables and 
explain more variation than these single variables. Loadings as presented in loading matrices, are the 
simple correlations between the components and the single variables.  Principal component analyses 
were applied in order to identify independent gradients within the data sets of the review analysis, 
and within the data sets of the field governance assessments. 
Assumptions for applying PCA were checked following (Pallant, 2010; Leard, 2020). They require (i) 
metric data or at least ordinal data with e.g. a five point Likert scale (ii) linear relationships between 
all variables, (iii) sampling adequacy with 5 cases per variable (iv) suitability for data reduction, i.e. 
adequate correlations between the variables, (v) no significant outliers, i.e. max 3 time standard 
deviation. 
The first assumption for applying PCAs is that data need to be metric or at least ordinal. Five or seven 
point Likert scale data are explicitly mentioned as such (Pallant, 2010; Leard, 2020). The governance 
data thus fulfilled this requirement. The second assumption of linear relationships between the 
single variables was checked following (Leard, 2020) by randomly selecting variable combinations 
and calculating Pearson correlation coefficients. Sampling adequacy is an additional assumption with 
at least 5 cases per variable mentioned as rule of thumb. With 21 governance elements and 28 
studies as a basis for the review this rule has been violated. However, (Jolliffe 2016) report that 
datasets with fewer observed entities than variables are becoming increasingly frequent and that 
“nothing prevents the use of PCA in such contexts” However, the interpretation has to take into 
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account that the results typically have a very small number of structured components, and very many 
noise dimensions, i.e. components with very low eigenvalues. A fourth precondition for PCA refers to 
the fact that data need to be suitable for data reduction, i.e. adequate correlations between the 
variables are needed. The data in this study fulfil this condition. Correlation matrices were calculated 
and single correlation results are reported in the results section where they contributed specific 
explanations and interpretations of the data. Taking into account the final precondition, no outliers 
had to be removed after analyzing the data distribution. 
 
3.3.3 Wilcoxon tests 
In order to compare governance scores between governance arrangements in the field assessments 
non-parametric Wilcoxon tests comparing multiple pairs were applied. A non-parametric test was 
applied as in a number of cases the assumption of normality in the data was not given. The test 
explores how the distribution of a continuous Y variable like governance scores differs across 
multiple categorical groups defined as X variable (Siegel, 1988). Mean governance in the field studies 
was calculated as the mean of the single governance elements across all polygons. 
 
3.3.4 Multivariate regression analysis 
Multivariate regression analyses (Kenney and Keeping, 1962; Rencher and Christensen, 2012) with 
backward elimination were applied in order to check for potential relationships between (i) single 
context factors (predictors) and governance (target variable) in the review data and (ii) between 
governance and proximate drivers (predictors) and deforestation (target variable) in the field data 
sets from Zambia and Ecuador. Backward elimination is appropriate for selecting those factors that 
contribute most strongly to the regression model, when the number of variables is high (Hocking, 
1976), as was the case in these analyses. Within backward selection, explanatory variables were 
successively removed that were not significant and that did not decrease the r2. 
For the field data set from Ecuador, governance information was extrapolated from 25 governance 
arrangements patches with field assessments of governance to additional 59 patches based on the 
expert knowledge of the field teams and in order to increase the sample size. Extrapolation was only 
carried out in cases where patches were comparable in terms of land use and land use history and 
governance mechanisms. A statistically significant difference in annual deforestation between 
patches with originally assessed and extrapolated governance scores could not be determined, a bias 
due to the method of determining governance performance can thus be excluded. 
For the field data set from Zambia only 80 of the 91 observations were included in the regression 
analyses due to absence of governance data for the private arrangements. A non-parametric Kruskal 
Wallis test was conducted to compare the annual rate of deforestation between the excluded and 
considered observations. The test verified the absence of elimination bias from exclusion of the 
private arrangements. 
From the original 84 patches that we used as basis for regression analysis in the Ecuadorian data set, 
four outliers were removed. Outliers were patches with more than three times standard deviation of 
deforestation. 
Multicollinearity refers to the condition in which two or more predictors are highly correlated with 
one another which can make it difficult to determine the effect of each predictor on the target 
variable. Multicollinearity of predictors was checked by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) for 
each of the predictors. VIFs quantify the severity of multicollinearity by providing an index that 
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measures how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased because of 
collinearity. VIFs above 10 are commonly regarded to signify high multicollinearity, VIFs above 5 
express at least moderate multicollinearity (PennState, 2019). VIFs in our analysis were in all cases 
below 5 and we thus excluded multicollinearity which is a precondition to run a valid multiple 
regression analysis. 
Normal distribution of the residuals (homoscedasticity) was analyzed by plotting and comparing the 
distribution of the residuals against a standardized normal distribution. Plotting residuals against 
predicted values helped identifying possible relationships between these. However, in none of the 
cases there were statistical significant linear relationships between the residuals and the predicted 
values. We also assured for homoscedasticity applying the Breusch-Pagan test. 
In the field studies of Ecuador and Zambia variables were measured at different scales. Z score 
standardization was thus carried out to normalize data. The original variables were rescaled to have a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one by subtracting the mean of the original variable from the 
raw value and then dividing it by the standard deviation (Dytham, 2011). 
In the Zambian data set (Nansikombi et al., submitted), the dependent variable, average annual rate 
of deforestation, was found positively skewed via a Shapiro-Wilk test with a p-value <.0001 and was 
therefore transformed with a square root function to ensure normal distribution (Freeman and 
Tukey, 1950; Thacker and Bromiley, 2001). All statistical evaluations were carried out using the 
statistical software package of JMP 12 (SAS, 2015). 
  
 





4.1 Development and application of methods for governance assessments 
 
4.1.1 Quantitative content analysis with standardized scores (Fischer et al., 2020) 
Deforestation is a global phenomenon, but published results are mostly case dependent. Expanding 
observations and inferences from individual case studies requires quantitative methodologies for 
generalizing locally specified knowledge. A methodology was therefore developed that extends 
qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2014) by combining it with standardized quantitative scores 
within the single categories in order to increase comparability and to open possibilities for statistical 
evaluations (Magliocca et al., 2018). In summary, the method includes 
1. literature review and identification of articles focusing on governance effects on 
deforestation 
2. content analysis with iterative development and application of categories for text analysis  
3. quantitative scoring of the content within the categories. 
The method is named quantitative content analysis with standardized scores. 
 
4.1.1.1 Literature review 
Peer reviewed English articles containing empirical results from forest governance studies were 
selected through a literature search in Scopus in March 2017. The search focused on studies 
published after 2000. Given the wide range of applied forest governance definitions the study was 
not focused on search terms that are elements of different definitions but rather on the overarching 
term ‘governance’ itself which is consensus among all definitions. The search algorithm included 
‘governance’ in combination with (i) ‘degradation’ and ‘forest’, (ii) ‘deforestation’ or (iii) 
‘reforestation’ in title, abstract and keywords. This resulted in 810 publications including duplicates 
(Tab. 1). Within each of the years and search term combinations, those publications were selected 
that had more citations than the average of the selected publications of the same year and search 
term combination in order to keep the large number of publications manageable. This resulted in a 




N all publications 
N publications with 
above average citations 
governance AND degradation AND forest 266 94 
governance AND reforestation 67 28 
governance AND deforestation  477 164 
subtotal 810 286 
after removing duplicates  198 
studies with empirical relations on governance 
and deforestation including global reviews 
 
32 
Total after removing global reviews  28 
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From these, only articles were selected for which the abstracts indicated research on effects of one 
or more governance components on deforestation, reforestation or degradation. Only studies that 
aimed to establish empirical links between these two were considered, irrespective whether they 
finally found or did not find such links. Empirical links either could be quantitative statistical or 
qualitatively descriptive based on defined scientific methods. Only research from countries with 
notable territories in the tropical climatic zone were selected. Four studies that were based on global 
reviews were excluded in order to focus the scope. The final selection yielded 28 articles (Tab. 1). 
 
4.1.1.2 Content analysis 
Content analysis was used as an approach for the systematic analysis of the published articles. The 
framework for governance indicators presented by the World Resource Institute (WRI) (Davis et al., 
2013b) was used to classify the governance contents. This framework provides a comprehensive set 
of thematic areas and elements (subthemes) but leaves leeway to adjust the system to the 
respective context. The specific WRI governance elements (Davis et al., 2013b) tackled in each of the 
studies were identified. 
Governance elements were assigned to either the agency or structure approach based on own 
interpretation in order to provide a basis for evaluating functional relationships between elements at 
a later stage (Tab. 2). Forest ownership, tenure dispute resolution, private sector, civil society, public 
participation in decision making and all elements related to revenues were interpreted as being 
decisive in the context of an agency related approach because these elements reflect individual 
decisions, personal motivations - including financial interests - and the possibilities of single actors to 
implement own interests. The WRI elements of land use planning, land use plan implementation, 
sectoral land use, forest strategies and plans, legal/policy framework, law enforcement and 
legislature were interpreted as being related to a structural policy approach, because they emphasize 
creation, existence and implementations of structures, rules and frames. A number of elements 
either could not be assigned exclusively to one of the approaches or contained aspects of both. 
 
1 Forest tenure 2 Land use 3 Forest management 
Forest ownership and use rights Land use planning Forest legal and policy framework 
Tenure dispute resolution Land use plan implementation Forest strategies and plans 
State forest ownership Sectoral land use Forest law enforcement 
Concession allocation Forest classification Forest management practices 
  Forest monitoring 
   
4 Forest revenues 5 Institutions 6 Cross cutting issues 
Forest charge administration Legislature Public participation in decision-making 
Forest revenue distribution Judiciary Public access to information 
Benefit sharing Executive agencies Financial transparency and accountability 
Budgeting Private sector Anticorruption measures 
 Civil society   
Table 2: Six thematic areas and 26 elements for governance assessments based on (Davis et al., 2013b). Black: 
elements that were interpreted as agency related; grey: elements interpreted as structure related. A number of 
elements could not be assigned to either of these two mechanisms. 
 
Qualitative content analysis required a thorough reading of the articles and assigning of governance 
information to 26 elements as provided by the framework of the World Resource Institute. The 26 
elements were thus subcomponents for classification within the content analysis (Mayring, 2000, 
2014). On average, only 4.9 elements out of possible 26 possible elements were identified per study. 
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Therefore, the 26 original elements were grouped to 11 aggregated elements by pooling less 
frequently mentioned elements within thematic areas. 
Many studies in addition contained information about the wider socio-economic and political context 
of deforestation. In a second step, all additional factors related to deforestation were therefore 
classified as context factors that included drivers and interventions. Content analysis was as well 
used to analyze such context factors. The study relied on a classification of deforestation drivers by 
(Hosonuma et al., 2012) and on categories for interventions used by (Agrawal et al., 2014). Factors 
that directly or indirectly increase deforestation were classified as deforestation drivers. Actions 
explicitly undertaken to counter land use changes were classified as interventions. The original 
classification was adapted using qualitative content analysis as an iterative method. This implies that 
during reading, categories for all context factors were partly newly created, rearranged or 
successively adapted based on the contents of the material (Mayring, 2000, 2014). A final reading 
was then conducted based on the final categories for governance elements and context factors. The 
texts were coded using MAXQDA (version 11). Each result or conclusion related to one of the 
categories was marked and coded; the coding system in MAXQDA consisted of the classification 
described above. 
Within the 28 studies, 596 key sentences or text pieces were coded: 338 codings were related to 
governance elements, 154 to drivers and 104 to interventions (column a in Tab. 3). Text related to 
forest law enforcement was most frequently encoded (58 codings in 20 documents). The most 
frequently identified context factors were population growth or density and economic development 
(30 codings in 9 documents). The fact that the number of codings for governance elements was 
higher as compared to codings for context factors was to be expected as governance was the search 
criterion for the studies. 
The number of original governance WRI elements that were coded in all documents was highly 
variable (column b in Tab. 3). Out of the 26 elements, 12 were only coded in 2 or less studies. None 
of the studies considered governance issues in the context of forest concessions, legislative 
institutions, budgeting or forest classification. Also, the number of coded text parts between the WRI 
thematic governance areas was unequal. Forest management elements were identified in 54 cases, 
which is mainly due to the importance of policy framework, monitoring and law enforcement. 
Elements related to the thematic area of forest revenues only occurred in 7 cases. The sum of all 
coded text pieces for agency related elements (48) and the number of all coded text pieces for 
structure related elements (47) was almost identical. 
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Table 3: Assessed governance elements and context factors, number of MAXQDA codings and number of 
documents scored. Aggregations of elements due to low abundances. Black: agency related governance 
elements, grey: structure related governance elements. Governance elements as specified by (Davis et al., 
2013b). Categories for drivers and interventions adapted from (Hosonuma et al., 2012) and (Agrawal et al., 
2014). 
 
4.1.1.3 Quantitative scoring 
Based on all coded text parts in a specific document, Likert scores (Likert, 1932) were applied to 
quantify effects of governance elements and context factors (Tab. 4). Identifying governance 
components and assigning scales meant interpreting the meaning of the texts. In case that negative 
governance was reported in the studies, the deforestation effect was inverted to make it comparable 
to studies reporting on positive governance: when e.g. negative governance within executive 
agencies was linked to higher deforestation (negative effect of negative governance) the effect of 
improved governance within executive agencies was assumed to be positive and high scores were 
given (equal to positive effects of positive governance). The scores for individual governance 
elements and context factors per study are presented in Table 5. These scores were input for further 











Element name Abbreviation Aggregated elements
1 FOREST TENURE Forest ownership and use rights Ownership Tenure/Ownership 45 13 13
Tenure dispute resolution Dispute 4 4
State forest ownership State forest 0 0
Concession allocation Concession Concession allocation 0 0 0
2 LAND USE Land use planning LUplanning 6 6
Land use plan implementation LUimplement 3 4
Sectoral land use SectoralLU 2 2
Forest classification Classification Forest classification 0 0 0
3 FOREST MANAGEM. Forest legal and policy framework Framework Legal/Policy framework 35 11 11
Forest strategies and plans Strategies 4 4
Forest monitoring Monitoring 23 9
Forest management practices Management 10 3
Forest law enforcement Enforcement Law enforcement 58 20 20
4 FOREST REVENUES Forest charge administration Charges 2 1
Forest revenue distribution Revenues 1 1
Benefit sharing Benefit 4 3
Budgeting Budgeting Budgeting 0 0 0
5 INSTITUTIONS Legislature Legislature Legislature 0 0 0
Judiciary Judiciary 2 1
Executive agencies Executive 37 16
Private sector Private 3 1
Civil society Civil 32 12
6 CROSS-CUT. ISSUES Public particip. decision-making Participation Participation 55 18 18
Public access to information Information 2 1
Financial transpar. and accountab. Transparency 3 2
Anticorruption measures Anticorruption 7 4
DRIVERS Corruption, Illegal logging 17 8
Population growth/density 30 9
Roads length/density 19 10
Land speculation, Opportunuity costs 18 6
Economic development, Forest income 30 9
Cash crops 15 7
Agricultural intensification/expansion 16 9
Timber, Firewood use 9 6
INTERVENTIONS Subsidies, Credits, Donor aid 24 8
PES, Certification 8 4
Protected areas 15 7
Community forestry/Decentralization 20 14
Tourism 6 2
(improved) Technology 11 4











Land use plan. 8
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Governance element or context factor is …. Likert 
score 
…strongly linked to increased deforestation (degradation) or decreased reforestation; strong essential 
factor, and/or mentioned in abstract or conclusion as a main factor 
1 
…linked to increased deforestation (degradation) or decreased reforestation; clear and substantial effect 2 
… slightly linked to increased deforestation (degradation) or decreased reforestation; small documented 
effect 
3 
…not linked to deforestation, no effect, or both: positive and negative effects 4 
…slightly linked to reduced deforestation (degradation) or increased reforestation; small documented 
effect  
5 
…linked to reduced deforestation (degradation) or increased reforestation; clear and substantial effects  6 
…strongly linked to reduced deforestation (degradation) or increased reforestation; strong essential 
factor, and/or mentioned in abstract or conclusion as a main factor 
7 
Table 4: Likert scale for de-/reforestation effect of governance elements and context factors. 
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Table 5: Publications selected for the content analysis with scores for governance elements and context factors; 
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4.1.2 Harmonized landscape level governance assessments (Nansikombi  et al., 2020; Fischer et al., 
submitted) 
Numerous forest governance field studies have been conducted and published. Given the wide range 
of governance definitions (see section 2.1.3) and research aims there is a corresponding range of 
field assessment methods. A landscape level approach for assessing governance at the field level that 
is applicable across different context situations and that provides quantitative data for integrated 
assessments with other components of socio ecological systems like livelihoods, inventory data and 
satellite information has been missing. Such an approach is presented in this section, because a 
landscape has been identified as the appropriate scale to examine the various entities that interact 
with effects on deforestation(Sayer et al., 2013) (see section 2.3). Taking into account specific locally 
different contexts and peculiarities, the method consists of a frame that needs to be adapted to 
specific cases on one hand, but allows for comparing results across landscapes and/or countries. It 
builds on the existing governance definition of (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014) and the assessment 
framework of the World Resource Institute (Davis et al., 2013b). The method combines qualitative as 
well as quantitative elements, and requires the participation of the people in the landscapes in 
participatory mapping exercises and focus group discussions. The main components comprise: 
1. Definition of governance arrangements 
2. Selection and local adaptation of governance elements 
3. Focus group discussions for governance quality scoring by Likert scores 
The governance assessment method has been tested and applied between 2016 and 2018 in the 
context of the LaForeT project (www.la-foret.org). The project is based on 36 research landscapes in 
Ecuador, Zambia and the Philippines. Together, the landscapes cover approximately 500,000 
hectares of land. 
 
4.1.2.1 Governance arrangements 
Within a landscape, varying governance mechanisms can be in place. Therefore, governance 
arrangements need to be determined and assigned as homogenous governance units for the 
assessment of governance quality on finer scales within landscapes. The term “governance 
arrangement” is used widely but inhomogenously in current literature. It can e.g. mean the 
constellation of international forest policies and mechanisms (Rayner et al., 2010) or resources and 
mechanisms needed to tackle the challenges of sustainable forest management in general (Weiland 
and Dedeurwaerdere, 2010). In most cases, it is used without specific definition. In this study, 
governance arrangements are defined as spatial units with homogeneous governance concerning 
ownership and management objectives including conservation status.  Governance arrangements are 
determined in a way that variation of governance structures within arrangements is minimized 
whereas variation between governance arrangements in a landscape is maximized. Governance 
arrangements can be classified and adapted during scoping visits. Locally occurring arrangements can 
be assigned to general categories by applying a coding system (Tab. 6) which enables cross country 
analysis based on comparable categories. The system is organized hierarchically in order to enable 
grouping and aggregation. The first hierarchy level refers to the ownership as defined by (FAO, 2015), 
whereas ‘communal’ refers to ‘ownership by local, tribal or indigenous communities’, ‘private’ refers 
to ‘private ownership by individuals’ and ‘state’ refers to ‘public ownership by the state’. The second 
hierarchy level refers to land titles, whereas land tiles mean that ownership is formally recognized by 
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a cadastral system. The third hierarch level refers to use restrictions, whereas ‘restricted land’ means 
‘forest area within protected areas’ according to (FAO, 2015). ‘Formal’ restriction identifies a 
protection status under state legislation. ‘Customary’ restriction means protection under traditional 
and indigenous governance systems. 
 






1. communal    
1.1 communal, no title    
1.1.1 individually 
managed land 
communal (2) customary individual 
(24) 
 
1.1.2 jointly managed 
land 





 culturally restricted (8)  
1.1.4 formally restricted 
land 
   
1.2 communal with title   PACBRMA * 
CADT * 
CBFM *    (9) 
1.2.1 individually 
managed land 
communal (29) customary individual 
(2) 
 
1.2.2 jointly managed 
land 






1.2.4 formally restricted 
land 
Socio Bosque (6)   
2. private  private (8) ISF*, IPR * (3) 
2.1 private, no title    
2.1.1 managed 
unrestricted land 
individual (7)   
2.1.2 restricted land    
2.2 private with title    
2.2.1 managed 
unrestricted land 
individual (26)   
2.2.2 restricted land    
3. state    
3.0.1 restricted PANE* (3) state forests with 
restrictions (6) 
state forest with 
logging ban (10) 
3.0.2 unrestricted    
4. overlapping claims, 
unclarified tenure 
 overlapping claims 
(21) 
 
Table 6: Governance arrangements with general code system and specific arrangements as applied in 
landscapes of Ecuador (ECU), Zambia (ZMB) and the Philippines (PHI) within the LaForeT project. In the country 
columns names of the locally determined arrangements are indicated. Single subcategories were grouped in a 
number of cases in order to enable meaningful statistical evaluations. (in brackets: number of cases evaluated 
within the LaForeT project). 
* CADT - Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title 
CBFM - Community Based Forest Management Agreement 
IPR - Individual Property Rights 
ISF - Integrated Social Forestry  
PACBRMA - Protected Area Community Based Resource Management Agreement 
PANE - Heritage of Natural Areas (Patrimonio de Áreas Naturales del Estado) 
 
Country specific governance arrangements were designated and mapped (Tab. 6). They take into 
account and are based on the specific forest ownership and tenure situation of the respective 
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countries as described in (Fischer et al., submitted) as well as in Annex 1. Seven different governance 
arrangement types were designated in Ecuador during scoping visits in the LaForeT project area and 
mapped during the participatory exercises. For further statistical evaluations, the seven 
arrangements in the project landscapes of Ecuador were grouped into four categories, namely 
communal, individual, indigenous reserves together with Socio Bosque and state protected areas 
(PANE). In Zambia, seven types of governance arrangements were designated. For further statistical 
evaluations these seven arrangements in the project landscapes of Zambia were grouped into six 
categories, namely customary communal, customary individual, culturally restricted, state restricted, 
overlapping claims and private land. For private land, however, governance quality could not be 
assessed, even though they were delineated and mapped. In the Philippines, 5 types of governance 
arrangements were designated. For further statistical evaluations these five arrangements in the 
project landscapes of the Philippines were grouped into three categories, namely CBFM (Community 
Based Forest Management Agreement), other systems with assigned tenure (including PACBRMA, 
CADT, ISF, IPR), and state forests. In the Philippines, the grouping into categories did not strictly 
follow the hierarchy of the general governance arrangement systems (see Tab. 6), as within the 
‘other systems’ communal and individual arrangements are grouped. This is due to the specific 
research focus on CBFM and the low number of cases that did not allow to assign more single 
categories. The governance arrangements in the three countries of Ecuador, Zambia and the 
Philippines are examples that show that they are in all cases country specific and their designation 
requires local governance understanding. Yet, based on the code table (see Tab. 6) they can, if 
necessary, be aggregated and compared.  
 
4.1.2.2 Selection, local adaptation and assessment of governance elements 
Within specified governance arrangements the quality of de facto governance on the ground was 
assessed by adapting the Governance of Forests Initiatives Framework of the World Resource 
Institute (WRI) to the specific context. The framework offers a comprehensive diagnostic tool that 
covers six thematic areas, including (i) forest tenure, (ii) land use planning, (iii) forest management, 
(iv) forest revenues, (v) institutions and (vi) crosscutting issues (Davis et al., 2013a). The framework 
assesses these thematic areas through a set of governance elements, each specified by elements of 
quality (indicators) that are rated on a scale of pre-coded statements, which are understood to range 
from poor performance to good practice. The assessment tool postulates that elements should be 
contextualized in order to better fit local needs and it is not foreseen that all elements are assessed, 
which would be beyond the scope of research relying on input from local communities. Therefore, 
the selection of elements to be assessed is a crucial step in the design of governance studies. 
Selected elements need to capture factors that most strongly determine and differentiate local 
governance in a sense that they are related to deforestation, reforestation or sustainable forest 
management. The selection of governance elements within the study took into account a number of 
criteria and aimed to  
(i) cover several thematic areas of the WRI framework (Davis et al., 2013b) 
(ii) comprise agency and structure related elements (see Tab. 2) (Fischer et al., 2020) 
(iii) include elements that are among the most frequently assessed elements as these obviously 
are perceived to be the most relevant ones (Fischer et al., 2020) 
(iv) exclude elements aiming at national de jure governance (e.g. legislative institutions, policy 
framework) 
(v) exclude elements not relevant and applicable in the specific context (e.g. performance of civil 
society organizations if no NGOs were present in the area) 
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(vi) be assessable with the given project resources 
The selection was carried out after scoping trips and relied on secondary information about the study 
area. 
 
Within LaForeT, 8 elements were assessed in Ecuador for 25 specific governance arrangement 
patches. 19 elements were assessed and evaluated for 80 patches in Zambia and in the Philippines 16 
elements were assessed for 22 patches (Tab. 7). The full list of elements with indicators is presented 




Governance element ECU ZMB PHI 
Forest tenure Forest tenure  X X X 









Protection of natural forest (logging moratorium).   
  
X  
Formal law enforcement X X X  





Implementation of National Greening Programme (NGP) 
  
X  
Reforestation (not for NGP reforestation areas) 
 
X X  
Protection and conservation X X X  
Timber harvesting licenses and permits  X X X  
Non-timber forest product harvesting licenses and permits.  
 
X X  





Programmes for supporting of forest-based sustainable livelihoods.  
 
X X  














 Local government institutions. X X X  
Non-governmental institutions. X X X  
Customary institutions. X X X 
Cross cutting 
issues 
Public participation in policy making X X X 
Number of elements evaluated 8 19 16 
Table 7: Governance elements evaluated in Ecuador (ECU), Zambia (ZMB) and the Philippines (PHI) within the 
LaForeT Project. 
 
4.1.2.3 Governance quality assessments with Likert scores in focus group discussions 
Within the presented methodology, governance elements were assessed within focus group 
discussions through specific indicators. Each indicator was scored on a five point Likert score (Likert, 
1932) on a scale from 0 (not existing), 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). Scores of the indicators were 
aggregated by averaging them to a mean per governance element. In many cases, several 
governance arrangements could be discussed and scored by the same focus group, if e.g. within a 
given landscape the same community members were responsible for communal lands, restricted 
lands and individually managed patches of land. Prior to scoring the quality, mapping was carried out 
and created awareness for the different governance arrangements. 
 
4.1.2.4 Results of governance measurements in Ecuador, Zambia and the Philippines 
The country specific analysis of governance effects on deforestation as a basis for policy 
recommendations in the countries needs a deeper understanding and interpretation of governance 
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quality in the specific landscapes and governance arrangements. Such an analysis is beyond the 
scope of this study that aims to determine functional relationships between governance elements in 
general. It is presented in (Fischer et al., submitted) and (Nansikombi et al., submitted). In this 
section, the quantitative results of governance assessments are thus summarized in order to present 
the data that are then further analyzed by quantitative statistics (see section 4.2).  
 
In the assessed landscapes of Ecuador (Tab. 8), Socio Bosque and indigenous reserves showed 
highest mean governance scores. Scores for Socio Bosque and indigenous reserves were almost 
consistently the highest for all single governance elements as compared to other arrangements. 
Specifically for tenure, the mean almost reached the maximum. The difference in mean governance 
scores between communal and individual properties was not significant. PANE areas could not be 
compared statistically, as only two of them occurred in the analyzed landscapes. 
 









Communal Individual State 
protected 
(PANE) 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Forest tenure Tenure 7 4.5A 10 3.3B 6 3.0B 2 3.2- 
Forest 
management 
Forest management practices* 7 3.8A 10 3.5A 6 3.4A 2 2.7- 
Law enforcement 7 3.9A 10 3.6A  6 3.0A 2 3.1- 
Institutions Institutions 7 2.1A 10 2.2A 6 1.8A 2 1.3- 
Cross cutting Participation 7 3.6A 10 1.8B 6 1.9B 2 1.7- 
Mean governance 7 3.6A 10 2.8AB 6 2.7B 2 2.4- 
Table 8: Mean governance scores by thematic area, elements and governance arrangement for LaForeT 
landscapes in Ecuador. Arrangements that do not share similar capital letters are significantly different (p<0.05) 
as result of the Wilcoxon Test (Wlcx); N: number of patches; Mean: mean governance. For PANE areas, only the 
mean is reported; they are excluded from the test due to the low sample size of 2. 
*composite governance element composed of different elements per governance arrangement based on timber 
licenses, protection/conservation and payments for ecosystem services. 
 
In Zambia (Nansikombi et al., 2020), more elements were assessed than in Ecuador, as a number of 
elements were included that were applicable only on some governance arrangement patches. The 
mean scores of the nine governance elements applicable for all sites was very low, with values 
between 1.23 and 1.51 per governance arrangement. The mean scores did not differ significantly 
between governance arrangements (Tab. 9). When site-specific elements were added, the final mean 
governance score remained low, with values between 1.47 and 1.98 and the final mean governance 
scores did as well not differ significantly between governance arrangements. As regards single 
elements, only the element of tenure rights recognition scored consistently above a mean Likert 
score of 3 in all arrangements. This element scored significantly higher in the customary than in state 
arrangements. Scores for conservation and use restrictions were significantly high on culturally 
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  N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Forest tenure Tenure  6 3.28B 8 4.08A 22 3.85AB 24 4.08A 20 3.91AB 
Land use plan Land use planning 6 0.58A 8 0.00B 22 0.23B 24 0.21B 20 0.50AB 
Forest 
management 
Land use plans and strategies  3 1.79 - NA - NA - NA - NA 
Conservation and use 
restrictions* 
6 1.63B 8 4.23A 22 1.28 B 24 1.43B 20 1.43B 
Non-timber forest products 
license  
1 2.17A - NA 1 2.17A 1 2.17A 1 2.17A 
Reforestation  2 2.20A - NA - NA 2 2.90A - NA 
Forest based livelihood programs 1 3.00A - NA 3 2.28A 6 3.14A 5 2.48A  
Payment of ecosystem service 
program 
- NA - NA - NA - NA - NA 
 
Formal law enforcement 6 2.03A 8 0.50BC 22 1.0ABC 24 0.49C 20 0.79B  
Customary law enforcement 6 0.58A 8 1.98A 22 1.59A 24 1.41A 20 1.49A 
Revenues Benefit sharing mechanisms - NA - NA - NA - NA - NA  
Forest revenue  3 2.28A - NA 9 1.67A 10 2.08A 8 1.84A 
Institutions Central government  6 1.92A 8 1.34A 22 1.65A 24 1.66A 20 1.57A  
Local government  6 0.02AB 8 0.06AB 22 0.07B 24 0.07B 20 0.16A  
Customary institutions 6 1.54A 8 1.39A 22 2.20A 24 1.76A 20 1.69A  
Non-government organizations  2 3.30A - NA 3 3.53A 3 3.53A 4 4.00A 
Crosscutting  Public policy participation 6 0.00A 8 0.00A 22 0.00A 24 0.00A 20 0.00A 
Mean Governance score (9 elements applicable in 
all sites)  
6 1.29A 8 1.51A 22 1.32A 24 1.23A 20 1.28A 
Mean Governance score (aggregated for all 19 
elements) 
6 1.98A 8 1.53A 22 1.47A 24 1.68A 20 1.68A 
Table 9: Mean governance scores by thematic area, elements and governance arrangement for LaForeT 
landscapes in Zambia. Arrangements not connected by the same letter are significantly different at p<0.05 with 
non-parametric Wilcoxon test. N = 80. Elements highlighted in orange are applicable in all sites.  
*composite element composed of different element per governance arrangement based on timber licenses, 
charcoal licenses and protection/conservation. Adapted from: (Nansikombi et al., 2020) 
 
In the Philippines, 9 governance elements were assessed that were applicable in each of the patches 
(Tab. 10). In addition, 6 elements were assessed that were not always applicable. State forest 
governance was compared to CBFM and other tenure types (CADT, PACBRMA and ISF/IPR). The 
scores of the other tenure types were summarized due to their low sample size in order to enable 
meaningful statistics. The results did not show a significant difference in the overall governance 
mean of CBFMA and other tenures, irrespective whether all elements are evaluated or only those 
applicable in all cases. However, a significant difference was observed between CBFM and other 
tenures as compared to state forests. Communities with formalized tenure systems had higher 
governance scores as compared to land in state forests. 
  
 
Richard FISCHER - Dissertation 33 
 
 
  Governance arrangements 
Thematic area  Element State 
(logging 
ban) 
CBFM PACBRMA,  
CADT, ISF, IPR 
 
 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Forest tenure Forest tenure recognition and protection 10 2.9A 6 2.7A 6 3.9A 
 Gender equity in tenure  10 4.6A 6 4.8A 6 5.0A 
 Tenure mean 10 3.8B 6 4.3AB 6 4.5A 
Land use planning Land use decision making 10 0.8B 6 3.6A 6 2.6A 
Forest Management Implementation of strategies and plans 10 0.4B 6 2.8A 6 1.4A 
 Protection of natural forests by logging moratorium 10 3.1A 6 3.4A 6 3.5A 
 Law enforcement 10 2.6A 6 2A 6 2.5A 
 Reforestation (excluding NGP) 2 3.5A 6 3.9A 5 4.6A 
 National Greening Programme (NGP) 6 2.9A 6 3.3A 3 4.2A 
 Protection and conservation 8 2.9A 5 3.2A 5 3.7A 
 Timber harvesting licenses and permits 2 4.5A 4 3.4A 2 4.1A 
 Non wood forest products licenses  0  3 2.75A 0  
 Programmes for supporting forest based livelihoods 2 3.4A 5 3.6A 2 3.5A 
 Forest Management Mean (3 elements applicable in 
all sites) 
10 2A 6 2.8A 6 2.5A 
 Forest Management Mean_all (all elements) 10 2.4B 6 3.1AB 6 3.1A 
Institutions Non governmental institutions 3 4.3A 6 4.3A 6 3.8A 
 Local Institutions 10 2.7A 6 3.3A 6 3.3A 
 Central government institutions 10 2.6B 6 4.2A 6 3.0B 
 Institutions Mean (2 elements applicable in all sites) 10 2.7B 6 3.8A 6 3.2AB 
 Institutions Mean_all (all elements) 10 2.8B 6 3.9A 6 3.4B 
Cross cutting issues Participation in policy making 10 1B 6 3.1A 6 1.7AB 
Overall Mean (only 10 elements applicable in all sites) 10 2.4B 6 3.5A 6 3.1A 
Overall Mean_all (all elements) 10 2.5B 6 3.5A 6 3.3A 
Table 10: Mean governance scores by thematic area, elements and governance arrangement for LaForeT 
landscapes in the Philippines. Arrangements not connected by the same letter are significantly different at 
p<0.05 with non-parametric Wilcoxon test. N = 22. Elements highlighted in orange are applicable in all sites. 
 
4.2 Functional relationships between governance elements 
4.2.1 Underlying governance factors explained by agency and structure elements 
Irrespective of specific elements, the main theoretical basis of forest governance has been claimed to 
consist of two mainstream models: rational choice and neo-institutionalism, otherwise described as 
agency - structure concept, which thus provides a theoretical basis to better understand and describe 
governance approaches (Arts et al., 2014) (see section 2.1.2). The data sets of this study as derived in 
a global review through quantitative content analysis (see section 4.1.1) as well as from landscape 
level field assessments (see section 4.1.2) were thus analyzed under this agency - structure 
perspective in order to substantiate and evaluate the general assumption. 
 
4.2.1.1 Agency and structure mechanisms in global review data (Fischer et al., 2020) 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was applied in order to identify independent gradients within the 
governance elements tackled in the studies of the review (see section 3.3.2) (Peres-Neto et al., 
2003). The results reveal nine components with eigenvalues above 1.0. The first four components 
explained nearly half of the total variance (Tab. 11). On the first component, nearly all elements for 
both, agency and structure elements, showed positive loadings. On the second component, structure 
elements on the negative end were separated from agency elements grouped towards the positive 
end. Also on the first and third component a certain, yet less distinct separation of agency and 
structure elements could be observed. On the first three components, that together describe 38% of 
the variance in governance elements, agency related elements thus could be distinguished from 
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structure elements. On the fourth and the other remaining components (not depicted) there was no 
distinct pattern of agency and structure related elements. The biplot of the first and the second 
component summarizes these findings and depicts that structure elements were rather grouped and 
separated from agency elements mainly along component 2 (Fig. 1). 
The results show that within the 28 studies evaluated, part of the variation in governance can be 
explained by a pattern of structural versus agency elements. A structural functioning of forest 
governance becomes visible, which can be separated from an agency related mechanism, even 
though that agency elements were not grouped so distinctively. 
 
 
Table 11: Loading matrix for the first four principal components of a PCA for governance elements with 
percentage of explained variance and eigenvalues (in italic). Elements sorted according to the loadings on the 
respective component; black: agency elements; grey: structure elements. On the first component, nearly all 
elements load positively. Especially on the second component structure and agency elements are separated 
with rather antagonistic effects. For abbreviations see Tab. 3. 
  
Component1 Component2 Component3 Component4
16.46% 12.18% 9.39% 8.92
3.46 2.56 1.97 1.87
LUimplement 0.82 Revenues 0.76 Monitoring 0.67 Dispute 0.57
Transparency 0.64 Benefi t 0.63 Charges 0.56 Private 0.52
Framework 0.60 Transparency 0.58 Civi l 0.49 Executive 0.50
LUplanning 0.59 Dispute 0.53 Enforcement 0.43 Information 0.43
Participation 0.58 Management 0.36 Management 0.37 Management 0.42
Benefi t 0.58 Private 0.28 Strategies 0.34 Strategies 0.40
Enforcement 0.53 Monitoring 0.17 Ownership 0.27 Sectora lLU 0.26
Anticorruption 0.42 Charges 0.10 Sectora lLU 0.22 Revenues 0.19
Revenues 0.34 Judiciary 0.06 Participation 0.17 Ownership 0.11
Ownership 0.30 Civi l -0.01 Dispute 0.16 Enforcement 0.09
Sectora lLU 0.29 Participation -0.10 LUplanning 0.11 LUplanning 0.07
Dispute 0.28 Executive -0.11 Revenues 0.07 Anticorruption 0.04
Executive 0.20 Anticorruption -0.13 LUimplement 0.06 Framework 0.02
Strategies 0.13 Ownership -0.18 Information 0.02 Judiciary -0.05
Private 0.11 Information -0.24 Judiciary -0.01 Transparency -0.15
Judiciary 0.01 Strategies -0.25 Private -0.03 Participation -0.17
Monitoring -0.01 Enforcement -0.28 Anticorruption -0.05 LUimplement -0.17
Charges -0.01 Framework -0.28 Benefi t -0.14 Charges -0.20
Information -0.08 LUimplement -0.31 Transparency -0.15 Monitoring -0.22
Civi l -0.15 LUplanning -0.33 Executive -0.36 Civi l -0.24
Management -0.23 Sectora lLU -0.40 Framework -0.42 Benefi t -0.38
 




Figure 1: Principal component analysis for governance elements, biplot for 1st and 2nd component. Black: agency 
elements; grey: structure elements (in brackets: explained variance). For abbreviations see Tab. 3. 
 
4.2.1.2 Agency and structure mechanisms on the landscape level 
In the review data, agency and structure could be identified as rather independent underlying 
mechanisms. Therefore, governance elements from landscape assessments were analyzed in order 
to substantiate if such a mechanism is effective at the landscape level as well. For this, the field data 
for governance elements from  Ecuador, Zambia and the Philippines (see section 4.1.2) were also 
classified as either agency related, or structure related or as indifferent (see Tab. 2) following (Fischer 
et al., 2020). This enabled to analyze them by PCAs in the same way as the review data. 
In contrast to the above presented findings, in the three country data sets there was no clear pattern 
with agency or structure related elements being grouped or differentiated against the others. On 
none of the principal components with eigenvalues above 1 there was a clear separation or sorting of 
agency and structure related governance elements (Figs. 2-9). In the data set from Ecuador (Fischer 
et al., submitted) there was one component with an eigenvalue above one which was most strongly 
determined by the management and conservation element. Participation had the lowest loading on 
this component (Tab. 12). Two elements that were not assigned to either structure or agency were 
loading highest and the agency related elements had the lowest loadings. Also on the second 
component there was no distinct pattern. Accordingly, the biplot did not show a clear separation 
(Fig. 3). In the landscape level data set from Zambia there were three components with eigenvalues 
above 1 (Fig. 4). On none of them there was a distinct differentiation between agency and structure 
related elements (Tab. 13). Tenure was the only agency related element evaluated in the PCA, as 
public participation was constantly scored with zero in the focus group discussions and did thus not 
appear in the PCA. Also for the Philippine data set there were three components with eigenvalues 
above one (Fig. 6). Land use planning had highest and law enforcement had lowest loadings on the 
first component (Tab. 14). Agency related elements had an intermediate position. Also on the second 
and third components there was no differentiation between agency and structure related loadings. 
In the merged data set that contained elements assessed in all three countries, law enforcement was 
the only structure related element. It loaded highest on the first component, whereas the agency 
related elements had lower loadings (Tab. 15). This shows a certain differentiation. On the second 
component and thus on the biplot there was no clear pattern that separated the two mechanisms 
(Fig. 9). 
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In summary, an agency and structure mechanism could not be substantiated in the data from 
landscapes in single countries. Instead, specific landscape level dynamics might need to be 
considered. At a higher scale, i.e. in the merged data set, there were indications for a certain 





Figure 2: Eigenvalues and cumulated 
variance explained for five principal 
components of a PCA for field data from 
Ecuador. Only components with 
eigenvalues above 1.0 explain more 
variation than single variables and are 
basis for further interpretation. 
Table 12: Loading matrix for first principal component (PC) 
calculated for field data from Ecuador. Loadings above 0.4 in 
brown. Elements are sorted according to loadings on PC1. 
Black: elements that are interpreted as agency related; grey: 
elements interpreted as structure related; white: elements 
assigned to neither of the two mechanisms. For abbreviations 





Figure 3: Biplot of first and second principal 
component calculated for field data from Ecuador. 
Black: elements that are interpreted as agency related; 
grey: elements interpreted as structure related; white: 
elements assigned to neither of the two mechanisms. 
For abbreviations see Tab. 3, partly aggregated 





Managem_Cons 0.89 -0.18 -0.17
Institutions 0.80 -0.23 -0.46
Enforcement 0.78 -0.03 0.13
Tenure 0.67 -0.11 0.68



























Figure 4: Eigenvalues and cumulated 
variance explained for eight principal 
components of a PCA for field data from 
Zambia. Only components with 
eigenvalues above 1.0 explain more 
variation than single variables and are 
basis for further interpretation. 
Table 13: Loading matrix for three first principal components (PC) 
calculated for field data from Zambia. Loadings above 0.4 in 
brown and below -0.4 in blue. Elements are sorted according to 
loadings on PC1. Black: elements that are interpreted as agency 
related; grey: elements interpreted as structure related; white: 
elements assigned to neither of the two mechanisms. For 
abbreviations see Tab. 3, “Managem_Cons” is an aggregated 




Figure 5: Biplot of first and second principal 
component calculated for field data from Zambia. 
Black: elements that are interpreted as agency 
related; grey: elements interpreted as structure 
related; white: elements assigned to neither of the 
two mechanisms. For abbreviations see Tab. 3, 
“Managem_Cons” aggregated, following 





Enforcement_customary 0.69 0.29 0.30
Executive_national 0.65 0.02 -0.35
Tenure 0.63 0.00 0.34
Enforcement_formal 0.56 -0.36 -0.37
Managem_Cons 0.52 -0.66 0.19
Civil 0.48 0.34 -0.25
LUplanning 0.21 0.76 0.32






























Figure 6: Eigenvalues and cumulated 
variance explained for nine principal 
components of a PCA for field data from 
the Philippines. Only components with 
eigenvalues above 1.0 explain more 
variation than single variables and are 
basis for interpretation. 
Table 14: Loading matrix for three first principal components (PC) 
calculated for field data from the Philippines. Loadings above 0.4 
in brown and below -0.4 in blue. Elements are sorted according 
to loadings on PC1. Black: elements that are interpreted as 
agency related; grey: elements interpreted as structure related; 
white: elements assigned to neither of the two mechanisms. For 




Figure 7: Biplot of first and second principal 
component calculated for field data from the 
Philippines. Black: elements that are interpreted as 
agency related; grey: elements interpreted as 
structure related; white: elements assigned to 
neither of the two mechanisms. For abbreviations 





LUplanning 0.87 -0.31 0.04
Strategies 0.78 -0.28 -0.19
Participation 0.75 -0.34 -0.12
Executive_national 0.73 0.18 -0.10
Tenure 0.54 0.36 0.49
Executive_local 0.45 0.67 -0.32
Managem_Cons 0.21 0.81 0.08
Tenure_gender 0.15 -0.60 0.53
































Figure 8: Eigenvalues and cumulated 
variance explained for five principal 
components of a PCA for merged field 
data from all three countries. Only 
components with eigenvalues above 1.0 
explain more variation than single 




Table 15: Loading matrix for three first principal components (PC) 
calculated for merged field data from all three countries. 
Loadings above 0.4 in brown. Elements are sorted according to 
loadings on PC1. Black: elements that are interpreted as agency 
related; grey: elements interpreted as structure related; white: 
elements assigned to neither of the two mechanisms. For 
abbreviations see Tab. 3. 
  
Figure 9: Biplot of first and second principal 
component calculated for merged field data from all 
three countries. Black: elements that are interpreted 
as agency related; grey: elements interpreted as 
structure related; white: elements assigned to 
neither of the two mechanisms. For abbreviations 
see Tab. 3. 
 
 
4.2.2 Other independent factors and governance elements explaining them 
The first PCA components were characterized by almost consistently positive loadings of single 
elements (Tabs. 12 - 15). In the review data set, only 5 out of 21 elements had negative loadings on 
the first component (Tab. 11). For Zambia only one out of 8 elements, namely local government, 
loaded negatively on the first component (Tab. 13). In all other country cases the loadings on the first 
component were (partly strongly) positive. On all first components the governance elements were 
thus not antagonistic; the elements were solely differentiated by either stronger or weaker positive 
loadings. Positive bi-variate correlations between single elements confirmed the close relation 
between element scorings (not depicted). For the data set from Ecuador, 5 out of 10 (50%) possible 
correlations between the 5 elements had error probabilities lower than 0.05. For Zambia, 10 out of 
28 possible correlations (38%) were significant. In the case of the Philippines the share was 5 out of 
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This finding is closely related to the fact that loadings on the first axis were correlating with mean 
governance for all data sets (Fig. 10).  
Even though their loadings were mainly positive, the order of the single elements on the first 
components varied strongly. There was no consistent order of the elements in a sense that mostly 





Figure 10: Loadings on first principal components regressed against mean governance for 25 governance 
arrangements in Ecuador (top left), 80 governance arrangements in Zambia (top right), 22 governance 
arrangements in the Philippines (bottom left), and 127 governance arrangements in all three countries (bottom 
right). 
 
In all PCAs, with exception of Ecuador, there were additional second and third components with 
eigenvalues above 1. On these components, single elements were partly antagonistic. But also for 
these components there was no single element or general set of elements that predominantly 
explained them, but instead country wise different elements that characterized the components 
(Tabs. 11; 13-15). 
The results show that in their relation to a main underlying process (represented by the first 
component) which closely correlates to mean governance, elements in general act conjointly. 
However, the importance of single elements for explaining this process varies between the local 
contexts. Also, additional general mechanisms (expressed by additional components) differ between 
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4.3 Effects on tropical deforestation 
4.3.1 Governance effects on deforestation and most decisive governance elements 
The effects of governance elements on deforestation were of interest in order to substantiate if 
governance was linked to reduced deforestation. The scores as derived from the quantitative content 
analysis within the review contained information on deforestation as they explicitly scored effects of 
governance elements on deforestation. The governance data from field assessments in Ecuador and 
Zambia were regressed against deforestation rates that were calculated for the respective areas 
based on satellite data. 
For the review data (Fischer et al., 2020), the number of studies with empirical relations of specific 
governance elements to deforestation was counted and provided quantitative information on 
governance - deforestation relations. The results show that all governance elements were 
predominately linked to decreasing deforestation or degradation or to increased reforestation (Fig. 
11). Tenure/ownership showed the largest share of controversial results: in five cases it was scored as 
positive and negative or with no effect and in one study it was related to increased deforestation, 
whereas in eight studies it was linked to deforestation decrease. It is notable that “not assessed” was 
the most frequently occurring category, showing that most studies only tackled a small subset of 
governance elements. Only law enforcement, executive agencies and participation were mentioned 
in more than half of the studies. A number of elements was not assessed at all in the reviewed 
studies (Tab. 3).  
In order to evaluate if structure or agency indictors had stronger effects on deforestation, the 
reviewed studies were classified into more agency or more structure related studies by calculating 
the share of assessed agency to assessed structure elements per study. Neither the share of assessed 
agency elements, nor the share of assessed structure elements nor the share agency vs. structure 
elements correlated with the mean governance effects on deforestation (not depicted).  
Thus, as all single governance elements showed relations to reduced deforestation, the general 
hypothesis of high governance scores being generally linked to lower deforestation could not be 
falsified. But neither a general focus on agency, nor a more pronounced focus on structure elements 
in the studies resulted in stronger or weaker effects on deforestation. The governance elements that 
were studied were highly variable and most studies focused on a limited number of elements only. 
  
 





Figure 11: Distribution of Likert scores for relations between aggregated governance elements and 
deforestation over 28 studies. 
 
For the data sets from the landscapes in Ecuador and Zambia (see section 4.1.2) satellite data on 
deforestation were available (Fischer et al., submitted; Nansikombi et al., submitted). This allowed to 
analyze deforestation effects of single governance elements based on harmonized field level data. In 
addition, it allowed to quantify governance effects in relation to other context factors influencing 
deforestation. Context factors were assessed in key informant interviews and focus group discussions 
during field assessments (Fischer et al., submitted; Nansikombi et al., submitted). Multivariate 
regression analysis with backward elimination was applied in order to check for potential 
relationships between deforestation (target variable) and several context factors as well as 
governance elements as predictor variables. Infrastructure, socio-economic factors and land use 
were included as context factors representing direct drivers of deforestation. In a first run, models 
were implemented that explain deforestation with direct drivers only. In further steps, governance 
data were added to evaluate if this would improve the models. 
Based on the data from Ecuador, the first model (Tab. 16, column a) explained 34% of deforestation 
by electrification, literacy and the percentage of land covered by crops. These variables represent 
infrastructure, development and agricultural intensification as direct drivers of deforestation. Adding 
governance arrangements in the second model (Tab. 16, column b) increased the r2 by additional 13 
percent points. Distance to markets became significant in this model. A detailed interpretation of the 
context factors’ effects on deforestation is presented by (Fischer et al., submitted). In the third model 
(Tab. 16, column c), mean governance added to the explanation of deforestation independently from 
other explanatory variables. The additional effect was, however, comparatively small. In the third 
model, also relative income from forests was negatively related to deforestation. In the fourth model, 
mean governance was replaced by specific governance elements. This model provided more 
explanatory power than the model with mean governance and increased r2 to 0.54. In this model, 
tenure and participation were significant with negative coefficients, supporting the hypothesis that 
high governance scores are related to lower deforestation. Institutions were positively related to 
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deforestation, even though in a bivariate analysis it had a negative correlation coefficient as well (not 
depicted, (Fischer et al., submitted)).  Law enforcement had to be excluded from the model due to a 
high variance inflation factor (VIF) of 5. VIFs for tenure and participation were moderately high but 
below 5 (4.6 and 3.4 respectively). Governance arrangements were no longer significant in the fourth 
model.  
In general, these results show that governance elements either as specific elements or as overall 
mean had a negative effect on deforestation which is independent from other variables: when 
governance performance was high, deforestation was significantly lower. Single selected governance 
elements explained deforestation better than governance arrangements as explanatory variable. 
However, cropland percentage and electrification were significant in all four models and explained 
larger parts of the variation. Agricultural land use and intensification as well as infrastructure 
development were the most predominant direct deforestation drivers in the analyzed landscapes in 
Ecuador. 
 
 a b c d 
r2 corr 0.34 0.47 0.50 0.54 
Prob>F *** *** *** *** 
N 80 80 80 80 
Infrastructure     
electrification (+)* (+)*** (+)*** (+)** 
km roads / ha     
km_to_general market  (+)** (+)*** (+)** 
km_to_agrimarket ns ns ns (+)** 
Land use     
% area covered by crops (+)*** (+)** (+)** (+)*** 
Socio economics     
literacy (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** ns 
$ wage employment     
% income from forests  ns (-)** (-)*** 
% income from agricult    ns 
Governance arrangement     
Communal  (+)** (+)*** ns 
Individual  (+)** ns ns 
Socio Bosque / 
indigenous reserves 
 reference reference reference 
PANE  ns ns ns 
Governance elements     
Mean governance   (-)**  
Participation    (-)*** 
Institutions    (+)* 
Enforcement     
Managem_Cons    ns 
Tenure    (-)*** 
Table 16: Multilinear regression models explaining mean annual deforestation per patch in the years 2008 - 
2016 in Ecuador. a: model disregarding governance information; b: model in addition including categories of 
governance arrangements, c: model in addition including mean governance performance; d: model with single 
governance elements instead of mean governance. From: (Fischer et al., submitted) 
+/- : positive/negative estimator 
ns: not significant 
significance levels: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 
shaded cells: variable excluded during backward selection 
hatched cells: variable not considered in the model 
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The first model based on data from Zambia (Nansikombi et al., submitted) explained 43% of 
deforestation with distance to roads, percentage of crop area and the intensity of charcoal 
production, as direct drivers, as well as by region (Tab. 17, column a). The Eastern region had lower 
deforestation rates as compared to Copperbelt. In contrast to the data set from Ecuador, the 
inclusion of governance arrangement information did not substantially change the model, it even 
increased the p value (Tab. 17, column b). The inclusion of governance elements, however, increased 
the r2 value and thus the percentage of explained variance to 50% (Tab. 17, column c). Only one 
governance element, namely local government capacity and effectiveness, showed a significant 
negative relation to the rate of deforestation i.e. better capacitated and more effective local 
government institutions were associated with lower rates of deforestation. Other governance 
variables (elements and arrangements) were not statistically significant. Three drivers, distance to 
road, percentage of area under crop cultivation and charcoal production and two regional dummies 
(Eastern and North Western) were statistically significant. Distance to road was associated with lower 
rates of deforestation; Eastern and North Western regions, as compared to the reference regional 
dummy of Copperbelt, were associated with lower rates of deforestation. On the other hand, 
percentages of area under crop cultivation and charcoal production were positively related to the 
rate of deforestation i.e. the higher the percentage of area under crop cultivation and the higher the 
production of charcoal, the higher the rate of deforestation. 
The comparison between the first and third model indicates that with the introduction of governance 
attributes in the analysis the r2 value increased by 7 percent points. In this model, governance can 
contribute to the explanation of deforestation. However, the direct drivers had the stronger direct 
explanatory power and effects. The error probabilities (p-values) of 0.13 and 0.12 were higher as 
compared to Ecuador, i.e. the complete models hardly significant. Governance scores in Zambia in 
general were much lower and hardly varying between governance arrangements (see Tab. 9) which 
made it difficult to show statistical effects. 
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 a b c 
r2 corr 0.43 0.44 0.50 
Shapiro-Wilk p-values 0.13 0.25 0.12 
Number of observations 80 80 80 
Intercept 0.536* (0.037) 0.507* (0.042) 0.475* (0.041) 
Proximate drivers    
Distance to road -0.131* (0.036)  - 0.117* (0.037) -0.112*(0.035) 
Percentage of crop area 0.168* (0.039) 0.144*(0.042) 0.155* (0.040) 
Charcoal production  0.152* (0.036) 0.135* (0.038) 0.146* (0.037) 
Timber extraction    
Pole extraction    
Firewood extraction    
Livestock grazing    
Percentage of built-up area    
Other factors    
Slope    
Area of arrangement    
Eastern region (Yes) -0.270* (0.041) -0.302*(0.046) -0.322* (0.049) 
North Western region (Yes)  -0.083 (0.055) -0.167* (0.059) 
Copperbelt region (Yes) reference reference reference 
Governance arrangements    
State forests restricted 
 
  
Traditionally restricted  
 
reference reference 










Governance elements    
Mean governance    
Local government    -0.087* (0.038) 
Customary government    0.092 (0.046) 
Central government     
Tenure rights  
 
  







Formal law enforcement  
 
  
Customary law enforcement 
 
  
Public policy participation 
 
  
Table 17: Stepwise multiple regression results showing linkages between annual rates deforestation, de-facto 
forest governance elements and arrangements, proximate and other factors for Zambia. Coefficients (with 
standard error); * Implies parameter estimates are significant at 95% confidence interval using standardized 
variables; adapted from: (Nansikombi et al., submitted). 
shaded cells: variable excluded during backward selection  
hatched cells: variable not considered in the model 
 
 
4.3.2 The role of context factors for governance effects on deforestation 
The socio-economic and infrastructure context plays an important role in differentiating the specific 
effects of governance on deforestation. Studies focusing on governance effects need to take specific 
context into account as governance measures depend on them and do not act independently 
(Wehkamp et al., 2018). Effects of governance elements as well as of socio-economic and political 
context variables on deforestation were quantified within quantitative content analysis (see section 
4.1.1). Context factors were determined based on a classification of deforestation drivers by 
(Hosonuma et al., 2012). Actions explicitly undertaken to counter land use changes were classified as 
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interventions. These were classified according to (Agrawal et al., 2014). Multiple regression analysis 
with backward selection was then applied with governance effects on deforestation as target and 
effects of context factors on deforestation as explanatory variables. The resulting model could 
explain 38% of the variation of governance effects (r2= 0.38) by the socio-economic and political 
context (Tab. 18). Based on the review data, corruption and illegal logging were negatively related to 
governance effects. Population growth/density correlated positively with governance effects on 
deforestation, showing that the stronger population effects on deforestation are, the less effects 
governance has on deforestation (population growth/density in general had Likert scores below 4, 
decreasing Likert scores for population thus show stronger relations to deforestation). Also economic 
development, tourism and technology were significant explanatory variables. 
In summary and applying the theoretical framework of (Fischer et al., 2020), these results show that 
beyond their direct effects on deforestation, context factors obviously moderate the effects of 
governance. 
 
 a b 
r2 adjusted 0.18 0.38 
probability > F 0.2872 0.029 
N studies 28 28 
Context factors   
Corruption/IllegalLog 0.055/- 0.038*/- 
Population growth/density 0.262/+ 0.026*/+ 
Roads 0.646/-  
LandSpeculation/OpportCosts 0.381/- 0.300/- 
EconDevelop/Income 0.255/+ 0.057/+ 
CashCrop 0.688/-  
Agriculture 0.567/- 0.119/- 
Timber/Firewood 0.950/-  
Nat.subsidies/Credits/Donor aid 0.436/-  
PES/Certification 0.819/-  
Protected Areas 0.696/+  
CommForestry 0.224/+ 0.148/+ 
Tourism 0.373/+ 0.042*/+ 
Technology 0.011**/- 0.001***/- 
Education/Research/PR/Awareness 0.105/+ 0.104/+ 
Table 18: Multiple linear regression explaining mean governance effects on deforestation by context factors; p 
values for single factors. +/- : positive/negative effect; shaded cells: variables not included in optimized model; 
significance levels: * 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001; a: full model with all context factors; b: optimized model with 
selected factors; optimization by backward selection. 
  
 





5.1 Methodological considerations 
The presented research develops and applies qualitative forest governance assessment methods 
within a review and within field assessments. It further transforms the findings into quantitative 
scores that are then the basis for a number of statistical applications. Such mixed methods 
approaches have until now not been applied in forest governance research. Even though, it has been 
acknowledged that the complexity of a modern governance understanding requires both, 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Krott et al., 2014; Kleinschmit et al., 2016), a combination has 
rarely been implemented. Methodological details of the mixed methods approach are discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
5.1.1 Quantitative content analysis with standardized scores 
Given the multitude of scientific studies and results related to forest governance and deforestation, 
interest is growing in deriving generalized knowledge from the multitude of case studies. The 
presented method of a quantitative content analysis with standardized scores presents a new 
approach to deal with such requirements. Whereas content analysis (Mayring, 2014) and Likert 
scoring (Likert, 1932) have frequently been applied, their combination in a new methodology 
provides new perspectives on forest governance. Generalization, which is the main aim of this 
method, means extending an empirical or conceptual relationship deduced from a set of case study 
observations beyond the specific contexts in which the relationship was observed (Steinberg, 2015). 
(Magliocca et al., 2018) reflect on general requirements for producing so called generalized 
knowledge claims consisting of three so-called dimensions, namely 
1. the existing knowledge base 
2. the generalization approach 
3. the methodology for producing so-called knowledge claims. 
The first dimension entails being explicit about the existing knowledge base of empirical evidence. In 
the study presented, the existing knowledge base was very comprehensive. The varying definitions of 
‘governance’ in applied research (Broekhoven et al., 2012; Facility, 2013; Giessen and Buttoud, 2014) 
and the large amount of studies covering varying scales and local conditions were major challenges. 
Nevertheless, this study applied a broad search term of ‘governance’ because pre-selection based on 
more specific governance components from sometimes dissenting definitions could have biased the 
results or excluded relevant literature. In order to derive a still manageable number of publications 
and to specifically focus on most remarkable scientific contributions, the research concentrated on 
more frequently cited papers, because citation indices are a widespread proxy for scientific quality. 
Sample size is a core methodological issue, specifically taking into account the broad and 
heterogeneous knowledge base related to governance effects on deforestation. A larger number of 
studies as a basis for the review might have produced more detailed results. However, many authors 
confirm that the number of observations in the review presented can be adequate as 198 articles 
were screened and 28 were evaluated. (Shahabuddin and Rao, 2010) base their global review on 34 
studies. (Porter-Bolland et al., 2012) publish a review across the tropics based on 27 studies. 
(Magliocca et al., 2018) suggest “a general rule of thumb is a sample size of 30”. (Wehkamp et al., 
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2018) present a meta-analysis based on 32 empirical cross-country studies. However, due to the still 
limited sample size, this does not necessarily mean that non-significant variables do not play a role. 
In a statistical terminology this refers to ‘type one errors’ that have to be taken into account, 
expressing the probability that true null hypotheses (significant governance studies and variables) 
were rejected (Dekking, 2005). 
The second dimension of the generalization approach refers to the type of inference presented in a 
study. This has implications on the extent to which an analysis can establish causality between the 
outcomes of interest and hypothesized related factors. The logic of the generalization (Magliocca et 
al., 2018) within the presented governance analysis is based on causal effects in the sense of a 
frequency analysis. The existence of frequent effects can be regarded as basis for claiming general 
causal effects (Magliocca et al., 2018). Given that all governance elements were predominately 
linked to decreasing deforestation, the assumption of a universal trend cannot be falsified based on 
the reviewed studies.  
As concerns the third dimension, which refers to the methodology for producing the knowledge 
claim the governance review relied on and further extended content analysis (Mayring, 2014). Such 
content analysis already takes into account the existing divide between a purely hermeneutical 
(qualitative) position, which tries to understand the meaning of the text as interaction between the 
preconceptions of the reader and the intentions of the text producer, and a positivistic (quantitative) 
position that tries to measure, to record and to quantify aspects of the text. (Mayring, 2014) specifies 
the approach as a “mixed method” that includes quantitative components. These quantitative 
components are however mainly confined to counting frequencies of text passages within the 
predefined categories. The novelty of the here presented method is that within these categories 
Likert scores were applied to standardize the information and thus to increase comparability and 
statistical power. This is an adequate methodology specifically when regarding large and 
heterogeneous data sets (Magliocca et al., 2018). Converting thematic analysis into quantitative 
Likert scales constitutes a data transformation based on an intensity scale (Castro et al., 2010). This is 
needed because scientific approaches in the underlying studies may not be consistent across 
observers and/or contexts, which requires standardization or harmonization in the form of coding 
before comparisons can be made (Coe and Scacco, 2017; Magliocca et al., 2018). The quantitative 
content analysis with standardized scores is therefore as well a mixed method in which qualitative 
results of reading the text are coded and thus transformed. 
 
5.1.2 Field governance measurements 
In the last decade the world has seen an “explosion” of empirical research aimed at measuring 
governance (Worldbank, 2006). This is the consequence of the attention governance has received in 
the context of endeavors aiming to reduce deforestation and improving development in general. 
Governance measurements are needed to identify policy strengths and weaknesses, initiate progress 
and monitor development (Kishor and Kenneth, 2012). Nevertheless, reliable information on 
functioning and effects of various forest governance elements across developing countries is lacking, 
even though it is very much needed also for guiding forest policy (Barbier and Tesfaw, 2015). Many 
case studies are existing (Wehkamp et al., 2018; Fischer et al., 2020). They employ a wide variety of 
specific methodologies that are rarely comparable. There are only a few harmonized field 
assessment methods. These are, however, mostly qualitatively descriptive (CIFOR, 2015; Ravikumar 
et al., 2015) or mainly focus on selected local forest patches (IFRI, 2011). To overcome this, a new 
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quantitative methodology for forest governance assessments at landscape level has been presented 
in section 4.1.2, comprising: 
1. Definition of governance arrangements 
2. Selection and local adaptation of governance elements 
3. Focus group discussions for governance quality scoring by Likert scores 
5.1.2.1 Governance arrangements 
Governance arrangements are a new approach. They define basic spatial units for the field level 
assessments within the presented landscape level assessment methodology. Mere governance 
assessments on landscape level (e.g.(de Graaf et al., 2017)) can provide means but would blur the 
underlying mechanisms, because within landscapes governance mechanisms can differ substantially 
as has been shown (see section 4.1.2). Governance arrangement delineation therefore is 
indispensable if mechanisms, functioning and effects of governance, e.g. on deforestation, are to be 
studied not only between but also within landscapes. They enable a more detailed and precise 
assessment. The proposed methodology based on governance arrangements is more laborious and 
expensive than only producing results per landscape; however focus group discussions are an 
efficient way to collect the data. The hierarchical code list for governance arrangements (Tab. 6) 
provides the basis for aggregation and cross country harmonization and thus comparison. On the 
highest level it takes into account actors (i.e. communal, individual and communal owners). On the 
lower levels it accounts for main structural features (land titling and management rules including use 
restrictions). It is thus applicable under the presented governance understanding (see section 2.1.3). 
 
5.1.2.2 Selection of governance elements to be assessed 
The selection and adaptation of governance elements builds on an existing framework (Davis et al., 
2013a) but provides new theory based considerations on the selection process. Existing 
measurement tools are all based on the separate assessment of different governance 
subcomponents that are called indicators, variables, elements or thematic areas depending on the 
assessment tool (see section 2.1.4). The long lists, different structures of governance assessment 
frameworks and hardly manageable compilations of elements, variables and indicators are due to the 
broad and complex nature of the recent governance understanding (Larson and Petkova, 2011; 
Broekhoven et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2013b; Giessen and Buttoud, 2014; de Graaf et al., 2017; 
Mansourian, 2017). Indeed it seems that “everything matters” (Brass, 2016). But because governance 
is complex and any indicator is subject to a degree of imprecision, no single indicator can be used 
mechanically for governance assessments (Worldbank, 2006). The multitude of elements and 
indicators pose a challenge and the only way for operational assessments is selection of specific 
elements and adaptation of existing frameworks to the regional or local context and to the research 
aim as proposed by (Davis et al., 2013a) or (Kishor and Kenneth, 2012) and as conducted in this 
study. 
Based on these considerations the open question remains whether a universal governance 
assessment tool with a manageable set of elements for de facto forest governance on the landscape 
level can be proposed. The answer is probably: no; because governance is on one side too broad and 
at the same time context specific. Thus, forest governance needs a deeper understanding before a 
selection can be made. Instead of defining a fixed set of elements, a functional understanding can 
help designing operational assessments. In any case, a selection of elements implies reduced 
assessments instead of a comprehensive approach covering full indicator frameworks. The economic 
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concept of marginal utilities can steer the reflection on justifying a reduced number of elements. 
Assuming that the “marginal utility of each (homogenous) unit decreases as the supply of units 
increases” (Rothbard, 2009), the marginal utility of additional governance elements assessed would 
be of interest. An economic assessment is beyond the limits of this study and would call for extended 
research. But the PCA and the correlation results of the presented governance research (see section 
4.2) point to the fact that the marginal utility of each additional governance information is rather 
quickly decreasing, which means that reliable (mean) information will mostly be available based on 
reduced stets of assessed governance elements. Synchronous functioning, probably even synergies 
between different governance elements - also as concerns effects on deforestation (see section 4.3) - 
are encouraging and support an approach that has a focus on a few selected core issues, covering 
main mechanisms instead of trying to cover all elements. Together with additional selection criteria 
(see section 4.1.2.2), the agency - structure approach can help to select indicators as it captures 
important governance functions. At the same time, elements that characterize local governance 
conditions need to be taken into account. 
 
5.1.2.3 Participatory mapping and focus group discussions 
Focus group discussions are a well-defined and already existing tool. However, they are mostly 
focused on qualitative statements and rarely used in combination with quantitative scoring. 
Participatory mapping and focus groups are classical tools of participatory rural appraisals (PRA). A 
large body of literature supports the application of the tools within the landscape level assessments 
presented. PRA tools were originally used for involvement of local people into planning processes of 
development projects. They have been further developed as research methods including modern 
tools like GIS (Chambers, 1994). Focus groups are discussions among a predetermined group of 
people in an interactive environment (Adhikari et al., 2018). The method has become a prominent 
component of field level research and practical guidelines have been prepared to support 
scientifically sound implementation (IFAD, 2009). Participatory mapping is a process of using local 
perceptions and knowledge to build maps of a shared geographical location (Beaudoin et al., 2016). 
Participatory mapping and focus group discussions are, like in the presented research, frequently 
used in combination with remote sensing analysis. This combination of methods has a number of 
mutual benefits. Participatory mapping provides an advanced and very comprehensive method for 
ground truthing of remote sensing data on one side and a basis for subsequent focus group 
discussions on the other, which then are the basis for the collection of quantitative and qualitative 
georeferenced data (Mapedza et al., 2003; Nackoney et al., 2013; Beaudoin et al., 2016). The 
combination of mapping and focus groups is also recommended because during the joint mapping 
problem understanding is created and an open trustful atmosphere can be created in the group 
(Freund et al., 2016). On the other side, findings from participatory rural appraisals can be affected 
by the composition of participant groups and group discussions can be influenced by one or two 
dominant individuals. To overcome these inherent weaknesses, it has been suggested that PRA 
techniques should best be deployed in conjunction with other methods, so that findings from 
technical and social research methods may subsequently be triangulated. One such complementary 
technology is GIS based remote sensing analysis (Mapedza et al., 2003), as applied in the presented 
research. 
In a few cases, mapping has been based on blanc sheets of white paper in order to capture the 
subjective perception of participants related to their physical environment (Lingel, 2011). However, 
following (Beaudoin et al., 2016; Freund et al., 2016) this study used predefined base maps and 
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satellite images that helped to identify basic features and were a basis for digitizing and subsequent 
georeferencing. Base maps are reported to save time and to provide a more efficient assessment 
(Nackoney et al., 2013). 
Like other PRA methods, participatory mapping and focus group discussions not only provide data 
input to research projects but have an important feedback side effect: PRA exercises can facilitate 
social learning and provide the foundation for the creation of social capital within the communities 
(Damastuti and de Groot, 2019). It is a key component of the interactive participation process that 
communities and villages take control over their own decisions. Village ownership of the mapping 
process needs to be promoted. Therefore, it has been emphasized that participatory maps and focus 
group results will belong to the village community, not to the research program (Nackoney et al., 
2013). Within the field campaigns of the LaForeT project which provided data input to the above 
presented research, feedback workshops were therefore conducted in the villages. During these 
workshops professionally prepared maps were handed over to the communities in order to 
demonstrate such ownership. 
 
5.1.3 Principal component analysis as tool for evaluating the inherent governance structure 
Principal component analyses (PCA) based on quantified review data or field governance 
assessments have to date not been applied. They can be regarded as a methodological contribution 
to the further development of forest governance research. PCA is a technique for reducing the 
dimensionality of the governance datasets (Dunteman, 1989; Jolliffe, 2002 ). In multidimensional 
data sets, each variable can be considered as a different dimension (Kassambara, 2017). 
Dimensionality in this study therefore relates to a high number of governance elements, the 
interrelation of which was not known and which was to be explored according to the research 
questions. Any reduction of the dimensionality of a dataset needs to ensure that as much variability 
as possible is preserved in order to not loose essential information. In contrast to “feature 
elimination” (Brems, 2017) which would imply eliminating governance elements from the analysis 
that are regarded less important, PCA solves this by “feature extraction”. This means determining 
new features (principal components) that are linear functions of the variables in the original dataset, 
that successively maximize variance and that are uncorrelated with each other (Jolliffe, 2002 ; 
Kassambara, 2017). In that sense, PCA is an adaptive descriptive open data analysis tool, as the new 
components depend on the dataset, rather than being pre-defined functions. In the presented study 
two basic features of forest governance could be extracted: the general positive loadings on the first 
components that signify the conjoint and synchronous functioning as well as the agency-structure 
dualism that became visible at least within the large scale governance data set. These results are 
based on a data set that fulfilled the assumptions for applying the method and they reveal new 
functional features that were not visible in the raw data set. PCA was thus a suitable and adequate 
method for identifying functional relationships between governance elements. 
A number of technical issues need to be considered with respect to the PCAs applied to the specific 
data sets. Due to the formal violation of the assumption of sampling adequacy (see section 3.3.2) 
data interpretation had to take into account that results had a comparatively small number of 
structured components, and very many noise dimensions, i.e. components with very low eigenvalues 
(Jolliffe, 2002 ). Therefore, only the first four components of the PCA related to the reviewed studies 
were interpreted. They explained nearly 50% of the variation and all showed eigenvalues above 1. 
The PCAs for country wise analysis had a higher number of elements per sampling unit which means 
that sampling adequacy in the above mentioned sense was given; however, at the expense of a 
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limited number of elements that were included in these analyses. Given the large number of possible 
governance elements, a full assessment of their statistical relations would require a higher number of 
assessed governance arrangements. 
Usually standardization of data is recommended before conducting PCAs, especially if data is 
measured on different scales. In the PCAs presented, however, all data were measured on identical 
Likert scales. After standardization the new covariance matrix would merely be a scalar multiple of 
the old one, hence with the same eigenvectors and the same proportion of total variance explained 
by each component (Jolliffe, 2002 ). Standardization was thus not required. 
 
5.1.4 Evaluating governance effects with multiple regression analysis 
The study analyzed governance effects and those of proximate drivers on deforestation by multiple 
regression analysis. Regression analyses have already been applied in forest governance research 
(Vuohelainen et al., 2012; de Souza et al., 2013; Larcom et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016). The method has 
a focus on causal inference. This means it describes the process of drawing a conclusion about a 
causal connection between cause and effect variables; it analyzes the response of the effect variable 
when the cause is changed (Pearl, 2009). In the case of the presented study the aim was to analyze 
the response of deforestation when governance is changed. The fundamental problem of causal 
inference studies is that effects of a changing predictor cannot be directly measured. It is not 
possible to observe both: what happens to an individual after taking the treatment and what 
happens to that same individual after not taking the treatment. In statistical words: the unobserved 
counterfactual outcome for each treatment cannot be observed (Dunning, 2008). But a linear model, 
such as multiple linear regression - which estimates the average effect on a target variable for each 
additional unit of explanatory variables - is seen as a natural starting point and appropriate method 
for causal inference evaluation (Gelman and Hill, 2006) given that the respective formal assumptions 
are met (see section 3.3.4). Thus multiple regression analysis can be regarded as the appropriate tool 
for evaluating the data of this study under the given objectives. 
 
5.2 Functional relationships between governance elements 
5.2.1 The agency and structure concept as theoretical foundation 
The agency - structure concept has been described as a theoretical basis of forest governance and is 
based on two mainstream models: rational choice and neo-institutionalism (Arts et al., 2014). The 
PCA results (see section 4.2.1) show that for the review data, specifically on the second component, 
agency and structure indictors were clearly differentiated. The grouping of structure and agency 
elements on the PCA components shows that forest governance functioning is indeed characterized 
by a mechanism that differentiates between agency and structure. Even though theoretically 
formulated, such a mechanism has to date not been shown based on empirical governance data. 
Even though that the agency - structure dualism became visible, it is undebated that agency and 
structure are idealized poles. There is consensus that actors’ decisions will not purely follow one or 
the other logic and context-specific combinations with different shares of agency and structure 
components need to be taken into account (Giddens, 1984a; March and Olsen, 1998). There was no 
statistically significant stronger effect of either of the two aspects on deforestation. Both aspects 
seem equally important and even though that structural elements were loading stronger on the PCA 
axes. This is supported e.g. by the institutional economics theory (Ostrom, 2009) claiming that 
rational choice is mediated by rules, norms and beliefs. In this respect also the practice based 
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approach (Arts et al., 2014) gains relevance. This approach emphasizes the constant and mutual 
feedback between structure aspects and agency. 
The application of this approach to landscape data from the three case study countries did, however, 
not reveal agency - structure patters for the single countries. For the country wise analyses based on 
data from single landscapes, agency and structure elements showed no distinct sorting on PCA 
components with eigenvalues above 1.0. The landscape approach has been advocated by (Sayer et 
al., 2013) as a basis for assessing field data (see section 2.3). Related to governance, however, it may 
be assumed that the landscapes still were too small to capture the full functioning of forest 
governance, as agency and structure mechanisms were not visible at this level. Multilevel 
governance approaches as advocated by (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2013; Rantala et al., 2014; Piketty et 
al., 2015) may thus be needed, which spatially exceed landscapes. In the ongoing forest policy 
debate, this implies the need to create nested REDD+ designs (Kashwan and Holahan, 2014) that take 
into account and relate international, national regional and local scales. 
The existence of agency and structure mechanisms connected through dynamic and interactive feed 
backs may help to design and steer governance research and development work. An example for 
practical implications of the theoretical governance research is the debate on whether existing 
governance results generally support agency based approaches to counteract tropical deforestation 
in contrast to structural approaches. Results based payments under the REDD+ (“Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation”) approach of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC 2007a; FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1) would be a prominent example for an 
agency based tool in international forest policy. Such payments build on the financial motivation of 
recipients. In contrast, traditional input based development aid often aims to improve structures, 
rules and their implementation. Results based payments under REDD+ have been promoted as an 
innovative tool. Still today, they are seen as a “main innovation to REDD+” (Angelsen et al., 2018). 
However, the disbursement of such finance is far below expectations and a controversial discussion 
on success and the future of REDD+ and the applicability of results based payments in international 
forest policy is ongoing (Fischer et al., 2016; Fletcher et al., 2016; Angelsen et al., 2017; Arts et al., 
2020). The findings support that structural components which are as well foreseen under REDD+ 
aiming to install legal and institutional structures, so-called readiness measures, need to be 
implemented first. They need to be perceived and communicated as independently functioning 
components. Expectations to tackle the tropical deforestation challenge with purely agency related 
measures are obviously hard to fulfil. 
 
5.2.2 Other independent factors and single elements explaining forest governance  
Nearly all elements loaded positively on the first principal components of the PCAs conducted (Tabs. 
11-14). This shows that there is in general a consistent functioning of the single elements. 
Governance elements obviously act conjointly; they are expressions of a similar underlying process. 
Such a joint functioning of different governance elements, independently from scale or context, has 
not been documented so far. 
However, none of the governance elements consistently had the highest loadings on the first 
component. This shows that the importance of single elements for a general characterization of 
governance depends on the respective context. For example, law enforcement had the lowest 
loadings on the first component in the Philippines, an intermediate position in Ecuador and the 
highest loadings in Zambia.  
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There were between none (Ecuador) and eight (review data) additional components with eigenvalues 
above 1. The interpretation of each of these components requires expert knowledge related to the 
underlying dataset in order to interpret specific processes or functions that are expressed by these 
independent components (Jolliffe, 2002 ). However, whereas the first component could in general be 
explained as expressing mean governance (see Fig. 10), there was no consistent explanation of 
element loadings on additional components. Overall, the importance and function of single elements 
on additional components was case specific. Also (Wehkamp et al., 2018) point to the fact that 
governance effects are context specific which means that in each area or country it might be other 
elements that more specifically characterize governance functioning beyond the general positive 
interrelation of single elements. It is be necessary to focus on specific governance elements in each 
context. 
Elements of the same thematic areas as defined by the framework of the World Resource Institute 
(Davis et al., 2013b) did not turn out to determine independent factors (components) in any of the 
PCAs. However, sample size was mostly too low to elaborate on such a complex and 
multidimensional framework in detail. Nevertheless, based on the results presented, the framework 
can be understood as an operational list of different aspects, not as a functional explanation of 
governance. 
 
5.3 Effects on tropical deforestation 
5.3.1 Governance effects on deforestation 
There is substantial knowledge on relations between single governance elements and deforestation 
(Kanninen et al., 2007; Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014; Stickler et al., 2017). Many authors claim positive 
effects of forest governance (Bhatterai and Hammig, 2001; Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004) or state 
that governance is a “precondition for achieving a sustainable landscape”(de Graaf et al., 2017) or 
vital for “successful REDD+ implementation”(Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014). But a comparison of 
deforestation effects of single governance elements based on a consistent empirical field data set is a 
novelty and has not been available until now. (Barbier and Tesfaw, 2015) apply multiple regression 
analysis based on a panel data set that includes three structural governance variables. (Korhonen-
Kurki et al., 2014) use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to evaluate combinations of 
governance and context factors on REDD+ implementation. However, they do not study effects on 
deforestation. 
 
The qualitative parts for studying governance effects on deforestation allow a deeper interpretation 
of relations between single governance elements and deforestation. The content analysis showed 
that high governance scores were predominately linked to decreasing deforestation. Between the 
elements, there were hardly differences in effects on deforestation or degradation (Fig. 11). 
Participation and tenure/ownership were the most frequently studied agency elements and the only 
two that, even though only in limited cases, were linked to increasing deforestation. Many authors 
base the importance of tenure security on the assumption that more secure land and resource 
tenure motivates land users to manage resources more efficiently (Ostrom, 1999; Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz, 2001; Andersson and Gibson, 2007; Ceddia et al., 2014). However, tenure security and 
participation alone can have divergent impacts by motivating agricultural expansion (de Souza et al., 
2013; Agrawal et al., 2014; Ceddia et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2017) or by fostering forest clearing to 
demonstrate property rights (Soares-Filho et al., 2004; Bottazzi and Dao, 2013). Granting of tenure 
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and enabling of participation obviously need to be controlled by a frame of structural governance 
mechanisms in order to be effective. 
 
Structural elements were most frequently represented by policy framework and law enforcement. 
The review showed both: negative effects of policies that do not care for deforestation (Soares-Filho 
et al., 2004; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Webb et al., 2014) and positive effects of laws aiming at 
forest conservation (Shahabuddin and Rao, 2010; Bae et al., 2012; Canova and Hickey, 2012). Policy 
framework and law enforcement are classical government related elements that remain important 
and need continued support even though the governance concept has been widened into a much 
broader concept. Structural elements like land use plan implementation, legal/policy framework and 
related law enforcement loaded stronger on the first component of the review based PCA as 
compared to agency elements that loaded less on the first axis. This might suggest a more uniform 
effect of these structural elements that are more strongly determining mean governance as 
compared to other elements, specifically as compared to agency related elements. 
 
Executive agencies were the most frequently studied example of an element that could not be 
assigned to either agency or structure and it also had an intermediate position between structure 
and agency related elements on the respective PCA axes. Executive agencies comprise both: 
structure and agency aspects (Giessen et al., 2014; Rahman and Giessen, 2017). On one side forest 
services are guards that are tasked with enforcing laws, structures and rules (Hayes and Persha, 
2010; Baynes et al., 2016; Mansourian, 2016). Often they even originate from police-like 
organizations (Hutchins, 1916). But on the other side they are service providers that need to locally 
moderate interests of stakeholders and multiple demands of society (Bennett et al., 2014; 
Mansourian, 2016). This can be interpreted as serving the agency aspect. Installing such executive 
institutions that fulfil both aspects, therefore, is a challenge that needs support and capacities. Most 
studies, however, did not differentiate between different aspects of executive agencies’ work 
(Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004; Gautam et al., 2004; Andersson and Gibson, 2007; Bae et al., 2012; 
Porter-Bolland et al., 2012). 
 
Multiple regression analysis helped to quantify effects of governance elements on deforestation. It 
was applied based on the data sets from Ecuador and Zambia in order to study the combined effects 
of several governance elements, to compare them against each other and against the effects of 
direct drivers. (Barbier and Tesfaw, 2015) followed the same approach, however with only three 
structural governance variables. The now presented study relies on two country wise and 
harmonized data sets and uses a larger number of governance elements. In both countries there 
were significant effects of a number of governance elements. The regression coefficients and 
significance levels of governance elements were, however, lower as for direct drivers (Geist and 
Lambin, 2002) such as e.g. agricultural land use. All models consistently revealed stronger effects of 
direct drivers on deforestation. However, the r2 of the models increased when governance variables 
were included. This supports the underlying theoretical understanding whereas governance has an 
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Among the governance elements analyzed in Zambia (Nansikombi et al., submitted), only local 
government was significant. It had an isolated function on reduced deforestation (see Tab. 17) in 
relation to other elements like law enforcement, central government and tenure which were not 
significant and from which it was clearly differentiated on the first component of the PCA (see Tab. 
13). The results from Zambia specifically suggest that improvement of forest governance alone does 
not exclusively guarantee successful deforestation abatement. However, governance scores in 
Zambia were very low and with little variation, which in general makes it statistically hard to explain 
any target variable. 
The governance data underlying the multiple regression analysis from Ecuador (Fischer et al., 
submitted) showed more variation. Specifically tenure and public participation were elements that 
jointly contribute to reduced deforestation (see Tab. 16). These two elements were grouped on the 
first component of the PCA (see Tab. 12) and also both of them explained reduced deforestation in 
the multiple regression. They were separated from institutions in the PCA and the multiple regression 
analysis. Both, the cases of Zambia and Ecuador show that those governance elements which are 
differentiated form others within the PCA also function jointly in their effects on deforestation. The 
joint functioning, however, can make it statistically difficult to substantiate isolated effects of single 
elements due to their multicollinearity. The exclusion of law enforcement as explanatory variable due 
to high VIFs is an example for this. 
 
For examining specific relations between direct drivers and governance, the multiple regressions 
presented are an indirect approach, because these relations between governance and direct drivers 
are not quantified in the models. For such quantification, interaction terms would need to be 
included. However, given the large number of governance elements and deforestation drivers, the 
resulting number of possible combinations would be too big for meaningful statistical analyses. For 
meta-analysis, (Rudel, 2008) points to the fact that when “cases drop below 60, the creation of 
interaction terms creates so many variables that the quantitative analysis begins to lose its power”. 
 
5.3.2 The role of context factors for governance effects on deforestation 
The target of this study with respect to context factors was to contribute understanding how context 
factors influence governance effects on deforestation (Fischer et al., 2020). Governance effects on 
deforestation as derived from the review study were used as target variable in a multiple regression 
analysis. Context factors were included as independent variables (see Tab. 18). This application bears 
the advantage that context factors can directly be linked to governance effects. Such an approach 
has until now not been presented. The constraint of this approach is however, that only mean 
governance effects are used as target variable. This is a simplification as not individual governance 
elements can be considered. The results show that corruption and illegal logging can negatively 
affect governance effects. Results also show that, the stronger population effects on deforestation 
are, the less effects governance has on deforestation. This supports (Wehkamp et al., 2018) who 
found that a governance effect was more likely to become significant when accounting for 
population in the models and suggest that political institutions are more important when 
demographic pressures are high. The now presented study also supports that agriculture and timber 
harvest did not moderate governance effects. Governance thus seems important irrespective of high 
or low pressures through agriculture and timber extraction. Technology was the strongest 
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explanatory variable and negatively related, suggesting that were a focus is on technological 
improvements, the effects of improved governance are less pronounced. 
  
 





6.1 Mixed governance assessment methods serving the science policy interface 
Two new methods for collection of forest governance data have been developed and implemented: 
Quantitative content analysis with standardized scores relies on existing results to derive generalized 
knowledge, whereas harmonized landscape level governance assessments produce new standardized 
field data. Both methodological approaches have been shown to be fully operational and applicable. 
Quantitative content analysis benefits from already existing studies but on the other hand has to deal 
with differing approaches, methods and not directly comparable studies. Harmonized landscape level 
governance assessments, in contrast, collect new standardized field data which provides the 
advantage of being directly comparable, however on the expense of not integrating existing data and 
knowledge. Based on the experience and results of this study, quantitative content analysis of 
existing research is advocated due to the fact that it will hardly be possible to produce new 
harmonized forest governance results to an extent comparable to existing scientific work. Before 
adding new case studies, governance researchers are required to clarify if it is not more efficient to 
re-analyze and generalize from existing work. The quantitative content analysis with standardized 
scores is a valuable methodological contribution in this respect. This does not mean that new field 
studies are not needed. On the contrary, new aspects and questions are arising that require new field 
research. Such new field research is recommended to follow standardized procedures as e.g. 
presented in this study. In this respect, research networks and scientific cooperation should gain 
importance, as standardization requires methodological integration and compromises between 
approaches. The presented standardized landscape level approach can stimulate the application of 
harmonized methods by a larger number of governance projects and researchers. 
Both methodological approaches presented are mixed method approaches that benefit from the 
strengths of qualitative and the quantitative components. Whereas qualitative understanding 
enables to capture more complexity and inquire more deeply, quantification is needed to apply 
statistical tools as a basis for generalizing results. Application of mixed methods in forest governance 
research needs to be strengthened in order to provide policy relevant information that makes full 
use of available knowledge and results. This requires a dialogue between researcher communities 
that have traditionally specialized on one or the other methodological domain. It as well requires a 
respective qualification of individual scientists. Principal component analysis and multiple regression 
analysis have been shown as viable quantitative approaches for the specific research questions in this 
study. Additional multivariate statistical tools need to be explored within forest governance research. 
 
6.2 Synchronous governance elements can encourage development policies 
To date there has been no comprehensive study analyzing functional interrelations of single forest 
governance elements based on empirical data. The presented results offer first insights in this 
respect. Governance elements such as e.g. tenure, law enforcement, participation, institutional 
performance act conjointly and into the same direction, they are features of the same underlying 
process that is highly correlated to overall mean governance. On one side, this is an important 
theoretical finding that helps understand and explain governance functioning.  On the other side, this 
has as well practical consequences. The fact that the complexity of a modern forest governance 
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concept probably leads to more demanding development concepts must, with these results in mind, 
not refrain from timely implementation of governance measures. On the contrary: the fact that there 
might even be synergies between governance elements and clear indications that these reinforce 
each other is encouraging. Rather than remaining in an “analysis paralysis” (Ranadive, 2020) and 
struggling to disentangle ever more details of governance functioning in all cases, these findings can 
justify and motivate politicians, scientists and practitioners to analyze governance core features that 
are relevant in the specific context and then take action. Actors in the forest governance arena can 
rely on the justified assumption that work on a few, however well selected, core elements will 
certainly not be in conflict with other governance elements, probably even have positive effects on 
the wider forest governance settings. 
 
6.3 An agency - structure based understanding provides a changed perspective 
for e.g. REDD+ implementation 
The agency and structure related forest governance understanding is not only a theoretical basis. 
Results of this study show that these two aspects are effective governance mechanisms. In view of 
complex indicator frameworks and different definitions this can help to focus research, development 
work and policy. Governance elements selected for specific action should at least cover these two 
aspects. Additional research might uncover additional underlying mechanisms that can help to still 
better understand governance functioning. 
An agency and structure related perspective provides the basis for understanding the current debate 
on the delayed success of REDD+. This debate builds on the fact that disbursement of carbon related 
results based payments is far below expectations. Results based payments focus on the agency of the 
recipients and may certainly be an effective measure. But a pure agency related focus will hardly 
work. Structural components like readiness measures have been implemented under REDD+ from 
the beginning and need to be perceived as independent and self-standing measures that are not only 
needed to prepare the ground for the payments. Readiness activities are themselves equally 
important governance measures and need to be considered in the discussion on the success of 
REDD+. The funds that have been spend for them may have a justification independent from results 
based payments.  
Forest governance requires a multilevel understanding in which international, national, regional and 
local measures and activities need to be integrated. Agency and structure mechanisms of governance 
only became visible at higher scales, i.e. when combining cross country data or analyzing review data 
from a larger number of cases. This supports that local and regional scales are not sufficient to tackle 
governance issues.  
 
6.4 “Good governance” to reduce deforestation 
The results of this study support the notion of a number of governance elements as being “good” for 
low deforestation. The findings thus imply that present “good governance” based approaches are 
applicable and can help reduce deforestation. However, when applying such frameworks, 
development work and policy needs to continuously reflect on the underlying goals and inherent 
values, as specifically informal values can differ between actors. Compared to such a normative 
approach, the principal difference of the presented analytical approach is that it explores causalities. 
It is outcome oriented. Based on this approach measures can rely on jointly agreed aims instead of 
value oriented principles. This can facilitate targeted policy and its implementation.  
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As improved performance of a number of governance elements is linked to reduced deforestation, 
the focus on governance as observed in all major international and many national forest policy 
initiatives is justified. On the other hand, numerous indicators were hardly or not at all covered in the 
reviewed studies. Thus, when talking and publishing about forest governance, at least a specification 
of the applied elements is needed in order to avoid governance to become a meaningless buzzword. 
The results further suggest that an improvement of forest governance alone will not exclusively 
guarantee successful deforestation abatement. The stronger statistical power of factors like 
intensified agriculture and infrastructure measures justifies their perception as direct deforestation 
drivers and shows the need to directly tackle these challenges. However, without taking into account 
governance elements, such measures will most probably not be effective. Also here the REDD+ 
readiness measures are a prominent example. It shows that basic governance measures are needed 
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Annex 1: Forest ownership and tenure in Ecuador, Zambia and The Philippines 
 
 
Forest ownership and tenure in Ecuador 
In Ecuador, the constitution of 2008 recognizes the right of communities, nationalities and 
indigenous territories to preserve the imprescriptible tenure over their ancestral territories with an 
inalienable and indivisible character (Art. 57). This includes the guarantee of collective rights for 
agricultural organizations and ancestral domains. Nowadays the two biggest owners of native forest 
are the Ecuadorian State and indigenous groups (Morales et al., 2010). Indigenous groups occupy 
territories corresponding to 65% of the Ecuadorian forests (Palacios, 2005). A significant portion of 
the indigenous groups, specifically in the Ecuadorian Amazon is still in the process of claiming the 
legal recognition of their lands. Within communal lands, with or without title, indigenous 
communities usually follow traditional governance mechanisms, including rules of land use planning, 
with significant portions of the land assigned to single families for individual management. 
Private individuals or organizations can obtain land titles if possession and production is documented 
over a minimum period of five years. But based on customary rights, private farms also exist on non-
titled lands. With the agrarian reforms in 1964 and 1973, the state government of Ecuador had 
awarded farms with on average 50 ha to enhance colonization (Pan et al., 2004). After colonists had 
settled, their claims on the land were respected if at least 50% of the forest was cleared (Richards, 
1997) and evidence of agricultural use was provided (Murphy et al., 1997). To a smaller extent, also 
indigenous families colonize land outside communal territories and claim the ownership under the 
same mechanism as non-indigenous settlers. Land use systems and governance mechanisms 
specifically of individual indigenous farmers more and more match those of colonizing settlers. 
Traditionally indigenous communities leave parts of their lands unmanaged as reserve after having 
assigned portions of individual land to each of the members. In the Amazon Basin, these indigenous 
reserves are mainly covered by forests, the ultimate goal is to reserve land for future generations and 
future production (Holt and Bilsborrow, 2004; Izurieta et al., 2014). 
Article 261 (11) of the constitution of Ecuador foresees that forest resources are under the principal 
competence of the state (ACE, 2008). The largest share of Ecuadorian state forest is constituted by 
the the ‘Patrimonio de Áreas Naturales del Estado’ (patrimony of natural areas - PANE) which is part 
of the system of protected areas ‘Sistema Nacional de Areas Protegidas’ (SNAP) (MAE, 2016). SNAP 
covers approximately 20% of the Ecuadorian surface in 56 natural reserves, ranging from National 
Parks (the highest level of protection) to ecological municipal areas. Forest use in PANE areas is not 
allowed, however, there is an overlap with ancestral domain areas inhabited by indigenous people, 
who are allowed to use forest products for subsistence use. 
 
 
Forest ownership and tenure in Zambia 
The forest governance arrangements of Zambia are grounded in the land reform in 1924, which dates 
back to the colonial period. At that time, land in Zambia was demarcated into crown land and native 
reserve land (Van Loenen, 1999, Brown, 2005). Following Zambia’s independence in 1964, crown 
land was converted to state land. The differentiation into customary and state land persists until 
today, but customary land administration was sub-ordinated to the formal law, which previously only 
applied to crown land. However, the method of customary land alienation continued to be under the 
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customary law. Today, the majority of Zambia´s forest occurs on customary land. In parallel to the 
political state administration within each district there is a strong customary administrative structure 
that is guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (Mason-Case, 2011) and that build 
on tribes headed by their chiefs who can delegate rights and responsibilities to headpersons and sub-
chiefs within their jurisdictions (Mason-Case, 2011). Today only selected customary lands are 
formally titled. Traditional leaders determine land use, access and user rights on customary land 
based on local traditions. The political administration must engage in consultations with traditional 
institutions before undertaking any activities on customary lands.  Under the formal law, commercial 
use of forest products without a license on customary lands is restricted although access and 
subsistence use are not (GRZ, 2015a). The local government´s involvement in governance of 
customary forests is constrained by contradicting land tenure policies (Chikulo, 2009). While the 
Local Government Act of 1991 gives the district council mandate to plan and lead the management 
of customary forests, the Land Act of 1995 places the administration of these lands under customary 
authority. Besides, customary authorities sometimes challenge the authority of the sub-district 
governance structures (Mfune, 2013). Following traditional rules, local chiefs can designate 
customary land either for individual use by single families or keep it as communal forests to meet the 
social, cultural and economic needs of local communities. For specific communal forests there are 
cultural use restrictions, e.g. in graveyards. 
Other forests in Zambia are located on state lands. State forests include National and Local Forest 
Reserves, administered by the Forest Department (GRZ, 2015a, Kalinda et al., 2008) as well as 
National Parks and Game Management Areas, administered by the Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife (GRZ, 2015b). The primary objective of the state forests is protection and enhancement of 
wildlife, ecosystems, biological diversity and natural beauty. Under the formal law, access and use of 
forest resources on state forests is restricted except with special permits. There also exist private 
forests on state lands, which constitute 10.6% of the total forest area. Registered individuals or 
companies through leasehold tenure own these. 
 
 
Forest ownership and tenure in the Philippines 
The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (PD 705) provides a system of land classification based 
on topography to distinguish “alienable and disposable” lands and “forest lands”. It defines 
forestlands as all land within or above the so-called 18 percent slope line. These forestlands are 
inalienable and are owned by the state, because as adopted by the Philippine Constitution, “all lands 
of the public domain belong to the state, and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private 
ownership are presumed to belong to the state.” An individual can only utilize, exploit, occupy, 
possess or conduct any activity within a forest upon the issuance of a license agreement, license, 
lease or permit issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The state 
forests fall under a “moratorium on the cutting and harvesting of timber in the natural forest” 
(Executive Order No. 23), commonly known as logging ban. However, the small scale use of timber in 
state forests is hard to control (Carandang  et al., 2012). Since there is limited manpower to guard 
and patrol these areas, people can easily get in and out of these areas resulting in uncontrolled use 
of the forest. Therefore, these forests have been occupied by upland dwellers who have cultivated 
the area for subsistence farming, claiming stake in the forest land informally. The informal claims are 
often respected by the community. 
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In 1995, Executive Order 263 was enacted to adopt Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) as 
a national strategy for sustainable forest management. The strategy regards the people as partners 
in forest management through the integration of people-oriented forestry projects, provision of land 
tenure security, promotion of livelihood projects, and decentralization of forest resource 
governance. With this instrument, communities are encouraged to establish livelihoods using forest 
resources since the program aims to provide an enabling environment where people can manage 
their forest resources. CBFM enables people organizations to apply for timber and NTFP licenses and 
resource use permits to legally acquire forest resources based on management plans. Protected Area 
Community Based Resource Management Agreements (PACBRMA) are comparable instruments, 
however they are issued to communities living in buffer zones of the National Integrated Protected 
Area System (NIPAS) or other types of protected areas. Both tenure instruments provide 25 years 
contracts (renewable for another 25 years) for tenure holders to develop, manage, protect, and use 
specified areas of the forest land (Executive Order 263, DENR Administrative Order No. 2004-32). The 
main incentive of the community-based agreements is tenure security. 
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADT) provides the rights to ancestral domains and lands to 
indigenous communities. With the provision of Rights to Ancestral Domains and Lands, the Republic 
Act 8371 recognizes communal land tenure of indigenous peoples as a legitimate right and offers the 
right to use and develop lands and natural resources in accordance with indigenous knowledge 
systems and practices and customary laws and traditions. 
The Integrated Social Forestry Program was launched in 1982. Integrated Social Forestry (ISF) with 
Individual Property Rights (IPR) provide individual forest tenure and land use rights for a period of 25 
years and is renewable for an additional 25 years to upland dwellers participating in the program 
With the implementation of the CBFM in 1995, ISF and other people-oriented forestry programs 
were integrated in the CBFM program. Nevertheless, the previous designated ISF areas are until 
today managed by individuals in contrast to the remaining CBFM area which is under community 
management. The rules and obligations of ISF are comparable to the remaining CBFM areas. 
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Annex 2: Governance elements with indicators as implemented in assessments 
in Ecuador (ECU), Zambia (ZMB) and the Philippines (PHI) 
 
(x: assessed) 
Thematic Area   Elements (in bold) with indicators and description ECU ZMB PHI 
Forest tenure  Forest tenure recognition and protection in practice. 
To what extent are tenure rights widely recognized 
and protected in practice? 
   
 
 Recognition. Individual and communal rights-holders 
have their rights formally recognized and recorded. 
x x x 
 
 Demarcation. Individual and communal forest lands 
have boundaries demarcated and surveyed 
x x x 
 





 Customary tenure. Minimal conflict exists between 
customary forest tenure systems and statutory 




 Gender equity. Rights registered to individuals or 
households are registered in the names of women, 
either jointly or individually 
x x x 
 
 
    
Land use  Land use decision making. To what extent are legal 
users involved in land use decision making? 
   
 





 Transparency. Planning process is transparent and 




 Opportunities for participation. Communities or 
entitled individuals have the possibility for 




 Coordination. Implementing 
agencies/persons/enterprise effectively coordinate in 




 Representation. Representatives to land use-planning 
processes reflect a range of community perspectives, 





 Capacity to engage. Representatives in land-use 
planning have information and skills to effectively 






    
Forest 
Management 
 Implementation of strategies and plans. To what 
extent are land use/forest/protected area strategies 
and plans effectively implemented in practice? 
   
 
 Coordination. Implementing 
agencies/persons/enterprise effectively coordinate in 





 Timeliness. Implementation happens according to the 




 Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular 




 Transparency. Land use plans and monitoring reports 










    
 
 Protection of natural forest (logging moratorium) .  
To what extent are natural forests protected? 
   
 
 Use restrictions. Stakeholders clearly understand the 
timeframe and what activities are allowed and not 




 Transparency. Implementing agencies are aware and 
effectively coordinate to carry out their roles and 





    
 
 Formal law enforcement. To what extent is formal 
law enforced? 
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 Apprehension. Violators are apprehended and 
brought to trial by concerned authorities 
x x x 
 
 Consistency. Assigned penalties are generally 
consistent with the law and appropriate given the 




 Compliance. Penalties are served or are paid in full in 




 Monitoring of compliance. Compliance with penalties 






 Transparency. Information about penalties and their 





    
 
 Customary law enforcement. To what extent is 
customary law enforced? 
   
 
 Apprehension. Violators are apprehended and 





 Consistency. Assigned penalties are generally 
consistent with the law and appropriate given the 





 Compliance. Penalties are served or are paid in full in 





 Monitoring of compliance. Compliance with penalties 






 Transparency. Information about penalties and their 






    
 
 Reforestation. To what extent are available forest 
lands replanted and rehabilitated not for  NGP 
reforestation areas)? 
   
 
 Coordination. The implementing agency coordinates 
implementation by  establishing clear agreements 




 Procedures. Stakeholders understand the procedures 
and terms of the program, including planting sites 





 Capacities. Communities have been capacitated to 





 Benefits.  Participants have received compensation as 




 Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular 





    
 
 Implementation of National Greening Programme. 
To what extent are available forest lands under the 
NGP Programme replanted and rehabilitated? 
   
 
 Procedures. Stakeholders understand the procedures 
and terms of the program, including planting sites 





 Coordination. The implementing agency coordinates 
implementation by  establishing clear agreements 




 Benefits.  Participants have received compensation as 




 Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular 





    
 
 Protection and conservation.  To what extent is 
forestland protected or allocated to the 
conservation of soil, water, biodiversity or culture?  
   
 
 Demarcation. Boundaries of protected or 




 Use restrictions. Stakeholders clearly understand the 
timeframe and what activities are allowed and not 
allowed within the protection or conservation area 
x x x 
 
 Enforcement. Implementing agencies are aware and 
effectively coordinate to carry out their roles and 
responsibilities 
x x x 
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 Penalties. Stakeholders understand penalties for 





 Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular 
monitoring of impacts and effectiveness 
x x x 
 
 
    
 
 Administration of timber harvesting licenses and 
permits. To what extent can tenure holders obtain 
necessary licenses and permits for harvesting 
timber?  
   
 
 To what extent can tenure holders obtain necessary 
licenses and permits for harvesting timber forest 
products?  
   
 
 Procedural clarity. Clear administrative procedures 
regulate the obtaining of licenses and permits 
x x x 
 
 Transparency. Application status can be tracked 
 
x x  
 Accessibility. The process for acquiring a license or 





 Timeliness. Licenses and permits can be obtained in a 
reasonable time and within the time prescribed 
x x x 
 
 Implementation. Licenses and permits are honoured 
during harvesting and transport of forest products 
x x x 
 
 
    
 
 Administration of non-timber forest product 
harvesting licenses and permits. To what extent can 
tenure holders obtain necessary licenses and 
permits for harvesting non-timber forest products?  
   
 
 Procedural clarity. Clear administrative procedures 




 Transparency. Application status can be tracked 
 
x x  
 Accessibility. The process for acquiring a license or 





 Timeliness. Licenses and permits can be obtained in a 




 Implementation. Licenses and permits are honoured 





    
 
 Administration of charcoal licenses and permits. To 
what extent can tenure holders obtain necessary 
licenses and permits for harvesting charcoal 
products?  
   
 
 Procedural clarity. Clear administrative procedures 










 Accessibility. The process for acquiring a license or 





 Timeliness. Licenses and permits can be obtained in a 





 Implementation. Licenses and permits are honoured 






    
 
 Implementation of programme/project for 
supporting of forest-based sustainable livelihoods. 
To what extent are forest-based sustainable 
livelihood programmes/projects implemented?  
   
 
 Procedures. Stakeholders clearly understand the 





 Coordination. Government agencies coordinate and 










 Facilities. Credit facilities and capacity building were 











    
Revenues  Revenues. 
   
 
 Fairness. Fees collected are reasonable and basis of 
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 Transparency. Field staff generate comprehensive 
and accurate records of all fees collected and are 





 Awareness. The government takes action to ensure 











 Monitoring. Regular monitoring evaluates whether 





 Benefit sharing mechanisms. 
   
 
 Participation. Community has participated in the 





 Compliance. Benefits are delivered in accordance 






 Awareness. Community members are aware of 












 Monitoring. Regular monitoring evaluates whether 






    
Institutions  Capacities and effectiveness of central government 
institutions. 
   
 
 Knowledge and skills. Institutions capacitated with up 






 Human resources. Institutions capacitated with 






 Financial resources. Institutions capacitated with 






 Scientific and technical information. Institutions 
capacitated with relevant scientific and technical 





 Effectiveness. Institutions are effective in 






    
 
 Capacities and effectiveness of local government 
institutions. 
   
 
 Knowledge and skills. Institutions capacitated with up 






 Human resources. Institutions capacitated with 






 Financial resources. Institutions capacitated with 






 Scientific and technical information. Institutions 
capacitated with relevant scientific and technical 





 Effectiveness. Institutions are effective in 





 Government capacities. Government agencies have 
adequate number of staff with up-to-date knowledge 
and skills, technology and equipment, and budget to 






    
 
 Capacities and effectiveness of non government 
institutions. 
   
 
 Knowledge and skills. Institutions capacitated with up 






 Human resources. Institutions capacitated with 






 Financial resources. Institutions capacitated with 
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 Scientific and technical information. Institutions 
capacitated with relevant scientific and technical 





 Effectiveness Institutions are effective in 





 NGO capacities. NGOs have adequate number of staff 
with up-to-date knowledge and skills, technology and 






    
 
 Capacities and effectiveness of customary 
institutions. 
   
 
 Knowledge and skills. Institutions capacitated with up 






 Human resources. Institutions capacitated with 






 Financial resources. Institutions capacitated with 






 Scientific and technical information. Institutions 
capacitated with relevant scientific and technical 





 Effectiveness. Institutions are effective in 





 Local community capacities. Local communities have 
adequate number of staff with up-to-date knowledge 
and skills, technology and equipment, and budget to 






    
Cross cutting 
issues 
 Public participation in policy making. To what extent 
are non governmental organizations participating in 
public forest policy making? 
   
 
 Awareness. Community members are aware in a 
timely manner of policies to be developed, reviewed 
and revised that are relevant for land use in their 
community 
x x x 
 
 Platforms. Platforms are provided for multi-
stakeholder participation in policy making 
x x x 
 
 Representation. Policy making platforms allowed 
participation of key representatives from the 
different forestry sector 
x x x 
 
 Effectivity. Facilitation methods allowed key 




 Transparency. The stakeholders are informed of the 
results of policy engagements 
x x x 
 
 
    
 
 Implementation of Payment for Ecosystem Services 
(PES). To what extent are PES schemes being 
implemented?  
   
 
 Procedures. The procedures for establishing PES have 
been made clear to the stakeholders 
x x x 
 






 Benefit sharing. The schemes for benefit sharing have 
been jointly decided, understood and acceptable to 
the stakeholders 
x x x 
 
 Protection. The protection of the forests providing 
these ecosystem services has been put in place 
x x x 
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A B S T R A C T
In view of a continuing global decrease of forest cover, many authors mention forest governance as a basic
concept contributing to reduced deforestation, specifically in the tropics. There are numerous definitions for
forest governance. The concept is commonly understood as a broad approach and assessment tools comprise
dozens of indicators. However, there is no information about relations between single indicators, their in-
dividual importance and whether contextual factors modify their effects. This article aims to analyze if the
hypothesized relation between governance leading to reduced tropical deforestation in general holds true, to
identify the most decisive governance components and to explore if the wider socio-economic and political
context influences potential governance effects. The structure - agency concept is used as theoretical basis to
identify underlying mechanisms and as conceptual basis for discussing individual indicators. We employ a
quantitative literature review based on scientific articles on governance and deforestation. From a total of 810
articles we select the most frequently cited publications related to the subject. From the resulting 198 papers
only those are studied that contain empirical relations between governance and deforestation. The remaining
28 studies are analyzed by applying the governance indicators of the World Resource Institute as categories for
content analysis. Likert scores are used to quantify governance effects as input for subsequent principal
component analysis and multiple linear regressions. Results show that indeed high governance scores fre-
quently relate to lower rates of deforestation and we thus recommend continued political support for the
concept. But the reviewed studies mostly focus on a smaller number of classical governance indicators, which
suggests that the governance concept might benefit from streamlining into a more targeted approach. In this
respect, several indicators were related to underlying principal components reflecting the agency and structure
concept. Even though we cannot claim a statistically significant stronger effect of one or the other component,
single structural indicators were more strongly and more consistently linked to reduced deforestation in
comparison to agency related indicators. The concept can thus be helpful to guide policy design and im-
plementation. We show this by applying it to the ongoing discussion on results based payments under REDD+
as a prominent example for agency related measures. The reviewed literature in addition suggests that gov-
ernance effects are moderated by deforestation drivers such as corruption, illegal logging and population
growth and by interventions like technology transfer.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Even though the pace of net forest loss has slowed, the area of the
world’s forests continues to decrease with a net annual forest loss of 3.3
mio ha (FAO, 2015). The largest loss of forest area still occurs in the
tropics. Research on causes of deforestation in the tropics has a long
tradition and numerous publications name and identify possible drivers
(Geist and Lambin, 2002; Hosonuma et al., 2012; Wehkamp et al.,
2015; Busch and Ferretti-Gallon, 2017). Governance has come into the
focus as a general approach to reverse the deforestation trend and in
international forest policy governance is increasingly taken into ac-
count (Singer and Giessen, 2017).
Numerous definitions have been proposed for forest governance
(Larson and Petkova, 2011; Broekhoven et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2013;
Giessen and Buttoud, 2014; de Graaf et al., 2017; Mansourian, 2017).
The recent definitions all understand governance as a broad and com-
prehensive concept that goes far beyond governments. For (Larson and
Petkova, 2011) and (Broekhoven et al., 2012) forest governance is
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.12.007
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centered around decisions on forest management. de Graaf et al. (2017)
emphasize rules and decisions. Wehkamp et al. (2018) and Davis et al.
(2013) focus on different dimensions by introducing levels and hor-
izontal dimensions or components and principles. Scholars have pro-
duced an increasing number of (i) case studies analyzing governance
effects on the ground (Andersson et al., 2014; Schusser et al., 2015;
Subhan Mollick et al., 2018) (ii) statistical evaluations of governance
effects using regional or global panel data sets (Umemiya et al., 2010)
and (iii) reviews of existing research results (Bhagwat et al., 2017;
Wehkamp et al., 2018). Whatever concept applied, the prevailing
conclusion is that improved forest governance will at least contribute to
reduced deforestation (Kanninen et al., 2007; Korhonen-Kurki et al.,
2014; Stickler et al., 2017). However, such a general conclusion needs
to be questioned or at least analyzed in detail, as governance comprises
a multitude of different components. Handbooks and toolboxes list
governance indicators but without substantiation of effects for each of
the multiple elements and components. The (Worldbank, 2006) spe-
cifies six dimensions of governance. Kishor and Kenneth (2012) list 130
governance indicators. Davis et al. (2013) provide 122 indicators in six
thematic areas and (Worldbank, 2006; Kishor and Kenneth, 2012; Davis
et al., 2013; de Graaf et al., 2017) defines four criteria with 18 in-
dicators. Previous studies rely on such indicator descriptions and ana-
lyze effects of single governance components on deforestation, but an
understanding of the inherent structure of different governance com-
ponents and how they interact is missing until today. It is also not clear
which of the multiple components are the most decisive ones with re-
gards to effects on deforestation. This, however, would be important for
the scientific understanding of governance functioning. It would also
have practical implications, as policy requires information on which of
the multiple components to concentrate and practitioners need to know
if additional governance components are affected when they are
working on one specific element. Additionally and above all, there are
indications that governance effects also depend on the specific context
(Wehkamp et al., 2018). Thus, context factors like local deforestation
drivers and other policy interventions on the ground need to be con-
sidered as well.
Irrespective of specific indicators, the main theoretical basis of
forest governance has been claimed to consist of two mainstream
models: rational choice and neo-institutionalism, otherwise described
as agency –structure concept, which thus provides a theoretical basis to
better understand and describe governance approaches (Arts et al.,
2014). An agency line of reasoning predominantly builds on local ac-
tors’ rational choice and e.g. financial motivation for increased eco-
nomic benefit of forest conservation. Structural approaches are based
on command and control interventions, with a focus on setting and
improving institutions, frames and rules enforcing them. Analyzing
current governance elements and results under this perspective could
thus provide a starting point for understanding the relation and impact
of different governance components.
An example for practical implications of such governance research
is whether existing governance results generally support agency based
approaches to counteract tropical deforestation in contrast to structural
approaches. Results based payments under the REDD+ (“Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation”) approach of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC
2007a; FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1) would be a prominent example for an
agent based tool in international forest policy as they build on the fi-
nancial motivation of recipients, in contrast to traditional input based
development aid, often aiming to improve structures, rules and their
implementation. Results based payments under REDD+ have been
promoted as an innovative tool. Still today, they are seen as a “main
innovation to REDD+” (Angelsen et al., 2018). However, the dis-
bursement of such finance is far below expectations and a controversial
discussion on success and the future of REDD+ and the applicability of
results based payments in international forest policy is ongoing (Fischer
et al., 2016; Fletcher et al., 2016; Angelsen et al., 2017).
1.2. Aim and objectives
This article aims to study the effects of governance on tropical forests
taking into account the specific local policy and deforestation context.
The particular objectives are to analyze (a) if the hypothesized relation
between quality of governance and deforestation in general holds true
and whether it applies to all governance elements. It (b) further explores
if general and independent structure or agency mechanisms are under-
lying applied governance research in order to conclude whether aspects
of rational choice or institutional settings have stronger explanatory
power as determinant governance factors for deforestation in the tropics.
In this respect, the study aims to (c) identify the most decisive govern-
ance indicators and (d) further analyzes effects of context factors on
forests to find out if governance effects depend on these.
2. Methods
The study firstly develops a theoretical framework for analyzing
governance effects on deforestation. It then applies a mixed method
approach, including systematic literature search and a review of peer
reviewed articles based on quantitative as well as qualitative content
analysis. This provides the basis for a principal component analysis
(PCA) and multiple regression analysis to evaluate the effects of gov-
ernance components, their interrelation and the wider socio-economic
and political context on deforestation, forest degradation or reforesta-
tion.
2.1. Development of governance concept and theoretical framework
The agency approach postulates that it is mainly self-interested
actors, with their specific motivations, intentions, goals, actions and
resources, that take active agency (Archer, 2003) and, hence, drive land
use decisions. Land users are assumed to take rational choices in order
to maximize their economic or political benefits. Broadly, this school of
thought assumes that “man’s natural proclivity is to pursue his own
interests” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985) and follows the logic of
consequences of behavior (March and Olsen, 2004). On the other side,
laws, regulations, plans, cultural conventions and norms shape land use
decisions providing a structural frame. Hence, this approach broadly
follows the logic of appropriate behavior (March and Olsen, 2004). It
has to be taken into account that usually neither structure nor agency
alone drive human behavior. March and Olsen (1998) consider the need
to study “which settings in practice enable the dominance of one logic
over all others” and (Giddens, 1984) formulates that agents - groups or
individuals - draw upon structures to perform social actions but at the
same time structure is the result of these social practices. This “feed-
back-feedforward” system has been adapted to forest governance by
Arts et al. (2014) in a so-called practice based approach described by
the metaphor of a dance or theatre performance in which actors are on
one side driven by scripts (structures) which they on the other hand
constantly re-interpret.
Taking into account the numerous definitions that have been pro-
posed for governance, a review needs a wide governance perspective
(Mansourian, 2016), because it should not exclude specific results only
because of different definitions. We thus base our study on the broad
definition of (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014) according to which “forest
governance comprises a) all formal and informal, public and private
regulatory structures, i.e. institutions consisting of rules, norms, prin-
ciples, decision procedures, concerning forests, their utilization and
their conservation, b) the interactions between public and private ac-
tors therein and c) the effects of either on forests”. This definition in-
herently reflects structure and agency components as it explicitly
mentions structural aspects in its first part and describes agency related
aspects as interactions of different actors in the second part. It further
relates governance to effects on forests, which is in line with the aims of
our study.
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From the different tools that are available to assess governance we
apply the framework presented by the World Resource Institute (WRI)
(Davis et al., 2013) because it provides a comprehensive set of oper-
ationally defined indicators but leaves leeway to adjust the system to
the respective context. The assessment tool is structured along six
thematic areas comprising all together 26 subthemes which we refer to
as indicators (Table 1). The assignment of indicators and thematic areas
to either the agency or structure approach allows applying the frame-
work under our definition. We interpret forest ownership, tenure dispute
resolution, private sector, civil society, public participation in decision
making and all indicators related to revenues as being decisive in the
context of an agency related approach because these indicators reflect
individual decisions, personal motivations - including financial interests
- and the possibilities of single actors to implement own interests. We
interpret the WRI indicators of land use planning, land use plan im-
plementation, sectoral land use, forest strategies and plans, legal/policy
framework, law enforcement and legislature as indicators related to a
structural policy approach, because they emphasize creation, existence
and implementations of structures, rules and frames. A number of in-
dicators either cannot be assigned exclusively to one of the approaches
or contains elements of both.
When analyzing relations between governance and deforestation,
single indicators, including their interactions. In our theoretical fra-
mework, we consider governance indicators of the WRI framework.
However, it is not these indicators but always actors that exercise in-
fluence on forests because deforestation processes depend on human
behavior. Governance indicators affect actors but are as well affected by
these. Actors, in addition, are influenced by other actors’ behavior
(Kickert et al., 1997; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Additionally we
take into account context factors like deforestation drivers and inter-
ventions, that interact with governance indicators as well as with actors
(Fig. 1). Finally, actors are influencing forests but are as well influenced
by these.
The actor-governance interactions are highly complex and case
specific and their study needs qualitative, individual and interpretative
approaches and “thick descriptions” (Arts et al., 2014). This is not ap-
plicable in a review study aiming to generalize results (see Section 2.3).
We therefore do not explore governance-actor interrelations but focus
directly on governance effects on deforestation because these are of
ultimate political interest. Information on governance-forest interrela-
tions is available in multiple studies and can thus be analyzed (Fig. 2).
In this respect, a governance effect means that within a specific study
qualitative or quantitative evidence is described for a specific WRI
governance indicator as independent variable causing changes on de-
forestation, reforestation or degradation as dependent variables.
Our framework also describes interrelations between governance
indicators because this has important practical implications for de-
signing forest governance measures in the field (Fig. 3). In addition, we
analyze effects of context factors on governance and forests (Fig. 4).
2.2. Selection of articles
The study relies on peer reviewed articles or reviews containing
empirical results from forest governance studies. We identified studies
through a literature search in Scopus in March 2017. In order to de-
termine the period of the analysis we checked the number of publica-
tions in Scopus per year using ‘forest’ and ‘governance’. After 2000,
there was a nearly constant increase in number of publications with 7
publications in 2000, 20 publications in 2001 and 297 publications in
2016. Thus, we focused the search on studies published after 2000. We
only selected English journal research articles. Given the wide range of
applied forest governance definitions we did not focus the study on
search terms that are elements of different definitions but rather fo-
cused on the overarching term “governance” itself which is consensus
among all definitions. We thus searched in title, abstract and keywords
for ‘governance’ in combination with (i) ‘degradation’ and ‘forest’, (ii)
‘deforestation’ and (iii) ‘reforestation’, resulting in 810 publications
including duplicates (Table 2). Within each of the years and search term
combinations, we selected those publications that had more citations
than the average of the selected publications of the same year and
search term combination in order to keep the large number of pub-
lications manageable. This resulted in a total of 286 papers. After re-
moving duplicates, we ended with 198 review publications.
From these, we only selected articles for which the abstracts in-
dicated research on effects of one or more governance components on
deforestation, reforestation or degradation. We searched for studies that
aimed to establish empirical links between these two, irrespective
whether they finally found or did not find such links. Empirical links
either could be quantitative statistical or qualitatively descriptive based
on defined scientific methods. We left aside studies focusing on urban
forestry and only focused on rural areas. We only selected research from
countries with notable territories in the tropical climatic zone or in the
case of reviews including more than 50 % of tropical countries. We
excluded four studies that were based on global reviews in order to
focus the scope. The final selection yielded 28 articles (Table 2).
2.3. Content analysis for governance indicators and context factors
We used content analysis as an approach for the systematic analysis
of the published articles. We firstly identified which of the specific WRI
governance indicators (Davis et al., 2013) were tackled in each of the
studies. In a second step, all additional factors related to deforestation
were classified as context factors. Qualitative content analysis required
a thorough reading of the articles and assigning of governance in-
formation to indicators as provided by the framework of the World
Resource Institute (see Tables 1 and 3). The 26 indicators were thus
Table 1
Six thematic areas and 26 indicators for governance assessments based on (Davis et al., 2013). Black: indicators
that we interpreted as agency related; grey: indicators interpreted as structure related. A number of indicators
cannot be assigned to either of these two mechanisms.
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subcomponents for classification within our content analysis (Mayring,
2000, 2014). On average, only 4.9 indicators out of possible 26 possible
indicators were considered per study. For a more focused descriptive
presentation and qualitative discussion we thus merged the 26 original
indicators to 11 aggregated indicators by pooling less frequently men-
tioned indicators within thematic areas.
Many studies in addition contained information about the wider
socio-economic and political context of deforestation. We also used
content analysis to analyze such context factors. We relied on a clas-
sification of deforestation drivers by (Hosonuma et al., 2012) and on
categories for interventions used by (Agrawal et al., 2014). Factors that
directly or indirectly increase deforestation were classified as defor-
estation drivers. Actions explicitly undertaken to counter land use
changes were classified as interventions. We adjusted the original
classifications using qualitative content analysis as an iterative method.
This implies that during reading, categories for all context factors were
partly newly created, rearranged or successively adapted based on the
contents of the material (Mayring, 2000, 2014). A final reading was
then conducted based on the final categories for governance indicators
and context factors. We coded our texts using MAXQDA (version 11).
Each result or conclusion related to one of our categories was marked
and coded; the coding system in MAXQDA consisted of the classification
described above. Based on the summary of all coded text parts in a
specific document we then applied Likert scores for effects of govern-
ance indicators and context factors (Tables 4 and 5). Identifying gov-
ernance components and assigning scales meant interpreting the
meaning of the texts. An example is given in Appendix A. Based on this
list of marked key statements the co-authors routinely checked codes
for plausibility in order to guarantee reliability. Taking into account a
still manageable amount of 28 studies we refrained from working with
multiple analyzers also taking into considering the challenges of cali-
brating multiple scientists (Bryman, 2003).
Converting thematic analysis into quantitative Likert scales con-
stitutes a data transformation based on an intensity scale (Castro et al.,
2010).This is needed because qualitative data descriptions as well as
quantitative approaches in the underlying studies may not be consistent
across observers and/or contexts, which requires standardization or
harmonization in the form of coding before comparisons can be made
(Coe and Scacco, 2017; Magliocca et al., 2018). Our content analysis is
therefore a mixed method in which qualitative results of reading the
text are coded and thus transformed. Quantitative components gain
particular importance when generalization of the results is required
(Mayring, 2014).
In case that negative governance was reported in the studies we
Fig. 1. Theoretical framework for analyzing
forest governance effects on deforestation
taking into account governance indicators that
are agency related (black rectangles) or struc-
ture related (grey rectangles), or related to
neither of them (white rectangles). Context
factors are deforestation drivers (“D” rhombs)
or interventions (“I” rhombs). Full grey arrows:
interactions of context factors with governance
and actors; dashed arrows: actor-governance,
actor-actor and actor-forest interactions; more
explanations in the text.
Fig. 2. Simplified model of governance effects on deforestation, as studied following objective (a) in order to analyze if the hypothesized relation between quality of
governance and deforestation in general holds true.
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Fig. 3. Relations between governance indicators in order to further explore if general and independent structure or agency mechanisms are underlying applied
governance and to identify the most decisive governance indicators following objectives (b) and (c).
Fig. 4. Effects of context factors on forests and on governance indicators, as studied following objective (d).
Table 2
Results of the literature search on governance relations to deforestation, reforestation and forest degradation.
N all publications N publications with above average citations
governance AND degradation AND forest 266 94
governance AND reforestation 67 28
governance AND deforestation 477 164
subtotal 810 286
after removing duplicates 198
studies with empirical relations on governance and deforestation including global reviews 32
Total after removing global reviews 28
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inverted the deforestation effect to make it comparable to studies re-
porting on positive governance: when e.g. negative governance within
executive agencies was linked to higher deforestation (negative effect of
negative governance) we assumed the effect of improved governance
within executive agencies to be positive and gave high scores (equal to
positive effects of positive governance).
2.4. Additional information
We coded supplementary information. Supplementary information
included four categories for scale. Subnational studies were those that
focused on specific regions within a country only. National studies in-
cluded one single country. Global studies related to at least 10 countries
distributed across the three major tropical forest regions (Central/South
Table 3
Assessed governance indicators and context factors, number of MAXQDA codings and number of documents scored.
Aggregations for qualitative analysis due to low abundances. Black: agency related governance indicators, grey:
structure related governance indicators. Governance indicators as specified by (Davis et al., 2013). Categories for
drivers and interventions adapted from (Hosonuma et al., 2012) and (Agrawal et al., 2014).
Table 4
Likert scale for de-/reforestation effect of governance indicators and context factors.
Governance indicator or context factor is …. Likert score
…strongly linked to increased deforestation (degradation) or decreased reforestation; strong essential factor, and/or mentioned in abstract or conclusion as a main
factor
1
…linked to increased deforestation (degradation) or decreased reforestation; clear and substantial effect 2
… slightly linked to increased deforestation (degradation) or decreased reforestation; small documented effect 3
…not linked to deforestation, no effect, or both: positive and negative effects 4
…slightly linked to reduced deforestation (degradation) or increased reforestation; small documented effect 5
…linked to reduced deforestation (degradation) or increased reforestation; clear and substantial effects 6
…strongly linked to reduced deforestation (degradation) or increased reforestation; strong essential factor, and/or mentioned in abstract or conclusion as a main
factor
7
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America, Africa, South-East Asia). Multinational studies comprised all
other studies.
In order to identify explanatory theoretical concepts in the reviewed
studies, we noted whether studies explicitly mentioned any social sci-
ence theory and, if yes, whether the agency or structure theory were
mentioned in the related study.
We coded the methodology applied in the different studies de-
pending on whether governance data within the studies was assessed in
the field or was taken from existing literature or databases. Forest and
deforestation information was either measured in the field, e.g. through
inventories, or could be derived from satellite data or literature. For
linking governance (explanatory) with deforestation (target) informa-
tion, studies were rated as either applying descriptive methods or
quantitative statistical approaches. Reviews summarizing results from
multiple studies were treated separately.
2.5. Statistical analyses
We applied Likert scores to quantify results of the qualitative con-
tent analysis. Mean governance effects on deforestation as well as mean
effect of context factors per study were calculated as the arithmetic
mean of the Likert scores of all original governance indicators and
context factors for each study. We also used Likert scores in principal
component analysis and multiple regression analysis following
(Manley, 2005). Gaps in the data sets occurred because not all in-
dicators and context factors, occurred in each of the studies. For con-
ducting principal component analysis and multiple regression analysis,
we filled the gaps with the mean Likert scores for indicators, drivers and
interventions respectively following (Dray and Josse, 2014).
In order to structure the complex data set of governance indicators
and to identify a smaller number of independent gradients (compo-
nents) we applied principal component analysis (Dunteman, 1989). We
used multivariate regression analysis with backward elimination in
order to check for potential relationships between single context factors
(predictors) and governance (target variable). Multicollinearity refers
to the condition in which two or more predictors are highly correlated
with one another which can make it difficult to determine the effect of
each predictor on the response. We checked for multicollinearity of
predictors by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) for each of the
predictors. VIFs quantify the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary
least squares regression analysis providing an index that measures how
much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased
because of collinearity. VIFs were in all cases below 2 and we thus
excluded multicollinearity which is a precondition to run a valid mul-
tiple regression analysis. We checked normal distribution of the re-
siduals by plotting and comparing the distribution against a standar-
dized normal distribution. Plotting residuals against predicted values
helped identifying possible relationships between these. However, in
none of the cases we identified statistical significant linear relationships
between the residuals and the predicted values.
All statistical evaluations were carried out using the statistical
software package of JMP 12 (SAS, 2015).
3. Results
3.1. Regional, methodological and theory context of the studies
Out of the 28 studies analyzed, 20 were local studies (Fig. 5). Case
studies from South America dominated the review, Africa was under-
represented. 13 studies were from South or Central America. Only three
studies were from Africa and out of these, only one was a field study,
the other two represented multinational ones, relying on existing da-
tabases. Mean governance effects in the three African studies were
lowest (5.3). Mean governance effects in the Asian studies were highest
(5.7), but in an analysis of variance (not depicted) differences between
regions were not significant.
Remote sensing data provided the basis for evaluating governance
effects on deforestation in most studies. Deforestation information was
based on satellite data in 17 studies, some studies used field inventories
(7 studies) or literature (4 studies). Quantitative and qualitative
methods were applied to similar extents. 14 studies used quantitative
statistics to examine relationships between governance indicators and
deforestation and 13 studies used qualitative descriptive tools. There
was one review among the studies. With a mean governance effect of
5.8 qualitative studies showed stronger effects of high governance
scores on deforestation as compared to quantitative studies that had a
mean of 5.2. However, differences were not statistically significant.
Social or policy theory considerations did not play a major role in the
reviewed sample of governance research. 23 studies did not mention
any social or policy theory as background for the research. Five studies
mentioned a theory context, namely concepts developed by (Bourdieu,
1991), (Becker, 1968), (Ostrom, 1990), or (Fraser, 2007). Oestreicher
et al. (2009) did not explicitly mention a theory concept but explicitly
called for a command and control structure. None of the studies ex-
plicitly mentioned agency or structure based theories.
3.2. Effects of governance indicators, deforestation drivers and interventions
on deforestation
Within the 28 studies, we coded 596 key sentences or text pieces:
338 codings were related to governance indicators, 154 to drivers and
104 to interventions (column a in Table 3). Text related to forest law
enforcement was most frequently encoded (58 codings in 20 docu-
ments). The most frequently identified context factors were population
growth or density and economic development (30 codings in 9 documents).
The fact that the number of codings for governance indicators was
higher as compared to codings for context factors was to be expected as
governance was the search criterion for the studies.
The number of original governance WRI indicators that we scored in
all documents was highly variable (column b in Table 3). Out of the 26
indicators, 12 were only scored in 2 or less studies. Even though that
governance today is defined and conceptualized as a broad and com-
prehensive approach comprising many different aspects, none of the
studies considered governance issues in the context of forest concessions,
legislative institutions, budgeting or forest classification. Also, the dis-
tribution of scores between the WRI thematic governance areas was
unequal. Forest management indicators were scored in 54 cases, which
is mainly due to the importance of policy framework, monitoring and law
enforcement. Indicators related to the thematic area of forest revenues
only occurred in 7 cases. The sum of all scores for agency indicators
(48) and the number of all scores for structure indicators (47) was al-
most identical.
All governance indicators were predominately linked to decreasing
deforestation, degradation or to increased reforestation (Fig. 6). Only
tenure/ownership showed a larger share of controversial results as it did
Fig. 5. Number of reviewed studies covering specific regions and scales.
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not only yield positive results. In five cases it was scored as positive and
negative or with no effect and in one study it was related to increased
deforestation. Among context factors, deforestation drivers were mostly
related to increased deforestation which is implied in the definition of a
deforestation driver. However, economic development/income and agri-
culture in some cases also had positive effects, i.e. they were linked to
decreasing deforestation. Interventions mostly decreased deforestation.
It is notable that “not assessed” was the most frequently occurring ca-
tegory, showing that most studies only tackled a small subset of gov-
ernance indicators and context factors. Only law enforcement, executive
agencies and participation were mentioned in more than half of the
studies.
3.3. Reducing the complexity of governance indicators
Principal component analysis (PCA) reduces the dimensionality of a
multivariate data set by producing linear combinations (principal
components) of the original variables (e.g. governance indicators) that
summarize the predominant patterns in the data (Peres-Neto et al.,
2003). In other words, we applied PCA in order to identify independent
gradients within the complex data set of those 22 governance indicators
that were tackled in the studies. The results reveal nine components
with eigenvalues above 1.0, i.e. components explaining more variation
than a single indicator. Those nine components together explained 78
% of the variation (Table 6). On the first component, nearly all in-
dicators showed positive loadings. They together were linked to de-
creasing deforestation. This component was most strongly determined
by land use plan implementation, transparency and legal and policy fra-
meworks. On the second component, structure indicators on the nega-
tive end were separated from agency indicators grouped more towards
the positive end. Also on the third component a certain, yet less distinct
separation of agency and structure indicators could be observed. On the
first three components that together explained 38 % of the variation
agency thus had rather antagonistic effects to structure indicators;
structure and agency indicators were determining these components
(Table 7). The biplot of the first and the second component summarizes
these findings and depicts that structure indicators were clearly
grouped and separated from agency indicators (Fig. 7). In summary, the
results show that within the 28 studies evaluated there is a clear pattern
of structural indicators, which means that even though not explicitly
named in the studies, a structural approach of forest governance re-
search can be distinguished, whereas agency indicators show a rather
diffuse relationship with underlying deforestation-governance compo-
nents.
3.4. Comparing agency and structure-related governance studies
In order to classify the studies into more agency or more structure
related ones we counted how many agency and how many structure
related indicators had been assessed in each study. Then we related the
number of assessed agency indicators to maximum possible agency
indicators and called this relation the share of assessed agency in-
dicators per study. The same we did for the structure indicators. We
also calculated the share of assessed agency to assessed structure in-
dicators. Neither the share of assessed agency indicators, nor the share
of assessed structure indicators nor the share agency vs. structure in-
dicators correlated with the mean governance effects on deforestation.
Thus, neither a stronger focus on agency, nor a more pronounced focus
on structure indicators in the studies resulted in stronger or weaker
effects on deforestation.
Fig. 6. Distribution of Likert scores for aggregated governance indicators and
context factors over the 28 studies.
Table 6
Eigenvalues for each principal component in order from largest to smallest. The
eigenvalues represent a partition of the total variation in the multivariate
sample. An eigenvalue of 1.0 (2.0 or 3.0) indicates that the respective com-
ponent explains as much variation as one (two or three) single variables. The
first nine components explain 78 % of the total variance of the model.
Component Eigenvalue % Expl. variance Cumulative %
1 3.46 16.46 16.46
2 2.56 12.18 28.64
3 1.97 9.39 38.03
4 1.87 8.92 46.95
5 1.56 7.44 54.39
6 1.45 6.89 61.28
7 1.29 6.15 67.43
8 1.08 5.14 72.58
9 1.05 5.02 77.60
10 1.00 4.78 82.38
11 0.88 4.18 86.56
12 0.79 3.74 90.29
13 0.62 2.94 93.23
14 0.51 2.44 95.67
15 0.37 1.76 97.43
16 0.22 1.04 98.47
17 0.19 0.90 99.38
18 0.07 0.34 99.71
19 0.04 0.17 99.89
20 0.02 0.11 100.00
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3.5. Multiple linear regressions explaining mean governance effects
In Section 3.2 we showed that governance indicators are in general
linked to decreasing deforestation. In order to analyze this effect in
more detail and to examine if this effect is moderated by context fac-
tors, we applied multiple linear regression analyses. We used mean
governance effects on deforestation as dependent variable and
explained it by context factors. Full models included all available ex-
planatory driver and intervention data. In the backward selected/op-
timized model we removed non-significant variables that did not in-
crease the r2 (Table 8). The full model with all context factors (column
a) had a low r2 of 0.18 and was not significant. The improved model
could explain 38 % of the variation of governance effects on defor-
estation (r2 = 0.38). Thus, in the dataset based on 28 studies, over one
third of the variation in governance effects was explained by the socio-
economic and political context. Corruption/illegal logging was negatively
related to governance effects, i.e. acting in the opposite direction as
governance. We interpret that corruption can counteract governance
effects. Population growth/density was positively correlated with gov-
ernance effects on deforestation, showing that the stronger population
effects on deforestation are, the less effects governance has on defor-
estation (population in general has Likert scores below 4, decreasing
Likert scores for population thus show stronger relations to deforesta-
tion). The same holds true for economic development. Tourism was po-
sitively correlated, showing that where tourism is related to decreasing
deforestation, the effects of governance are reinforced and vice versa.
Technology was the strongest explanatory variable and negatively re-
lated. We interpret that technological improvements and governance
effects are antagonistic.
4. Discussion
4.1. Relation between quality of governance and deforestation
High scores for governance indicators analyzed across the 28 se-
lected studies, were predominately linked to decreasing deforestation.
Between the indicators, there were hardly differences in effects on
forests (Fig. 6). In addition, nearly all indicators loaded jointly and
positively on the first PCA component (Table 6). This confirms the
finding of in general consistent effects and suggests that the governance
indicators act conjointly and together have predominantly positive ef-
fects on reduced deforestation. Seemingly, the hypothesized relation
between quality of governance and deforestation holds true and the
findings are thus in line with many authors claiming positive effects of
forest governance (Bhatterai and Hammig, 2001; Bhattarai and
Hammig, 2004) or stating that governance is a “precondition for
Table 7
Loading matrix for the first four principal components of a PCA for governance
indicators. For full names of indicators see Table 3. Indicators sorted according
to the loadings on the respective component. Components aggregate informa-
tion from several governance indicators. By definition, loadings can range be-
tween -1 and 1. High positive or negative loadings indicate strong explanatory
power of the indicators for the respective component; black: agency indicators;
grey: structure indicators. Especially on the second component structure and
agency indicators are aggregated. On the first component structure parameters
are loading higher, on the second the agency parameters.
Fig. 7. Principal component analysis for governance indicators, biplot for 1st
and 2nd component. For full names of indicators see Table 3. Black: agency
indicators; grey: structure indicators. The grouped occurrence of structure in-
dicators suggests that there are inherent structural approaches in governance
research whereas agency aspects are separated from them and more dispersed
throughout the studies.
Table 8
Multiple linear regression explaining mean governance effects on
deforestation by context factors; p values for single factors. +/- :
positive/negative effect; shaded cells: variables not included in op-
timized model; significance levels: * 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001; a: full
model with all context factors; b: optimized model with selected
factors; optimization by backward selection.
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achieving a sustainable landscape” (de Graaf et al., 2017) or vital for
“successful REDD+ implementation” (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014).
Angelsen et al. (2017) even refer to missing governance as a reason for
unsatisfactory results of REDD+ globally.
4.2. Structure or agency mechanisms underlying applied governance
research
The reviewed studies examine effects of one or several governance
indicators on deforestation, but they hardly consider relations between
them. Our PCA shows specific relations between single governance
indicators across the studies. Specifically on the second axis agency and
structure indictors are clearly differentiated, and also on the first and
third axis there is a certain, yet less distinct sorting (Table 6). The
grouping of structure and agency indicators on the first three compo-
nents shows that beyond a general trend of positive effects, independent
governance mechanisms are in place that are characterized by varying
contributions of single indicators. Agency and structure can be inter-
preted as such general and underlying governance mechanisms. This
supports (Arts et al., 2014) claiming them to be two mainstream models
that can help to understand governance functioning.
It is, however, undebated that agency and structure are idealized
poles. As shown in our conceptual considerations (Section 2.1), there is
consensus that actors’ decisions will not purely follow one or the other
logic and context-specific combinations with different shares of agency
and structure components need to be taken into account (Giddens,
1984; March and Olsen, 1998). Both aspects are important and our
results show that none of the two has stronger effects on deforestation.
This is supported e.g. by the institutional economics theory (Ostrom,
2009) claiming that rational choice is mediated by rules, norms and
beliefs. In this respect also the practice based approach (Arts et al.,
2014) gains relevance, even though that in our evaluated studies such a
dynamic dualism is hardly mentioned. Only (Andersson and Gibson,
2007) formulate such an understanding as “local … moderation of
national policy … that researchers and policymakers need to under-
stand”. The perception of individual agency and structure mechanisms
connected through dynamic and interactive feed backs may help to
design and steer governance research and development work.
4.3. Most decisive governance indicators
Governance can only be assessed through individual indicators that
represent specific governance aspects and that contribute to differing
extends to structural or agency mechanisms. This necessitates a more
detailed discussion of single indictors in the structure-agency context,
taking also into account that a number of indicators represent aspects of
both or cannot be assigned to either of the mechanisms.
Structural indicators like land use plan implementation, legal/policy
framework and related law enforcement load stronger on the first PCA
component as compared to agency indicators that load less on the first
axis. In addition, agency indicators of tenure/ownership and participation
show controversial results with some studies also reporting negative
effects on deforestation (Fig. 6). This might suggest a more uniform and
positive effect of structural indicators which might be interpreted as
more strongly determining deforestation reduction. However, neither
the share of agency nor the share of structural indicators per study
correlated with mean deforestation effects (Section 3.4). It thus seems
that even though we cannot claim a statistically significant stronger
effect of one or the other mechanism, single structure indicators are
more strongly and more consistently linked to reduced deforestation.
This is an important finding in the context of the ongoing discussion on
results based payments under REDD+. Such payments aim to utilize
the financial motivation of recipient countries for reducing deforesta-
tion; they are an agency related governance component. The ongoing
discussions on its implementations (Fischer et al., 2016; Fletcher et al.,
2016; Angelsen et al., 2017, 2018) already show that a pure agency
focus will hardly work. Our findings support that structural components
which are as well foreseen under REDD+ aiming to install legal and
institutional structures, so-called readiness measures, need to be im-
plemented first. They need to be perceived and communicated as in-
dependently functioning components. Expectations to tackle the tro-
pical deforestation challenge with purely agency related measures are
obviously hard to fulfil.
In our review, structural indicators were most frequently re-
presented by policy framework and law enforcement. The legal policy
framework and its enforcement are very closely intertwined in the PCA
results (Fig. 7). Both of them are linked to reduced deforestation and in
many studies they were evaluated conjointly. Our studies show both:
negative effects of policies that do not care for deforestation (Soares-
Filho et al., 2004; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Webb et al., 2014) and
positive effects of laws aiming at forest conservation (Shahabuddin and
Rao, 2010; Bae et al., 2012; Canova and Hickey, 2012). Policy frame-
work and law enforcement are classical government related components
that remain important and need continued support even though the
governance concept has been widened into a much broader concept.
Participation and tenure/ownership were the most frequently studied
agency indicators. Public participation aims to ensure that stakeholders’
interests are reflected in final decisions. The reviewed studies provide
strong support for the general positive notion of participatory ap-
proaches (Hayes, 2006; Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009) and provide rich
evidence for positive effects of many aspects of participation including
among others cooperative management (Gautam and Shivakoti, 2005;
Oestreicher et al., 2009), respect of customary law (Webb et al., 2014)
and autonomy of communities and indigenous people (Gautam et al.,
2004a; Shahabuddin and Rao, 2010). In contrast, top down policy ap-
proaches (Baynes et al., 2016) and industry dominated activities
without civil society participation (Heilmayr and Lambin, 2016) seem
to lead to increased deforestation. Tenure/ownership which was the
second most frequently studied agency indicator refers to the entire
bundle of property and user rights that might be held individually or by
an organization such as community, a state entity or a private company.
In general, many authors base its importance on the assumption that
more secure land and resource tenure motivates land users to manage
resources more efficiently (Ostrom, 1999; Angelsen and Kaimowitz,
2001; Andersson and Gibson, 2007; Ceddia et al., 2014). Indeed, we
find prevailing positive effects in most of the studies. However, parti-
cipation and tenure/ownership also show some ambivalent results
(Fig. 6). Tenure security alone can have divergent impacts by moti-
vating agricultural expansion (de Souza et al., 2013; Agrawal et al.,
2014; Ceddia et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2017) or by fostering forest
clearing to demonstrate property rights (Soares-Filho et al., 2004;
Bottazzi and Dao, 2013). Increased participation and decentralization
was linked to higher forest clearing specifically in urban areas (Liu
et al., 2016). Such divergent impacts of participation and tenure/own-
ership show that on one hand the motivation of single agents is a helpful
mechanism to be built upon in deforestation abatement policies. On the
other hand, it needs to be controlled by a frame of structural govern-
ance mechanisms in order to be effective.
The first three PCA axes, which we interpret as depicting agency
and structure mechanisms, only explain 38 % of the variation of
governance effects (Table 6). In addition, there are indicators that
could not exclusively be assigned to either of the two mechanisms.
Executive agencies is the most frequently studied example of such an
indicator and it consequently has an intermediate position in-
dependent from structure or agency related indicators on the first two
PCA axes (Table 7). We interpret that executive agencies comprise
both: structure and agency aspects (Giessen et al., 2014; Rahman and
Giessen, 2017). On one side forest services are guards that are tasked
with enforcing laws, and structures rules (Hayes and Persha, 2010;
Baynes et al., 2016; Mansourian, 2016). Often they even originate
from police-like organizations (Hutchins, 1916). But on the other side
they are service providers that need to locally moderate interests of
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stakeholders and multiple demands of society (Bennett et al., 2014;
Mansourian, 2016). This we interpret as serving the agency aspect. To
set up such executive institutions that fulfil both aspects is a challenge
that needs support and capacities. Most studies, however, did not
differentiate between different aspects of executive agencies’ work
(Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004; Gautam et al., 2004b; Andersson and
Gibson, 2007; Bae et al., 2012; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012). The ex-
ample of executive agencies and the remaining unexplained variance
are indications that the agency-structure concept is not the only me-
chanism underlying forest governance and further research is required
to explain more variation.
The assessment frequency of the indictors in the articles varied
much stronger than the effects of governance indicators on forests. Law
enforcement, executive agencies and participation were scored in more
than every second study. But in contrast, 12 indicators were of (very)
minor importance in current research, occurring in only two or less
studies. None of the studies even considered governance issues in the
context of forest concessions, legislative institutions, budgeting or forest
classification. It remains open if these indicators are indeed not studied
or if they are simply not perceived as governance indicators by authors
thus making them undetectable for our search algorithm. In any case, it
shows the limitation of a too wide concept. Hence, it is questionable
whether large sets of e.g. 130 governance indicators (Kishor and
Kenneth, 2012) do not pose the risk of making it inapplicable. The
importance of a number of governance factors should not result in
subsuming “everything” under governance. At least, research as well as
development work needs to specify what aspects of governance they
cover.
4.4. Effects of context factors
As expected by definition, deforestation drivers in our review were
linked to increasing deforestation and interventions were mostly
linked to decreasing deforestation (see Fig. 6). For in-depth conclu-
sions related to single drivers or interventions we refer to specified
literature (Geist and Lambin, 2002; Hosonuma et al., 2012; Agrawal
et al., 2014; Busch and Ferretti-Gallon, 2017). But beyond their direct
effects on deforestation, context factors obviously moderate the effects
of governance (Table 8). We show that governance is specifically
linked to reduced deforestation in the context of corruption and illegal
logging and can thus obviously counteract negative effects. In addi-
tion, the stronger the deforestation effects of population are, the less
effective governance measures become. We thus support (Wehkamp
et al., 2018) who found that a governance effect was more likely to
become significant when accounting for population in the models and
suggest that political institutions are more important when demo-
graphic pressures are high. In line with our study, agriculture and
timber harvest did not moderate governance effects. Governance thus
seems important irrespective of high or low pressures through agri-
culture and timber extraction. Wehkamp et al. (2018) included forest
area and could show that forest policy gains importance if forest area
becomes smaller. We, in addition, show an effect of economic devel-
opment. In general, the understanding of governance effects certainly
requires consideration of the socio-economic and biophysical context.
Given the large number of context factors reported, a larger number of
reviewed studies would certainly improve the statistical power of our
results.
A discussion of all context factors would be beyond the scope of our
review. Instead, we discuss two deforestation drivers - economy and
agriculture - and two interventions - community forests and protected
areas. These issues were most frequently mentioned and most con-
troversially discussed in the reviewed studies. We consider them of
specific political relevance and worth a specific discussion.
Economic development/income and agricultural intensification are
context factors with positive and negative effects reported. On one
hand, both do have the potential to reduce pressure on forests (Ashraf
et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017; Andoh and Lee, 2018). On the other hand,
leading to increased opportunity costs, they can also increase the de-
mand for forestland. They are an example showing that not only context
factors affect governance but that governance structures are needed to
moderate economic activities; or as (Ceddia et al., 2014) summarizes:
economic development and “agricultural intensification need to be
accompanied by policies that specifically focus on the environmental
aspects of governance”.
Community forests and protected areas are often regarded as com-
peting, focusing rather on utilization versus conservation. Community
forests emphasize participation and agency of local stakeholders
whereas strictly protected areas are a structural approach often based
on top down rules and bans (Ribot et al., 2010; Porter-Bolland et al.,
2012; Agrawal et al., 2014). For both approaches we find supporters.
For community forestry (Porter-Bolland et al., 2012) conclude that
“tropical forest protected areas may not always represent the best way
to conserve forests vis à vis tropical forests locally managed for pro-
duction of goods and services”. Protected areas do often not avoid
clearing within the boundaries (Stocks et al., 2007; Porter-Bolland
et al., 2012), highly depend on monitoring and law enforcement
(Oestreicher et al., 2009) and displacement of deforestation from pro-
tected areas is a permanent risk (Bare et al., 2015). Positive outcomes
for community forestry are reported in 12 of the studies (see Fig. 6). On
the other side (Shahabuddin and Rao, 2010) argue that community-
conserved areas “fall short of the needs of comprehensive biological
conservation” and community forests may tend to conserve an altered
species composition and tend to loose species, often those of the highest
conservation value (Shahabuddin and Rao, 2010; Ceddia et al., 2014).
Five studies find positive evidence for protected areas. A closer look
reveals that such generalizing “either - or” discussions do not lead
further because (i) the landscape context is of huge importance and (ii)
both approaches often contain elements of the other one anyhow. To
improve their effectiveness it might be an alternative to include pro-
tected areas as parts of community managed forests as long as in-
digenous demarcation works (Stocks et al., 2007).
4.5. Methodological considerations
The regional distribution of our studies was highly uneven with
studies mainly based on the Asian and central/south American context.
This has to be taken into account when generalizing the results and
points to a regional challenge for forest governance research. Also in
the review of (Porter-Bolland et al., 2012) eleven out of 16 countries
were located in Latin America and the Caribbean and only two of them
were from in Africa. Our results confirm (Stickler et al., 2013) who
complain about a heavy regional bias with very limited evidence from
governance research in Africa. Substantiating our findings specifically
for Africa would be a next step that would require more samples, e.g.
derived from a stratified random sampling method.
In our review, quantitative studies yielded weaker effects of gov-
ernance indicators on deforestation as compared to qualitative studies.
There is a long ongoing discussion on objectivity or subjectivity of
qualitative research e.g. Ratner (2002) and Austin and Sutton (2014).
Even though that the difference was not significant, our results might be
based on the fact that the paradigm of good governance leading to less
deforestation is omnipresent in the research community. This may
challenge unprejudiced research and imply some danger for subjectivity
in qualitative methods. We thus recommend using quantitative statis-
tical methods as much as possible as being the obviously more critical
ones.
Producing generalized knowledge based on reviews requires a dis-
cussion on the validity, transparency and accuracy of the results, spe-
cifically as our studies cover a wide variety of scales and are based on
multiple different methods. Pathways to generalize review results are
proposed by (Magliocca et al., 2018) providing typology based on (i)
the existing knowledge base, (ii) the generalization approach and (iii)
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the methodology for producing the knowledge claim. In our case, the
existing knowledge base was very comprehensive. The varying defini-
tions of ‘governance’ in applied research (Broekhoven et al., 2012;
Facility, 2013; Giessen and Buttoud, 2014) and the large amount of
studies were major challenges. Nevertheless we stuck to the broad
search term of ‘governance’ because pre-selection based on more spe-
cific governance components from sometimes dissenting definitions
could have biased the results or excluded relevant literature. We con-
centrated on more frequently cited papers because citation indices are a
widespread proxy for scientific quality. Our generalization approach is
based on quantifying effects of governance indictors on deforestation
(see Figs. 1 and 6). The existence of frequent effects is the basis for
claiming general causal effects (Magliocca et al., 2018). Given that all
governance indicators were predominately linked to decreasing defor-
estation, we cannot falsify the assumption of a universal trend. As
concerns the methodology for producing the knowledge claim we
standardized the mixed data through coding in order to increase com-
parability and statistical power. This is an adequate methodology spe-
cifically when regarding large and heterogeneous data sets (Magliocca
et al., 2018). Reviews and meta analysis will gain importance taking
into account the increasing number of governance publications. Related
methodological guidelines are available (Petrokofsky et al., 2013;
Livoreil et al., 2017; Pullin et al., 2018) and we support that investing
existing resources in condensing and concluding from existing field
studies is more efficient than adding new case studies with specified
regional scope.
Sample size is a core methodological issue. Many authors confirm
that our number of observations (198 articles screened and 28 eval-
uated) can be adequate. Shahabuddin and Rao (2010) base their global
review on 34 studies. Porter-Bolland et al. (2012) publish a review
across the tropics based on 27 studies. Magliocca et al. (2018) suggest
“a general rule of thumb is a sample size of 30”. However, due to the
still limited sample size, this does not necessarily mean that non-sig-
nificant variables do not play a role.
Our target variable “effects on deforestation, degradation or refor-
estation” needs some critical reflection, because deforestation in the
tropics is not per se a negative event. It would have been desirable to
differentiate between authorized deforestation under the sovereign
discretion of tropical countries and illegal land use change. However,
only (Andersson and Gibson, 2007) provided for such a differentiation
which we could thus not take into account.
5. Conclusions
Our results show that successful implementation of different gov-
ernance components mostly fosters reduced deforestation in the tropics,
even across different regional and context situations. We thus confirm
governance as an important instrument for reducing tropical defor-
estation or increasing reforestation. In consequence, the governance
focus of current deforestation policies needs continued support. But
governance is a very comprehensive concept and there are assessment
tools that specify more than 100 different aspects and indicators (Davis
et al., 2013). Our analysis shows that single indicators act conjointly
towards reduced deforestation. We hardly found conflicting elements.
This is encouraging for policy applications. On the other hand, nu-
merous indicators were hardly or not at all covered in the reviewed
studies. Thus, when talking and publishing about forest governance, at
least a specification of the applied components is needed in order to
avoid governance to become a meaningless buzzword (Giessen and
Buttoud, 2014). The importance of a number of governance elements
should not result in subsuming “everything” under governance.
In view of the broad concept with numerous synergistic elements,
the question arises as to which elements applied policy should focus.
Our analysis shows that previously defined agency and structure
components (Arts et al., 2014) are visible as underlying factors and
allow to structure the multitude of elements. Agency relies on the self-
interest of actors, with their specific motivations, whereas the structure
concept has a focus on social norms, political conventions and frames as
well as on agreed rules. Even though that the structural component was
more clearly distinguishable in our principal component analysis, nei-
ther of the two approaches revealed statistically stronger effects on
reduced deforestation. Both general aspects therefore need to be taken
into account when selecting specific indicators. The selection and ap-
plication of specific indicators needs to be locally adapted and we
follow (Davis et al., 2013) recommending to adjust the system to the
respective context. From the multitude of indicators, the structural in-
dicators of land use planning, policy framework and law enforcement were
scoring highest on the first axis of the PCA and we interpret that they
have strongest effects on deforestation (Table 7); also in single studies
they were consistently related to decreasing deforestation (Fig. 6).
Among agency related indicators tenure/ownership and participation
were most frequently studied and together with indicators related to
financial interests had the highest scores on the first PCA axis. However,
tenure/ownership and participation also show a small number of cases
with negative effects (Fig. 6), suggesting that agency needs to be framed
by legal and political structures. Results based payments under REDD+
are a prominent example to which we apply these findings. The current
debate on applicability and limited implementation of such payments
shows that agency related measures need to be accompanied by struc-
tural work, which is e.g. tackled in so-called readiness measures under
REDD+. Structural development on one side is a precondition for
agency based payments and on the other side results based payments
function as an agency driven motivation for basic structural develop-
ment.
In our PCA, only 38 % of the variation in effects of governance in-
dicators could be explained by the first three components related to a
structure or agency mechanism. Governance is thus still more complex.
Targeted development work and forest conservation measures still need
a better understanding of interactions and relations between single
governance indicators. More work is required to clarify and to describe
specific correlations between single indicators. This would further
clarify governance functioning and would show if additional indicators
are directly affected by the work on one specific indicator.
Deforestation drivers and development interventions need to be
taken into account as they can moderate governance effects. We could
explain approximately one third of the governance effects by context
factors. Population growth and corruption are prominent examples. We
interpret that population density and corruption can counteract gov-
ernance effects. On the other hand, agricultural development and timber
extraction were not significant in our regression analysis suggesting that
high governance scores have effects on reduced deforestation in-
dependently from high or low direct land use pressure.
Methodological literature for review studies is available
(Petrokofsky et al., 2013; Livoreil et al., 2017; Magliocca et al., 2018;
Pullin et al., 2018). Given the increasing number of governance pub-
lications, reviews should gain importance and should rely on still lager
samples as we only focused on most frequently cited papers. Gaps in
governance studies still need to be filled. In this respect, we draw the
attention to the limited number of governance studies from Africa.
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Appendix A. Key statements for scouring the governance indicator “Forest ownership and use rights”
Example for illustrating the scoring process referring to column “Tenure/Ownership” in Table 4 of the main document
Description of “Tenure/Ownership” indicator
“Forest ownership and use rights (hereafter called “forest tenure rights”) refers to the entire bundle of forest-related property rights that may be
held individually or communally in a country, including rights of land ownership and secondary rights to access, use, and manage forest
resources.”
Summarized key statements that were the basis for governance scores related to tenure/ownership (Note: in many cases statements were included
in several parts of the publication, e.g. in results, conclusions and abstract. Here we present key statements only.)
Study authors Year Key statements Resulting gov-
ernance score
Andersson K., Gibson C.C. 2007 municipal governance systems can mitigate pressures to deforest … municipal moderation of deforestation is related
to … facilitation of improved forest property rights for local forest users. And forest users who have more secure forest
property rights are more likely to engage in forest management activities and are less likely to convert forest
6
Barsimantov J., Navia Antezana J. 2012 communities that have maintained forest cover have stronger local governance institutions, … and choose to maintain
the common property regime. …. Local governance in non-forestry communities is nearly non-functioning. Non-
forestry communities did not initiate the official process of certification of communal lands … in this official process,
rules stating that forested lands cannot be divided are explained and usually enforced.
6
Bottazzi P., Dao H. 2013 It is obvious that the inherent characteristics of individual property rights pave the way for an extreme fragmentation
of this space, which entails a linear evolution of deforestation under the pressure of cattle-rearing … On individual
parcels, each user directly affects himself … to sell or rent his parcel for pastoral use (which) is not an incentive to limit
overexploitation… This means that the more land is fragmented by individual ownership, the higher the deforestation
rate. Land rights are thus a secondary factor of forest cover change (note: we interpret that it is not ownership per se that
has an effect on deforestation but fragmentation)
4
Ceddia M.G., Bardsley N.O., Go-
mez-Y-Paloma S., et al.
2014 With respect to the conventional dimensions of governance, we use three indicators developed by the Worldbank …
ROL reflects the ability to enforce contracts and the security of property rights … (note: the indicator was obviously
included but no results reported)
4
De Souza R.A., Miziara F., de Ma-
rco Junior P
2013 A significant and positive relationship (p < 0.050) was found between the percentage of titled lands in the
municipalities (per 1000 ha) and the deforestation rates for all years between 2005 and 2009 … This finding supports
the claim that deforestation is still significantly related to the presence of land under the regime of private property.
2
Gautam A.P., Shivakoti G.P., We-
bb E.L.
2004 Legal transfer of resource ownership is not an important precondition for successful forest conservation at the local
level … The finding that semigovernment forests managed by self-organized informal user groups improved and
gained forest more rapidly than formal community forests suggests that a formal handover of forest ownership is not
necessarily a strong determinant of successful forest conservation
4
Hayes T., Persha L. 2010 since the Ministry of Forestry technically owned the reserve lands, there was no reason for the local residents to
comply with land-use rules as the lands were no longer their responsibility (note: In case that negative governance was
reported in the studies we inverted the deforestation effect i.e. negative effect of no ownership was scored equally to positive
effects of ownership, see explanation in Section 2.3 of main document)
6
Jones K.W., Holland M.B., Naug-
hton-Treves L., et al.
2017 Overall, the responses were mixed in terms of actual changes in land use following titling: about half the groups stated
no major differences were occurring and the other half mentioned that they were starting to increase agricultural
production.
4
Sendzimir J., Reij C.P., Magnusz-
ewski P.
2011 In an atmosphere free of oversight by colonial or national authorities, farmers and communities took ownership of
trees and the ways in which they farmed. In the regreened area of the Maradi/Zinder region … tree density increased
… when farmers became free to experiment with techniques rediscovered with NGO help. The resulting tree growth
increased tree density and further reinforced the sense of ownership and other variables in the chain of feedbacks.
6
Shahabuddin G., Rao M. 2010 factors related to institutions, governance and tenure are likely very significant in influencing trends in biological
indicators. Well-defined user groups, high social capital and strong governance were associated with higher basal area
and species diversity…
6
factors underlying good ecosystem management in include …. autonomy that allows local communities to craft locally
relevant institutional arrangements, well-defined boundaries and tenurial security.
Soares-Filho B., Alencar A., Neps-
tad D., et al.
2004 Landholders clear their forest less if they have strong claims on their property (legal titles). 6
Stocks A., McMahan B., Taber P. 2007 all differences between indigenous and colonist controlled regions were statistically significant… Indigenous
communities, even with relatively high populations, maintain large areas of intact forest …. They have held the belief,
even from the beginning of their mapping project that they would somehow be able to legalize their territorial claims
… This belief or hope, we argue, has been a significant factor that has kept a measure of protection for the land even
when funding for supporting voluntary forest rangers was irregular.
7
Webb E.L., Jachowski N.R.A., Ph-
elps J., et al.
2014 Emerging policies are likely to tip the scales towards … potentially greater rates of deforestation due to the
introduction of wellfunded investors, insufficient land tenure agreements, and low governance effectiveness.
6
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.12.007.
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After state-centered and market-centered approaches have driven international development 
cooperation activities in previous decades, improved governance has now come into the focus as a 
means to help reversing global trends of tropical deforestation. Yet, “good governance” remains a 
normative, broad and often underspecified concept consisting of a wide range of elements and 
implicit value judgements. Specific knowledge is missing on the relative importance of single 
elements, on their interdependencies and their specific effects. Following an analytical approach, we 
aimed to investigate if single governance elements affect each other and whether they relate to 
decreasing deforestation. We conducted a quantitative field study in twelve selected landscapes 
across 160,000 ha of tropical lowland forest in Ecuador. We mapped governance arrangements and 
land use in participatory exercises. The performance of single governance elements including tenure, 
forest management practices, law enforcement, institutions, and participation was quantified based 
on the governance assessment framework of the World Resource Institute. We assessed context 
information and used satellite based deforestation data. Principal component analysis showed that 
all governance elements loaded positively on the first axis. Specific governance elements thus acted 
conjointly. They interact positively and might reinforce each other. Policy and development work 
may therefore focus on a smaller number of well-selected governance elements. High performance 
of specific governance elements, in particular tenure and participation was linked to reduced 
deforestation. This supports the notion of a number of governance elements as being indeed “good” 
for low deforestation. This functional understanding draws a more differentiated picture for single 
governance elements and supports outcome oriented decisions instead of value-oriented principles 
that underlie “good governance”. Direct deforestation drivers such as agriculture and infrastructure 
explained larger shares of deforestation as compared to governance. A number of conclusions and 






































































Interplay of governance elements and their effects on deforestation in tropical landscapes: 




 Specific governance elements act conjointly, interact positively and probably reinforce each 
other. 
 Tenure and participation were related to decreasing deforestation. 
 A differentiated view on single governance components is needed for development work and 
research. 
 Direct drivers such as agriculture and infrastructure had higher explanatory power for 
deforestation as compared to governance elements. 
 Results are based on a comprehensive, empirical field study in Ecuadorian lowland forests 
covering 160,000 ha. 
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Interplay of governance elements and their effects on deforestation in tropical landscapes: 






Even though the pace of net forest loss has slowed, the area of the world’s forests continues to 
decrease. The rate of annual net loss of forest has slowed from 7.8 mio hectares in the 1990s to 4.7 
mio hectares between 2015 and 2020 (FAO, 2020). The largest loss of forest area still occurs in the 
tropics particularly in Africa and South America. Improved governance has come into the focus as a 
promising mechanism to globally reverse this trend. In international forest policy, governance is 
increasingly taken into account (Singer and Giessen, 2017), even though it is clear that forest 
governance alone is certainly not sufficient to address drivers of deforestation and degradation 
(Larson, 2011; Busch and Ferretti-Gallon, 2017). Governance is one out of six UN Forest Goals (UN, 
2019) and plays a core role in international forest programs, such as REDD+ (“Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation”) and FLEGT (“Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and 
Trade”) to which it even lends its name. 
The concept of governance has, in part, evolved from a fundamental problematization of the role 
and function of the state, starting in the 1970s (Ansell and Torfing, 2016). This resulted in a transition 
from state-driven governments to multi-actor governance (Arts, 2014). Such governance is 
understood to steer society and the economy through collective action (Torfing et al., 2012). In 
contrast to a normative “good governance” concept (Arts, 2012; Ansell and Torfing, 2016), analytical 
governance approaches rely on the mere reflection of the processes and their explanation (Giessen 
and Buttoud, 2014). But as forest governance comprises a multitude of different elements, an 
analytical governance approach needs an understanding of how different governance elements are 
related, how they affect each other and which of them are of specific relevance for achieving 
predefined aims. In practice, governance elements and numerous forest governance indicators are 
specified by handbooks, frameworks and toolboxes (Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012; Davis et al., 
2013b; de Graaf et al., 2017). Analytical governance understanding is challenging due to the large 
number of governance elements and the decisive role of the local contexts (Wehkamp et al., 2018). 
First insights into governance functioning have been provided by (Fischer et al., 2020) based on 
review data. Further substantiation based on empirical field data is now required. 
In order to value the importance and relevance of different governance elements, it is necessary to 
relate them to outcomes, such as reduced deforestation in the tropics. (Geist and Lambin, 2002) 
conceptualize that proximate drivers have effects on deforestation and are themselves affected by 
governance which is understood as an underlying cause. There are numerous case studies that 
analyze effects of single governance elements on deforestation. Reviews based on such case studies 
have been published (Wehkamp et al., 2018; Fischer et al., 2020). However, a comprehensive 
analysis based on empirical field data is hardly available until today. Specific analyses on landscape 
level are needed in order to research larger areas where agriculture, forestry, and other productive 
land uses compete with environmental and biodiversity goals (Sayer et al., 2013). 
 
1.2 Aims 
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This study aims to empirically analyze forest governance functioning and to quantify governance 
effects on deforestation. It seeks to disentangle functional relations between main governance 
elements in order to find out if specific elements are determining overall governance and its effects 
on deforestation more than others. Governance effects on deforestation are studied together with 
direct (proximate) deforestation drivers that are themselves hypothesized to be affected by 
governance as an underlying cause. The results aim to contribute to an outcome oriented analytical 
governance understanding which can justify, challenge or moderate measures that are until now 
based on a normative “good governance” approach. 
Methodologically the study implements an empirical field study at landscape level. This implies a 
spatial analysis of larger areas. The study is carried out in tropical lowland forest areas of Ecuador. 
Insights and recommendations for the development of the study area are presented. 
 
2. Theoretical foundations 
 
2.1 Governance theory and definition 
The main theoretical basis of forest governance has been claimed to consist of two mainstream 
models: rational choice and neo-institutionalism, otherwise described as agency – structure concept, 
which provides a theoretical basis to better understand and describe governance approaches (Arts et 
al., 2014). The agency approach postulates that it is mainly self-interested actors with their specific 
motivations, intentions, goals, actions and resources, which take active agency and, hence, drive land 
use decisions. On the other side, structural elements like laws, regulations, plans, cultural 
conventions and norms provide a frame for land use decisions (Archer, 2003). Specifically (Ostrom, 
1990) points to the fact that institutions impact behavior through rules, norms and incentives in 
order to prevent a tragedy of the commons. (North, 1991) emphasizes the importance of informal 
institutions vis a vis the formal ones. It has to be taken into account that usually neither structure nor 
agency alone drive human behavior. (Giddens, 1984) formulates that agents - groups or individuals - 
draw upon structures to perform social actions but at the same time structure is the result of these 
social practices. 
Numerous definitions have been proposed for forest governance (Larson and Petkova, 2011; 
Broekhoven et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2013b; Giessen and Buttoud, 2014; de Graaf et al., 2017; 
Mansourian, 2017). The recent definitions all understand governance as a broad and comprehensive 
concept that goes far beyond governments and that is centered around decisions on forest 
management (Larson and Petkova, 2011; Broekhoven et al., 2012). Following (Giessen and Buttoud, 
2014) “forest governance comprises a) all formal and informal, public and private regulatory 
structures, i.e. institutions consisting of rules, norms, principles, decision procedures, concerning 
forests, their utilization and their conservation, b) the interactions between public and private actors 
therein and c) the effects of either on forests”. This definition explicitly mentions structural aspects in 
its first part and describes agency related aspects as interactions of different actors in the second 
part. It further relates governance to effects on forests, which is in line with the aims of this study. 
This definition thus provides the basis for the present study. 
 
2.2 Interlinkages of governance elements and their effects on forests 
Whatever definition applied, governance comprises a multitude of different elements specified by 


































































of functional links or effects for each of them (Worldbank, 2006; Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012; Davis 
et al., 2013a; de Graaf et al., 2017). (IFRI, 2011) provides conceptualizations of governance element 
interactions and a methodology for field assessments based on (Ostrom, 1999) but is mainly based 
on qualitative descriptions. Also (CIFOR, 2015; Ravikumar et al., 2015) aim at a descriptive approach. 
Systematic studies that quantify functional relations based on these approaches are missing. First 
quantitative insights into governance functioning have been provided by (Fischer et al., 2020) based 
on review data. Our study relies on the forest governance assessment framework of the World 
Resource Institute (Davis et al., 2013a). It extends the methodological approach of (Fischer et al., 
2020) to the field level. 
Existing results on governance effects show positive relations between improved governance and 
reduced deforestation. Scholars have produced an increasing number of (i) case studies analyzing 
governance effects on deforestation in field studies (Andersson et al., 2014; Schusser et al., 2015; 
Subhan Mollick et al., 2018) (ii) statistical evaluations of governance effects using regional or global 
panel data sets (Umemiya et al., 2010) and (iii) reviews of existing research results (Bhagwat et al., 
2017; Wehkamp et al., 2018; Fischer et al., 2020). The prevailing conclusion in such studies is that 
improved forest governance at least contributes to reduced deforestation. However, quantitative 
relations of governance indicators to proximate drivers remain open and effects are reported for 
individual governance elements only. It is not clear, which are the most decisive governance 
elements with respect to deforestation outcomes and how elements are functionally related in their 
effects. 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework  
Taking into account the definition of (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014) we conceptualize governance as 
being based on (A) multiple actors and (B) structures including formal and informal rules of forest-
related decisions and their implementation (Fig. 1). These two main governance components reflect 
the agency – structure concept, which provides a theoretical basis to better understand and describe 
governance approaches (Arts et al., 2014; Fischer et al., 2020). In addition to these two components 
we take into account (C) interactions between actors, (D) interactions between actors and structures 
and (E) the effects of either on forests in order to compose a comprehensive governance framework. 
In order to specify actors, structures and interactions we use a set of governance elements as 
described by the World Resource Institute (Davis et al., 2013a). We relate governance elements 
either to one specific component (e.g. institutions represent an actor) or in other cases to several 
governance components (e.g. tenure refers to actors and rules, participation refers to interactions 
between actors and to interactions between actors and structures). 
Like socio-economic factors, forest governance is an underlying cause i.e. a fundamental force that 
underpins the proximate drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Turner et al., 1993; Geist 
and Lambin, 2001; Geist and Lambin, 2002; Hosonuma et al., 2012a). Therefore, we incorporate 
selected proximate drivers of deforestation (Fig. 1). The proximate drivers are human activities that 
directly affect the environment or forest. In our study we consider agricultural expansion, wood 




































































Figure 1: Conceptual framework underpinning the study. Adapted from (Geist and Lambin, 2002) and amended 
by the governance components: (A) actors, (B) structures (C), interactions between actors, (D) interactions 
between actors and structures, (E) the effects on forests. Bullet points represent governance elements and 




3.1 Deforestation, forest governance and study area in Ecuador 
With an annual forest loss rate of 0.6% calculated for the period 1990 - 2015 (FAO, 2015), Ecuadorian 
forests are among those with highest deforestation rates in South America. The main drivers of 
deforestation in Ecuador are agricultural expansion with crops produced for subsistence use, 
domestic and international markets as well as land demand for pastures. Road infrastructure 
provides access to remote areas and is frequently provided by logging operations, oil mining 
industries as well as governmental investments. Commercial crop plantations play a regionally 
important role, like e.g. palm oil plantations in the province of Esmeraldas (Castro et al., 2013; Sierra, 
2013). 
Forest resources of Ecuador are under the principal competence of the state (ACE, 2008). The largest 
share of state forests falls under the patrimony of natural areas (PANE). This is part of the national 
system of protected areas ‘Sistema Nacional de Areas Protegidas’ (SNAP) which covers 
approximately 20% of the Ecuadorian territorial surface. Private individuals or organizations can 
obtain land titles if possession and production is documented over a minimum period of five years. 
But based on customary rights, private farms and communal settlements also exist on non-titled 
lands (Holland et al., 2014). Settlers introduced intensified agricultural practices including cattle 
ranching (Pichón, 1997; Rudel et al., 2002) and until today often benefit from road infrastructure 
created by logging and mining enterprises as well as public and non-public oil roads (Baynard et al., 
2013). Indigenous populations occupy territories corresponding to 65% of the Ecuadorian forests 
(Palacios, 2005) (Morales et al., 2010), with large parts located in SNAP areas. Traditionally 


































































portions of individual land to each of the members. The ultimate goal is to reserve land for future 
generations and future production (Holt and Bilsborrow, 2004; Izurieta et al., 2014). In 2008, the 
Ecuadorian government launched the Socio Bosque program, which applies to private and communal 
forest owners and gives direct monetary incentives for the conservation of vulnerable ecosystems. 
The program is based on 20-year legally binding conservation contracts including biannual payments 
as partial compensation for restrictions from altering the forests. 1.6 mio ha are currently under 
Socio Bosque, annual payments for 2018 amounted to 10.5 mio USD and were distributed to 175.000 
beneficiaries (MAE, 2018b).  
The study was conducted in the provinces of Esmeraldas (Northwestern Coast), Napo, Pastaza and 
Orellana (Central Amazon). These provinces accounted for 27% of the net deforestation of Ecuador in 
the years 2014-2016 (MAE, 2018a). For our research, we selected twelve landscapes within the larger 
LaForeT project (www.la-foret.org). Each landscape covered approximately 100 km2 and was situated 
within one parish (‘parroquia’) to ensure homogeneous formal administration. Each landscape was 
placed to cover a gradient of typical forest cover development and to include different phases of 
forest transition (Mather, 1992; Grainger, 1995; Hosonuma 2012). Half of the landscapes included 
conservation areas of PANE or Socio Bosque as two prominent forest conservation schemes in 
Ecuador, whereas the other half did not include such restricted areas. All landscapes were located at 
elevations of below 1100 m asl. within the natural vegetation zones of evergreen lowlands or 
evergreen foothill forests (MAE, 2013) (Tab. 1).  
 





San Francisco Ónzole 10.615 62,16% (-0,50%) 
Santo Domingo Ónzole 10.010 88,48% (-0,34%) 
Tabiazo 8.800 31,07% (+0,96%) 
Cube 11.937 23,92% (-3,46%) 
Chontapunta 16.407 50,17% (-1,27%) 
Ahuano 18.919 65,03% (-0,17%) 
Carlos Julio Arosemena 13.458 57,60% (-0,99%) 
Rukullakta 15.878 71,52% (+2,31%) 
San Jose de Dahuano 13.010 49,37% (-1,73%) 
Avila Huirino 16.128 61,83% (-0,87%) 
Arajuno 16.136 81,84% (-0,71%) 
Canelos 12.148 72,62% (-0,36%) 
Table 1: Key characteristics of landscapes studied (*FC2016 is native forest cover % within the landscape 
boundaries in 2016, calculated from (MAE, 2017b). AFCC (in brackets) is the mean annual native forest cover 
change within the landscape for the period 2008-2016 (MAE, 2016, 2017a)) 
 
3.2 Data collection 
Data collection was carried out through participatory exercises (see 3.2.1) and included mapping of 
governance arrangements (3.2.2) for which governance performance was assessed (see 3.2.3), as 
well as land use mapping (see 3.2.4). Key informant interviews were conducted for socio economic 
and infrastructure data (see 3.2.5). Deforestation was calculated based on satellite data and served 
as target variable in the models (see 3.2.6). Explanatory variable for the multiple linear regression 
consist of infrastructure, land use, socio-economic variables as well as of governance elements.  
 


































































We carried out participatory mapping (Elwood and Ghose, 2011; Martin et al., 2012; Freund et al., 
2016) based on focus group discussion (Nyumba et al., 2018) in order to spatially determine 
governance arrangements as well as land use within all landscapes. Two workshops were carried out 
in each landscape with between 15 and 25 community and stakeholder representatives. All mapped 
information was digitized using QGIS 2.18 (QGIS, 2018). 
 
3.2.2 Classification and delineation of governance arrangements 
Governance arrangements were defined as spatial units with a homogeneous constellation of 
governance components (see 2.3). During scoping visits we identified 6 different governance 
arrangement types based on an own categorization related to the conditions in the research area. 
Governance arrangements were determined so that variation of governance within arrangements 
was minimized whereas variation between governance arrangements in a landscape was maximized. 
They comprised 
1. Communal land, with or without land title, excluding conservation areas. In the research 
area, communal lands were coinciding with indigenous land ownership. 
2. Individually owned land, with or without land title. In the research area, individual land 
predominantly coincided with farms owned by settlers. 
3. Indigenous reserves as traditional form of land conservation on communal indigenous land. 
4. Socio Bosque conservation areas on communal indigenous land. 
5. State protection areas (PANE). 
6. Others (including private enterprises, research areas, land with unidentifiable/unassessable 
governance and ownership, cities, airports, large infrastructure) 
In total, we mapped 139 polygons each one determining the area of one specific governance 
arrangement patch. These patches covered 163,627 ha. We excluded the category “6. Others” from 
further evaluations. It was not possible to establish contacts to private enterprises engaged with 
logging activities in the landscapes. 
 
3.2.3 Governance elements and performance 
During the focus group discussions we assessed governance performance for patches of single 
governance arrangements by applying the forest governance assessment tool of the World Resource 
Institute (Davis et al., 2013b). The assessment tool postulates that predefined elements should be 
contextualized in order to better fit local needs. After scoping trips in the study region we selected 
five governance elements namely (i) tenure security, (ii) forest management practices, (iii) law 
enforcement, (iv) institutions, and (v) participation in public decision making. These elements are 
among the most frequently researched governance elements in global literature (Fischer et al., 
2020), represent different governance components (see 2.3) and thematic areas as specified by 
(Davis et al., 2013b). Each of the five governance elements was assessed by three indicators through 
Likert scores (Likert, 1932) on a scale from 0 (not existing), 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). Definitions of 
governance elements and indicators are provided in Annex 1. 
Considering available project resources and time that stakeholders were able to make available for 
the workshops, governance was scored for 25 selected governance arrangement patches covering in 
total 50,115 ha. We selected all available Socio Bosque and PANE patches for the assessment of 
governance performance scores as these categories were less frequently occurring. Governance 
performance of the remaining governance arrangements was assessed on randomly selected patches 


































































governance performance scores to additional 59 patches. We extrapolated within the same or 
neighboring landscapes where patches were comparable in terms of land use and governance 
mechanisms. Extrapolation of governance scores increased the number of patches with governance 
information to 84 covering 99,563 hectares. 
 
3.2.4 Land use types 
Land use is considered a decisive context factor influencing deforestation. We classified it adapting 
and simplifying (Di Gregorio and Jansen, 2005). Seven land use types were mapped in all landscapes 
in participatory exercises during the workshops. They included (i) primary forests (ii) secondary 
succession forests, (iii) secondary forests after timber harvest, (iv) crop lands, (v) pastures, (vi) 
agroforestry systems, (vii) others. In all we mapped 1136 land use polygons in the 12 landscapes. 
 
3.2.5 Socio economic and infrastructure context 
We conducted three key informant interviews per landscape with randomly selected community 
leaders. Seven key variables were derived from the interviews: (i) percentage households with 
electricity, (ii) percentage of population that can read/write, (iii) km from community center to 
nearest general market, (iv) km from community center to nearest agricultural market, (v) hourly 
rate for wage employment of an unskilled worker in US Dollars, (vi) mean percent of household 
income from forests, (vii) mean percent of household income from agriculture. 
Road density is associated with economic-infrastructure development and it can be understood as an 
indicator of accessibility, which is related to a range of pressures on the natural environment and 
likely to affect forest cover negatively (Reed et al., 1996; Hawbaker et al., 2005). We determined 
total road length within each governance arrangement patch by summing up all the terrestrial means 
of transportation, including highways, roads, paths and railways as obtained from shapefiles of public 
sources (IGM, 2018; OSM, 2018). The road density [km/ha] was then calculated by dividing the total 
road length [km] by the total area of each specific governance arrangement patch [ha].  
 
3.2.6 Deforestation  
The net loss of native forest (deforestation) between years 2008 and 2016 was determined for the 
area of each of the 139 mapped governance arrangements based on data from the Ecuadorian 
Ministry of Environment (MAE, 2015, 2017c). Based on automatic classification of LandSat imagery 
using RapidEye scenes and ground control points as validation sources (MAE-MAGAP, 2015), this 
data set provides spatially explicit land cover information. We calculated the loss of native forests 
(‘bosque nativo’) between 2008 and 2016 in hectares relative to the total area of each delineated 
governance arrangement patch and divided it by the number of years in order to derive mean annual 
deforestation rates. 
 
3.3 Statistical analysis 
In order to compare governance scores we used the non-parametric Wilcoxon test comparing 
multiple pairs. We applied this non-parametric test because in a number of cases the assumption of 
normality in the data was not given (Siegel, 1988). We pooled Socio Bosque patches and indigenous 
reserves because sample sizes of five Socio Bosque and two indigenous reserves polygons were too 


































































pooling (mean governance for indigenous reserves was 3.4 and for Socio Bosque 3.8). We excluded 
PANE areas from tests comparing the means as the sample size of two polygons was too low. Mean 
governance was calculated as the mean of the five single governance elements per polygon. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) (Dunteman, 1989) reduces the dimensionality of a multivariate 
data set by producing linear combinations (principal components) of the original variables (e.g. 
governance indicators) that summarize the predominant patterns in the data (Peres-Neto et al., 
2003). We calculated a PCA for the 25 governance arrangement patches with field governance 
assessments in order to identify independent gradients within the governance data and their 
correlations to original governance variables. 
We used multivariate regression analysis with backward elimination in order to check for potential 
relationships between deforestation (target variable) and infrastructure, socio-economic, land use as 
well as governance variables (predictors) for all 84 patches with assessed or extrapolated governance 
information. As we could not determine a statistically significant difference in annual deforestation 
between patches with assessed and extrapolated governance scores, a bias due to the method of 
determining governance performance can be excluded. From the original 84 patches that we used as 
basis for regression analysis, we removed four patches with more than three times standard 
deviation of deforestation. Our models satisfy the assumptions of normality (Shapiro-Wilk-W test, p-
values always >0.5), and no multicollinearity (VIF <5, (PennState, 2019)). We assured for 
homoscedasticity applying the Breusch-Pagan test. 
As independent variables were measured at different scales, we conducted Z score standardization 
to normalize data. Land use variables were all highly intercorrelated as indicated by variance inflation 
factors (VIF) above 10; we thus only used percentage of crops to characterize land use, which we 
interpret as indictor for agricultural land use intensity. Within backward selection, we successively 
removed explanatory variables that were not significant and that did not decrease the r2. Within our 
nested survey design, governance arrangement patches are clustered in 12 landscapes. We therefore 
checked for the effect of landscapes by including the landscapes as a dummy variable. We also 
checked for an effect of PANE/Socio Bosque being present or absent in the landscapes. Both effects 
were not significant. 
We used Likert scores and their means as continuous values in quantitative statistical approaches 
including comparison of means, principal component analysis and multiple regression analysis 
following (Manley, 2005). All statistical evaluations were carried out using the statistical software 
package of JMP 12 (SAS, 2015). 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1 Mean governance performance in the landscapes 
Socio Bosque patches and indigenous reserves in general had highest governance scores (Tab. 2). 
These significantly differed as compared to individually managed patches. This overall difference was 
based on a significant difference of governance performance for tenure and participation between 
Socio Bosque/indigenous reserves on one side and communal and individually managed patches on 
the other side. There were no differences in governance performance for forest management 
practices, law enforcement and institutions. PANE had lowest scores for mean governance, forest 













































































  Wlcx mean Wlcx mean Wlcx mean Wlcx mean Wlcx mean Wlcx mean 
SBosque/IndRes 7 A  3,6 A  4.5 A  3.8 A  3.9 A  2.1 A  3.6 
Communal 10 A B 2,8  B 3.3 A  3.5 A  3.6 A  2.2  B 1.8 
Individual 6  B 2,7  B 3.0 A  3.4 A  3.0 A  1.8  B 1.9 
                    
PANE 2 - - 2,4 - - 3.2 - - 2.7 - - 3.1 - - 1.3 - - 1.7 
Table 2: Wilcoxon Test for governance differences between governance arrangements. Arrangements that do 
not share similar capital letters are significantly different (p<0.05) as result of the Wilcoxon Test (Wlcx); N: 
number of patches; mean: mean governance. For PANE areas, only the mean is reported; they are excluded 
from the test due to low sample size of 2. SBosque/IndRes – pooled category of Socio Bosque and indigenous 
reserves. 
 
4.2 The interrelation of different governance elements 
The PCA showed that all governance elements loaded high on the first component, which already 
explained 55.2% of the variance (Fig. 2, Tab. 3). Bivariate correlations corroborate these findings: 7 
out of 10 pairwise correlations between these five governance elements were statistically significant 
(correlation coefficients not depicted, p<0.05). Additional components were characterized by single 
governance elements that loaded high on these. Participation had the strongest individual effect on 
the second component. The third component differentiated tenure against institutions and the 
fourth component was strongly determined by law enforcement. The fifth component differentiated 
(to a weaker extent) forest management practices against institutions (Tab. 3). However, the 
explanatory power of these latter components low, as only the first component had an eigenvalue 
above 1. 
The loadings on the first axis significantly correlated with mean governance (p< 0.05) (Fig. 3). In other 
words, governance arrangement patches with high mean governance were characterized by high 
loadings on the first component. 
 
 
Figure 2: Biplot of a PCA for Likert scores of five governance elements assessed for 25 polygons. 
 
 PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 
 (2.8) (0.8) (0.7) (0.5) (0.2) 
Tenure 0,67  -0,11 0,68 0,26 0,11 


































































 PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 
LawEnf 0,78  -0,03 0,13  -0,61  -0,00 
Institutions 0,80  -0,23  -0,46 0,12 0,28 
Participation 0,52 0,85  -0,06 0,08 0,02 
Table 3: Loadings on the principal components (PC). Loadings larger/smaller than +/- 0.5 in bold. By definition, 
loadings of each variable can range between -1 and 1. High positive or negative loadings indicate strong 
explanatory power of the indicators for the respective component. Eigenvalues are given in brackets. An 
eigenvalue of 1.0 (2.0 or 3.0) indicates that the respective component explains as much variation as one (two 
or three) single variables. 
 
Figure 3: Correlation between loadings on first principal component and mean governance for 25 governance 
arrangement patches (r
2
 =0.94, p<0.01). Loadings on the first component are adjusted for the mean and 
standard deviation (SAS, 2017). 
 
4.3 Single correlations of potential deforestation drivers with deforestation 
We calculated single bivariate correlations of infrastructure, socio-economic, land use and 
governance variables with deforestation (see Annex 2). Infrastructure variables did not correlate with 
deforestation. Among socio economic variables, the literacy rate and income from forests were 
highly significant. Land use cover variables were mostly related to deforestation. In addition, 
percentages of specific land use types correlated among themselves which was to be expected as 
land use percentages per patch always add up to 100% in a sense that high percentages of the land 
covered e.g. by forest automatically resulted in lower percentages covered by agriculture. Among 
governance elements, participation, law enforcement and tenure correlated negatively with 
deforestation. Also mean governance, which was based on all five governance elements correlated 
with deforestation.  
 
4.4 Multiple linear regressions explaining deforestation 
Multiple linear regression allows to analyze effects of multiple predictors (deforestation drivers) on a 
target variable (deforestation). The first model (Tab. 4, column a) excluded governance and had an r2 
of 0.34. In this model, percentage of households with electricity, literacy and the percentage of land 
covered by crops were significant explanatory variables. In the second model (Tab. 4, column b) 
governance arrangements were added as explanatory variables which increased the r2 to 0.47. 
Results show that deforestation was significantly higher on managed communal and individual lands 
as compared to the reference of Socio Bosque and indigenous reserves. Distance to markets was also 
significant in this model. In the third model (Tab. 4, column c) mean governance was added as 
additional variable and significantly contributed to the explanation of deforestation. In the third 
model, relative income from forests was negatively related to deforestation. In the fourth model 
(Tab. 4, column d), we replaced mean governance by single governance elements. These explicit 


































































increased the r2 to 0.54. Specifically tenure and participation were highly significant. These two 
governance elements had also shown significant differences between individually and communally 
managed land on one side and protected areas on the other side (Tab. 2) and were at the same time 
most clearly differentiated from the remaining governance variables on the second and third 
component of the PCA (see Tab. 4). In the fourth model, individual and communal arrangements 
turned insignificant. Participation and tenure as single selected governance elements thus overruled 
governance arrangements as explanatory variables. Law enforcement was significant in the multiple 
linear regression but had to be removed due to a high VIF above 5. VIFs for tenure and participation 
were moderately high but below 5 (4.6 and 3.4 respectively). 
In general, governance either as selected elements or as overall mean had an effect on deforestation 
which is independent from other variables: when governance performance was high, deforestation 
was significantly lower. However, cropland percentage and electrification were significant in all four 
models and explained larger parts of the variation, showing that agricultural land use and 
intensification as well as infrastructure development are predominant proximate deforestation 
drivers in the analyzed landscapes. 
 
 a b c d 
r2 corr 0.34 0.47 0.50 0.54 
Prob>F *** *** *** *** 
N 80 80 80 80 
Infrastructure     
%electricity (+)* (+)*** (+)*** (+)** 
km roads /ha     
km_to_market  (+)** (+)*** (+)** 
km_to_agrimarket ns ns ns (+)** 
Land use     
Crops% (+)*** (+)** (+)** (+)*** 
Socio economics     
%read_write (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** ns 
$wage/h     
%income_forests  ns (-)** (-)*** 
%income_agri    ns 
Governance 
arrangement 
    
Communal  (+)** (+)*** ns 
Individual  (+)** ns ns 
SBosque/ResIndig  reference reference reference 
PANE  ns ns ns 
Governance 
performance 
    
MeanGov   (-)**  
Participation    (-)*** 
Institutions    (+)* 
LawEnforcement     
ForestManPract    ns 
Tenure    (-)*** 
Table 4: Multilinear regression models explaining mean annual deforestation per patch in the years 2008 – 
2016. a: model disregarding governance information; b: model in addition including categories of governance 
arrangements, c: model in addition including mean governance performance; d: model with single governance 
elements instead of mean governance. Abbreviations of variables are explained in Tab. 8. 
+/- : positive/negative estimator 
ns: not significant 


































































shaded cells: variable excluded during backward selection 




5.1 The interrelation of different governance elements 
The main finding with regard to interrelations between single governance elements is that they all 
load positively and high on the first PCA axis, which already explains 55% of the variance of the 
governance elements (see Fig. 2 and Tab. 3). This finding is based on the fact that correlations 
between single governance elements were mostly significant. The different governance elements are 
obviously expressions of a same underlying process. Governance as observed in the field study is a 
process that is characterized by several governance elements which act conjointly and which are not 
antagonistic. A predominant importance of single elements as differentiated by the framework of the 
World Resource Institute could hardly be identified. The general governance trend can be expressed 
by mean governance (see Fig. 3). As the loadings on the first component of the PCA were closely 
related to mean governance, the elements with highest loadings on the first component can be 
interpreted as those most strongly determining mean governance. But as four out of the five 
elements had loadings between 0.67 and 0.80 it is hard to claim a predominant role of one of them. 
The results confirm (Fischer et al., 2020) who applied the same methodology to 26 governance 
elements as derived from 28 reviewed studies and who did not find substantial negative loadings on 
the first component of a PCA as well. The homogeneous and harmonized data set from the field 
study shows this trend even more clearly as compared to the heterogeneous review data set. 
However, the global findings of (Fischer et al., 2020) provide the basis for a generalization of our 
results. 
Our findings have implications for the understanding of governance functioning. We cannot falsify 
the concept of governance, building on actors and structures and their interactions (Giessen and 
Buttoud, 2014) (see Fig. 1). We found indications that these governance components as quantified by 
five governance elements are equally important. At least for the extensive data set from tropical 
Ecuadorian forests we claim that none of the different components is more strongly determining 
overall governance.  
In view of the large number of governance elements that have been described in different 
frameworks (Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012; Davis et al., 2013a), the results are encouraging for 
policy, applied development work and further research. The positive interrelation of governance 
elements suggests that work on one element may have positive effects on others and that 
governance elements behave synergistically. They are not antagonistic. As it is simply impossible to 
focus on all governance elements in development work, policy or research, it may be promising to 
select a few of them and concentrate work on these. The conceptual framework can be applied to 
make sure that actors, structures and interactions are considered in the selection of elements. 
Beyond the general positive loadings on the first components there are governance element that 
differentiate governance on additional components depending on the local context. We recommend 
that such locally important elements, like participation and tenure in the case of our Ecuadorian data 
set, receive specific attention in the respective implementation.  
 


































































We confirm governance effects on reduced deforestation (Kanninen et al., 2007; Korhonen-Kurki et 
al., 2014; Stickler et al., 2017). We specifically confirm and further elaborate on the results of 
(Barbier and Tesfaw, 2015) who also carried out a comparison of deforestation effects of different 
governance elements in addition to proximate drivers, however with a few structural governance 
variables only. We differentiate this effect for five governance elements and show that the effects 
are independent from proximate deforestation drivers and have an additional effect on reduced 
deforestation (Tab. 4). However, the significance level and the explanatory power for governance 
elements was lower as for the proximate drivers which is rather plausible as governance elements 
are understood as underlying causes (Geist and Lambin, 2002)(see Fig. 1) in comparison to direct 
deforestation drivers such as e.g. agricultural land use (Hosonuma et al., 2012b; Ferrer Velasco et al., 
2020). The results imply that in development work, policy and research a focus on governance 
elements alone is not sufficient. Governance needs to be tackled in addition to proximate causes of 
deforestation. 
“Good governance” is based on a number of principals such as effectiveness, efficiency, 
transparency, accountability, legitimacy, lack of corruption, stability, empowerment, social justice, 
equity, environmental and social sustainability (Arts and Visseren-Hamakers, 2012; Secco et al., 2014; 
Ansell and Torfing, 2016). In this normative approach the principal question of “who has the right to 
define them” remains open (Secco et al., 2011). In practice, the above mentioned principals 
represent formal rules and norms as formulated in official policies, e.g. (UN, 2019). Our empirical 
results support the notion of a number of governance elements as indeed being “good” for low 
deforestation and thus justify the “good governance” approach related to this outcome. But the 
analytical approach which is based on empirical causalities can make it easier to negotiate and agree 
upon governance measures independently form implicit value statements, as informal values may 
substantially differ between e.g. indigenous and government stakeholders (Schweizer, 2017; Gupta 
and Koontz, 2019; Gustafsson and Scurrah, 2019). 
In our analysis, the governance element of “institutions” comprised a mean of government, NGO and 
community institutions (see Annex 1). It hardly correlated with deforestation in a bivariate 
correlation (see Annex 2) but was positively related to deforestation in the multiple regression model 
(see Tab. 4). Such inconsistent behavior points to the need for in-depth evaluations that reflect on 
formal and informal stakeholders separately in subsequent analyses. (Nansikombi  et al., 2020) also 
point to the need to differentiate between customary and formal institutions. 
 
5.3 Present land use and deforestation drivers as context for governance effects 
Our results confirm for Ecuador that infrastructure, socio economic and land use variables have 
predominant effects on deforestation (Geist and Lambin, 2002; Barbier and Tesfaw, 2015). These 
variables need a specific discussion that relates their effects to governance and which also provides 
the basis for conclusions related to the specific local context. 
Intensified agricultural land use, including ranching and livestock farming has been reported as a 
main deforestation driver in developing countries in general (Hosonuma et al., 2012b) and 
specifically for Ecuador (Lerner et al., 2014; MAGAP, 2014). (Castro et al., 2013) report that 
expansion of crops like cocoa, oil palm, rice, and cassava is the main deforestation driver along the 
Northwestern coast of Ecuador and in the provinces of Napo, Pastaza, and Orellana. Our findings are 
fully in line with these results. The development and implementation of improved land use systems, 
however, might be hampered by the specifically low governance scores for individual land ownership 


































































need to be improved as a basis for further developing land use systems that save or re-establish 
forests. 
Among the socio-economic variables, literacy rate in the study landscapes related positively to 
deforestation. Direct positive links between literacy and deforestation would contradict numerous 
authors reporting that higher education is related to decreasing deforestation (Bhattarai and 
Hammig, 2004; Soares-Filho et al., 2004; Barsimantov and Navia Antezana, 2012; Baynes et al., 
2016). In our study, settlers had highest literacy rates (not depicted, p<0.05). Therefore, we interpret 
that it is not literacy itself which is related to increasing deforestation but potentially a more 
intensive and deforesting land use of the better-educated settlers. At the same time, percentage of 
income from forests showed negative effects on deforestation. This shows that when forests are a 
source for income, deforestation might be lower which is in line with (Bae et al., 2012) and 
(Sendzimir et al., 2011) who report that income sources from forests could even foster reforestation. 
These findings mean that policy makers should take care that education is accompanied with 
sustainable management measures like e.g. certification or land use planning and that sustainable 
forest management is fostered as general safeguard for rural development projects. 
Socio Bosque areas showed reduced deforestation as compared to communal and individually 
managed lands (see Tab. 4) and as well highest governance scores (see Tab. 2). Many authors report 
success of this incentive program (Loaiza et al., 2017) (Jones and Lewis, 2015; Rosa da Conceição et 
al., 2015; Jones et al., 2017; Cuenca et al., 2018; Mohebalian and Aguilar, 2018). Lessons from 
improved governance in these areas can stimulate to specifically work on tenure security and 
participation in adjacent areas as well. These governance elements scored specifically high in Socio 
Bosque areas. (Eguiguren et al., 2019) have shown that the mere presence of Socio Bosque areas has 
positive effects on neighboring areas where logging operations are carried out and interpret this as, 
among others, governance effects. These results also advocate to extend governance improving 
measures to other land use forms. 
The two PANE areas considered in this study show high governance performance for the ecological 
reserve of El Pambilar and low scores for Mache-Chindul. The ecological reserve of Mache-Chindul 
was established and use restrictions were superimposed when already indigenous people were living 
there. This creates land use conflicts until today as expressed by qualitative statements, low 
governance scores and higher deforestation rates. El Pambilar, on the other side, was created to 
solve land use conflicts between a logging company and indigenous people. The use restrictions are 
respected until today, because the involved stakeholders participated in the process and their own 
interest in dispute resolution was taken into account. For El Pambilar, governance scores were 
considerably higher and deforestation is low. These findings support the need to include local 
communities in decision making in order to sustainably implement conservation areas (Stocks et al., 
2007; Oestreicher et al., 2009; Shahabuddin and Rao, 2010). In the specific case of the two PANE 
areas in Ecuador, institutions’ capacities and local participation need to be improved as these 




Improved governance is today seen as core to approaches aiming to reduce tropical deforestation. 
Our study provides first insights into interrelations and functioning of different forest governance 
elements in the field. Such analytical understanding is urgently needed in order to complement a 


































































Governance elements such as e.g. tenure, law enforcement, participation, institutional performance 
act conjointly and into the same direction, they are expressions of a same underlying process that is 
highly correlated to overall mean governance. This has implications for an analytical understanding 
of forest governance, which, based on our findings, is characterized by a synchronous functioning of 
different governance elements. Forest governance can be described by a conceptual framework 
including actors, structures and their interactions. This framework is now supported by empirical 
evidence because the results show that these components are equally important and interact 
positively. Such functional understanding of forest governance can support an efficient 
implementation of governance measures. From the multitude of governance elements that are 
described in existing assessment frameworks, the locally relevant ones need to be identified. These 
are elements that score low in all or in a number of governance arrangements. At the same time the 
selected elements should consider actors, structures as well as their interactions. Stakeholders in the 
forest governance arena can then rely on the justified assumption that work on a few, however well 
selected, core elements will have positive effects on the wider governance settings.  
Multiple regression analysis confirmed an effect of specific governance elements on reduced 
deforestation. In the case of Ecuador mostly tenure and participation had an effect on reduced 
deforestation, but this may vary depending on the local context. Further studies are needed to 
analyze which governance elements have effects on deforestation in a differing context. The 
quantification of governance effects on deforestation is important to specify “good governance” as 
an approach that is to date mainly based on a number of politically accepted principles. The 
difference to such a normative approach is that our analytical understanding is outcome oriented. 
Analytical governance rather highlights cause-effect chains related to a specific outcome of interest. 
A normative approach rather relies on value-oriented principles without revealing causalities. This 
may be problematic as informal values of local stakeholders can differ from official principles. 
Proximate drivers like infrastructure development and pressure from agricultural land use as well as 
the socio - economic context had stronger deforestation effects as compared to governance which is 
seen as an underlying factor. Proximate drivers urgently need to be taken into account and a sectoral 
emphasis on governance measures alone will not yield the expected results. However, governance 
measures are needed to ensure success of work related to proximate drivers. 
Based on our landscape data from deforestation hotspots in Ecuador there are a number of case 
specific conclusions. We confirm agricultural land use as prominent direct driver of deforestation. 
Improved agricultural techniques are needed to reduce the pressure on remaining forests. Land use 
planning is important in order to ensure that improved techniques will not result in increasing 
opportunity costs that again accelerate deforestation. Indigenous communities need alternative land 
use systems and income possibilities as they are in the process of adopting agricultural methods of 
the settlers. Income from forests can be an alternative, however it is unclear how long such forest 
based livelihoods are sustainable in view of still ongoing deforestation. We show that Socio Bosque is 
a functioning incentive based forest conservation program that rightly receives attention. The 
program can stimulate governance development in neighboring individually (settlers) and 
communally managed (indigenous) lands as well as in other countries striving to include PES 
(payment for ecosystem services) programs e.g. under REDD+. With increasing pressure on primary 
forests specifically to be expected for the Amazon region, it seems to be relevant to install 
conservation areas like Socio Bosque in time. Forest state conservation areas (PANE) were rated with 
lower governance quality. Institutional performance and participation of the local population were 
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Governance elements with indicators. 
 
Tenure security 
 Recognition. Individual and communal rights-holders have their rights formally recognized 
and recorded. 
 Demarcation. Individual and communal forest lands have boundaries demarcated and 
surveyed. 
 Gender equity. Rights registered to individuals or households are registered in the names 
of women, either jointly or individually 
Forest Management practices 
Administration of timber licenses (for individual and communal land) 
 Procedural clarity. Clear administrative procedures regulate the obtaining of licenses and 
permits. 
 Timeliness. Licenses and permits can be obtained in a reasonable time and within the time 
prescribed  
 Implementation. Licenses and permits are honored during harvesting and transport of 
forest products 
Protection and conservation (for indigenous reserves and SNAP) 
 Use restrictions. Stakeholders clearly understand the timeframe and what activities are 
allowed and not allowed within the protection or conservation area.   
 Enforcement. Implementing agencies are aware and effectively coordinate to carry out 
their roles and responsibilities. 
 Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring of impacts and effectiveness.  
Implementation of payments for ecosystem services (for Socio Bosque) 
 Procedures. The procedures for establishing PES have been made clear to the 
stakeholders. 
 Benefit sharing. The schemes for benefit sharing have been jointly decided, understood 
and acceptable to the stakeholders.  
 Protection. The protection of the forests providing these ecosystem services has been put 
in place. 
Law enforcement 
 Apprehension. Violators are apprehended and brought to trial by concerned authorities.  
 Compliance. Penalties are served or are paid in full in a timely manner.  
 Transparency. Information about penalties and their state of compliance is publicly 
disclosed 
Institutions 
 Government capacities. Government agencies have adequate number of staff with up-to-
date knowledge and skills, technology and equipment, and budget to perform its roles and 
duties. 
 NGO capacities. NGOs have adequate number of staff with up-to-date knowledge and 
skills, technology and equipment, and budget to provide services. 
 Local community capacities. Local communities have adequate number of staff with up-to-
date knowledge and skills, technology and equipment, and budget to perform its roles and 
duties. 
Participation in public policy making 
 Awareness. Nongovernmental stakeholders are  aware in a timely manner of policies to be 
developed, reviewed and revised that are relevant for land use in their community. 
 Platforms. Platforms are provided for multistakeholder participation in policy making  




































































Bivariate correlations between explanatory variables and deforestation 
 





Infrastructure    
electricity (%) % households with electricity 0,17  
km roads /ha km roads / ha 0,1  
km_to_market km to nearest market 0,09  
km_to_agrimarket km to nearest agricultural market 0,07  
Land use    
Agrofor (%) % of patch area agroforestry 0,3 *** 
Crops (%) % of patch area crops 0,49 *** 
Pastures (%) % of patch area pastures 0,41 *** 
PrimForest (%) % of patch area primary forests -0,53 *** 
HarvestFoestr (%) % of patch area harvested forests -0,1  
SuccessForest (%) % of patch area succession forests 0,27 ** 
Socio economics    
read_write (%) % of population that can read/write 0,33 *** 
$wage/h hourly rate for wage employment 0,22 * 
income_forests (%) % of household income from forests -0,3 *** 
income_agri (%) % of household income from agriculture -0.06  
Governance     
Participation participation -0,36 *** 
Institutions institutions -0,02  
LawEnforcement law enforcement -0,26 ** 
ForestManPract forest management practices -0,08  
Tenure tenure -0,18 * 
MeanGov mean governance  -0,29 *** 
Table: Pearson correlation coefficients for single bivariate correlations with % annual deforestation 
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The REDD program (“Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation”) was launched in 2007. Two
years later it was modified into REDD+. Since then, numerous sub-national initiatives have implemented
REDD+ or REDD+-like mechanisms. Now, shortly before the COP (United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Conference of the Parties) in Paris 2015 it is timely and necessary to analyze insights and to
draw upon lessons learned. This study reviews multi-national REDD+ studies by applying qualitative content
analysis using the UNFCCC Warsaw Framework for categorization.
Experienceswith the implementation of core REDD+ topics like institutional responsibility and results-based fi-
nancing aremostly not encouraging.Monitoring systems require further development, and guidance for jurisdic-
tional approaches is lacking. Experiences with reference levels, permanence and leakage have hardly been
reported. More general topics like stakeholder participation, tenure clarification and biodiversity co-benefits
are in turn more advanced. But these are not necessarily effects of REDD+ components in the projects. The pro-
jects obviously offer a platform to advance classical development issues.
We conclude that financial signals from the upcoming COP in Paris are essential to encourage further develop-
ment and implementation. This supports conclusions in accordance with the UNFCCC session in Bonn 2015 stat-
ing that methodologies are now complete and implementationmust begin. Additional conclusions are drawn for
specific topics of theWarsaw Framework. Authors claim that REDD+ should stimulate and support transforma-
tional change.
© 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Policy context and aims
Forests play a crucial role in the context of climate change. A total of
12% of total greenhouse gas emissions in the period 2000–2009 were
from forests and other forms of land use (IPCC, 2014). On a global
level, deforestation is still high. Around 13 million hectares of forests
were lost each year in the first decade of the millennium (FAO, 2010),
most of these in tropical countries (GFW, 2015). In 2007, the REDD
(“Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation”) process
was launched in Bali under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2007a). Two years later it was modified
into REDD+. The program was designed, developed and promoted as
an innovative approach to reduce deforestation based on broad cooper-
ation and shared responsibilities between developing and developed
countries. The core idea is that developed countries would financially
compensate losses due to avoided deforestation and degradation.
These conditional payments would depend on a verified monitoring of
carbon stocks and fluxes by developing countries. REDD+ raised high
expectations as it was hoped that it would mobilize billions of dollars
to compensate for the opportunity costs of forest conservation.
Eight years later no binding international agreement has yet been
reached onhow to pay for or reimburse verified net emission reductions
or enhanced removals of greenhouse gases. However, in the readiness
phases, preparation activities and pilot projects, a wealth of expertise
and experiences has become available on different aspects and func-
tionalities of the REDD+ mechanism. In the present analysis we aim
to review scientific publications and reports that summarize results
from a larger number of such formal and informal REDD+ activities in
order to check for ground-level information supporting REDD+ imple-
mentation. We also seek information to provide lessons that can be
learned for the further development and implementation of the
REDD+ process. The results and conclusions aim at supporting policy
makers, as expectations for international agreement are high in this
pre-conference period of the Conference of the Parties in Paris 2015.
In order to verify whether the manifold initiatives on the ground pro-
vide compatible perceptions of the political UNFCCC Framework,
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework of the review. Top down studies are based on official documents or global data. Bottom-up studies are based on projects or on available project data bases;
(a) results from different studies are summarized and structured along the topics of theWarsaw Framework applying qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000, 2014); (b) they serve as
input to the policy level. Further explanations in the text, abbreviations explained in caption to Table 1.
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discussion also focused on the differing conclusions between “top
down” or “bottom up” studies.
1.2. The REDD+ mechanism
REDD+ is implemented in three phases (UNFCCC, 2011), including
(i) the development of national strategies or action plans, policies and
measures, and capacity-building, followed by (ii) the implementation
of national policies and measures and (iii) results-based actions that
should be fully measured, reported and verified. The initial phase is
usually called the “readiness phase” and is supported by institutions
like the UN-REDD program, or the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
(FCPF) of the World Bank. The current status of national REDD+ activ-
ities is reported in formal documents such as “readiness proposals”
and national communications. The requirements for implementing
REDD+ are laid down in the Warsaw Framework (UNFCCC, 2013).
With this framework, “REDD+ made much progress — on financing,
transparency and safeguards, and monitoring and verification”
(Morgan et al., 2014). But even pledges to the Convention's
Green Carbon Fund made at the last COP meeting in Lima passed the
10 billion USD mark, no agreement has yet been reached on how to
pay for or reimburse verified net emission reductions or enhanced
removals of greenhouse gases.
While the formal REDD+ process under UNFCCC is still under
discussion, numerous REDD+ projects have been installed in devel-
oping countries. They include REDD+ pilot projects that are linked
to national REDD+ strategies as a response to a call for demonstra-
tion activities (UNFCCC, 2007b). Simonet et al. (2014) show that
23% of all REDD+ projects are pilot projects integrated into national
REDD+ strategies. In addition, there is a wide variety of informal
approaches, concepts and self-defined REDD+ projects that are la-
beled as REDD+ by their proponents. Thus, most of these activities
do not formally operate under the REDD+ process of UNFCCC, even
though that they all aim to cover main elements defined by
UNFCCC. Nevertheless, there is great interest in learning from
their experiences for the development of the formal REDD+ pro-
cess and these initiatives can indeed be regarded as “the laboratory
in which the REDD+ experiment is being conducted” (Sunderlin in
Sills et al., 2014).
2. Methods
Our study reviews material published from different sources and
compiles the lessons learnedwithin the structure of theWarsaw Frame-
work as input to the UNFCCC policy level (Fig. 1).
We used qualitative content analysis as an approach for the system-
atic analysis of the published articles. Qualitative content analysis is a
mixed methods approach. It includes categorization of the text into
sub-components text as a qualitative step, working through text
passages and analysis of sub-components as a quantitative part
(Mayring, 2000, 2014). The analysis is based on the methodological
steps shown in Fig. 2.
The important characteristics of themethod are feedback loops from
Steps 6 and 7 back to Step 3 which makes the method an iterative ap-
proach in which the differentiation of the subcomponents, analysis
techniques and procedural model are successively adapted during
analysis.
2.1. REDD+ definitions
The main differences of the REDD+ projects compared to the
UNFCCC REDD+ process are that (i) they are mostly based on other
standards like the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) or the Climate, Com-
munity & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA), (ii) often aim at financing
through the international voluntary carbon market and (iii) they are
sub-national, whereas REDD+ by definition is a national exercise
(with a few interim exceptions). In our review, REDD+ project defini-
tions vary substantially and influence the basis and results of each
study. A specific ambiguity is related to afforestation and reforestation
(A/R). It often remains unclear if afforestation and reforestation projects
are included within the studies reviewed. Under UNFCCC, the REDD+
activity “enhancement of forest carbon stocks” may be understood to
include afforestation and reforestation (Angelsen et al., 2011; Iverson
et al., 2014), but at the same time the Clean Development Mechanism
under the Kyoto Protocol also allows the generation of emission reduc-
tion certificates from afforestation/reforestation projects, which does
not make a REDD+ project definition easier. Among the studies
reviewed, Sills et al. (2014) only rely on projects that “do not derive
most of their carbon benefits from afforestation/reforestation outside
Fig. 2. Steps within qualitative content analysis (simplified after (Mayring, 2014)).
Table 1














“Top–down” studies based on REDD + documents





Y Drivers for deforestation
and degradation
Romijn et al. 2012 99 FAO FRA Y Forest monitoring
systems
Goers Williams 2013 32 FCPF R–PP,
UN–REDD NPD
N Several
“Bottom up” studies based on existing online data bases
Lawlor et al. 2013 41 22 CCBA Y Community
participation and
benefits
Simonet et al. 2014 329 47 Own data base N Several
“Bottom up” studies with own assessments
Goldstein et al. 2014 417 39 Own data base N Carbon market





De Oliveira et al. 2014 6 6 Own research N Several
Minang et al. 2014 4 Own research Y Several
Sills et al. 2014 23 6 CIFOR GCS N Several
Sunderlin et al. 2014a 23 6 CIFOR GCS N Several
Sunderlin et al. 2014b 23 6 CIFOR GCS Y Tenure
Murdiyarso et al. 2012 23 6 CIFOR GCS Y Several
Jagger et al. 2014 16 3 CIFOR GCS Y Safeguards
Luttrell et al. 2013 20 6 CIFOR GCS Y Benefit sharing
Joseph et al. 2013 21 6 CIFOR GCS Y MRV
Korhonen–Kurki et al. 2014 12 CIFOR GCS Y MRV, institutions
Studies excluded from the further evaluation. Further explanations in the text.
CCBA — Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance; CIFOR — Center for International
Forestry Research; ER-PIN Emission Reduction Program Idea Note; FAO — Food and
Agriculture Organization; FCPF — Forest Carbon Partnership Facility; FRA — Forest
Resource Assessment; GCS — Global Comparative Study; MRV — Monitoring Reporting
Verification; NatComm— National Communication; NPD— National Program Document;
R-PP — Readiness Preparation Proposal; UN-REDD — United Nations Collaborative
Initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation.
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of existing forest.” Lawlor et al. (2013) explicitly include A/R projects.
Simonet et al. (2014) explicitly distinguish REDD, A/R and Improved
Forest Management (IFM) projects but include them all in their study.
Other studies do not specify the selection criteria for the projects,
which is the reason for the fact that we included all of the selected stud-
ies. Due to the missing definitions in a number of studies, a selection
according to an own REDD+ definition was simply not possible. The
resulting vagueness needs to be taken into account.
2.2. Definition of the material: studies and sources used for the review
We applied a basic search in Science Direct (www.sciencedirect.
com) with “REDD” and “project” in the title, abstract or keywords and
with publication date N2010 and a second search with “REDD” and
“readiness” in the title, abstract or keywords. This yielded 92 results.
In the Web of Knowledge (www.webofknowledge.com) we used the
same words as topic and yielded 420 articles. Gray literature was
added from an own EndNote library, which was a collection of 187
REDD+ related publications compiled by the authors during previous
ongoing research. As we were searching for multi-national studies we
consecutively removed all those studies that mentioned one specific
country in the title. This reduced the number of publications by over
50%. On the basis of abstracts, introduction and methods we selected
those that contained results from REDD+ activities in at least three
countries in order to focus on overview studies and generalizing conclu-
sions that reach beyond single case studies. Further on we only selected
studies providing conclusions from REDD+ activities to at least one of
the topics of the Warsaw Framework (Section 2.3). In cases where re-
sults from the same studies were provided in different publications,
we prioritized reviewed scientific articles. We found 21 studies that
matched our formal selection criteria. From these we excluded four
studies: Cerbu et al. (2011) and Caplow et al. (2011) which were very
early studies with rather preliminary results; Nguon and Kulakowski
(2013), which had a very specific topical focus on natural disturbances
and FCPF & UN-REDD (2012) which was based on a questionnaire
among partner countries which we interpreted as a policy targeted
“wish list” rather than a scientific study. We grouped the remaining
17 studies (Table 1) according to their information sources into:
• studies relying on national REDD+ documents under UNFCCC, FCPF
and UN-REDD, as well as global data; we called these studies “top-
down” studies;
• studies using online data bases and maps of REDD+ projects includ-
ing project descriptions and design documents; we called these
studies “bottom-up” studies; and
• studies from research projects with own field assessments; we called
these studies “bottom-up” studies.
Only three studies were top-down studies, i.e. based on official
REDD+ documents or based on global data sets. There were two
bottom-up studies based on existing online project data bases. A list of
publicly available project data bases that are a substantial basis for
these studies is provided in the supplementary material (Supplementa-
ry material, Table A).With twelve studies the largest share of themate-
rial is based on own, original data collection. CIFOR's Global
Comparative study (GCS) played a dominant role. Eight studies in the
review rely on this project. There aremore publications from the project
that are not included in the reviewbecause these studies tackle only sin-
gle countries (Resosudarmo et al., 2014; Awono et al., 2014; Dokken
et al., 2014; Cromberg et al., 2014; Duchelle et al., 2014; political econ-
omy studies introduced by Brockhaus et al. (2014a)), tackle topics
that are beyond the operational level of the Warsaw Framework
(Brockhaus et al., 2014b), or because the results are included in other
GCS studies (Larson et al., 2013; Brockhaus and Di Gregorio, 2014). All
CIFOR GCS studies were treated as one respondent in the quantitative
analysis as many authors collaborate in several publications and all re-
sults are from similar projects.With regard to the State of the Forest Car-
bon Markets report (Goldstein et al., 2014) we used only the most
recent report within this annual series, as the latest version includes
the previous years' data as historical information as well.
2.3. Direction of the analysis and differentiation of subcomponents: the
Warsaw Framework
The REDD+ framework of the UNFCCC provided a structure for dif-
ferentiating the existing information into subcomponents. Within the
so-calledWarsaw Framework, UNFCCC has specified the fields relevant
for the implementation of REDD+. These specific fields were used as
subcomponents within our content analysis.We called them topics. Sci-
entific input, if relevant to the policy and development of the formal
REDD+process, needs to deal with and discuss these topics. Most stud-
ies had a specific topical focus and did not provide results and conclu-
sions on all of the topics.
Table 2
Topics and summary of the UNFCCC REDD+ “Warsaw Framework” (UNFCCC, 2013;
Climate Law&Policy, 2014).
Sub-component/topic Summarized content
Results-based financing • Encourage adequate and predictable
results-based financing from variety of sources
• Key role of Green Climate Fund
• Incentivize non-carbon benefits




• Establish robust and transparent national
forest monitoring systems
• Guided by IPCC guidelines.




• Measure, report and verify anthropogenic
forest-related emissions by sources and re-
movals by sinks, forest carbon stocks, and
forest carbon stock and forest-area changes
• As part of the National Forest Monitoring
System
• Parties' biennial update reports
• Verified by a team of technical experts
Forest reference emission levels
and/or forest reference levels
• These benchmarks are a precondition for
results-based payments
• Sub-national levels may be elaborated as an
interim measure
Safeguard reporting • Take into account national forest programs,
international conventions and agreements
• Governance
• Rights of indigenous peoples
• Stakeholder participation
• Natural forests, Biodiversity
• Risks of reversals
• Emission displacement
Drivers of deforestation and
forest degradation
• Parties are encouraged to take action to reduce
drivers and to share the results of their work
Table 3
Key expressions for the interpretation of study conclusionswhen answering on a five level
Likert scale reaching from 1 (fully agree) to 5 (completely disagree).
Scale Key expressions
1 “always”, “in all countries”
2 “mostly applied”, “in many cases”
3 “not sure”, “neither yes nor no”, “may potentially be”
4 “not applicable in most countries”, “little clarity”
5 “not applicable in all countries”, “topicwas amajor obstacle”, “completely unclear”
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Table 4
Statements and related scores for each of the studies on a five level Likert scale from 1 (fully agree) to 5 (completely disagree). In cases where
scores to a specific statement were available from several CIFOR GCS studies, we only used the study with the most detailed and substantiated






































































































































Conditional and results–based payments on project–and jurisdictional level presently play a significant role
5 4 *) 4 4 4 (4)
Conditional and results–based payments at project or jurisdictional scale are regarded as a promising cornerstone of future
REDD + implementation
6 3 3 3 4 3 3 (3)
3.2 Institutions
There are clear institutional responsibilities related to REDD + implementation in the countries/jurisdictions
7 4 4 4 2 4 (4) (5) 4
3.3 Monitoring 
The status of monitoring systems is satisfying
9 4 3 4 4 3 (3) (5) (4) 3 (4)
There are promising options for technical cooperation on MRV systems
4 2 2 2 (2) 2
Based on clear guidance for bridging the project and national scales, jurisdictional approaches are on the way to becoming
milestones in the global REDD + implementation
6 3 3 3 4 4 4 (4)
3.4 Safeguards
3.4.1 National forest programs
REDD + activities take into account national forest programs and/or international agreements beyond UNFCCC
1 1 1
3.4.2 Governance (incl. tenure)
Tenure rights are clarified in REDD + projects or jurisdictions
10 4 2 2 3 2 4 4 (4) (4) (4) 4
REDD + provides a valuable framework/process to clarify tenure rights
7 1 3 2 2 2 (3) (2) 2
3.4.3 Indigenous peoples and stakeholder participation
Indigenous people and stakeholders are involved in REDD+ activities
7 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2
The level of participation and/or the background information provided to stakeholders is adequate
5 5 4 4 3 4 4
3.4.4 Permanence and Leakage
Experience on permanence and leakage is provided from projects
0
3.4.5 Social safeguards and benefit sharing
Social and/or biological safeguard reporting receives attention in the REDD + activities and is implemented based on documented procedures
4 3 4 2 4 4
Socio–economic co–benefits are provided
5 3 3 3 4 4 (3)
Procedures for benefit–sharing are defined
6 4 4 3 4 (3) (4) 4
Procedures for benefit–sharing are implemented
4 4 5 4 (4) 4
3.4.6 Natural forests, Biodiversity
Conservation and biodiversity services are provided
4 3 3 2 3 3
3.5 Forest reference emission levels and/or forest reference levels
There are unambiguous standards and capacities to set reference levels in projects
4 3 3 (5) (3) 3
3.6 Drivers of deforestation and forest degradation
Project specific drivers for deforestation and degradation are taken into account
11 3 2 2 3 1 2 5 2 (3) (2) (1) 2
Number of topics 1 2 7 6 8 8 9 11 11 18 12 5 8 4 3 3 5 2
*) Study not taken into account as (Goldstein et al., 2014) exclusively focus on projects with conditional payments.
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2.4. Techniques of analysis and procedural model
A category systemwithin qualitative content analysis thatwe specif-
ically developed for our study constitutes the central instrument used to
structure and analyze the text.We formulated policy relevant questions
and statements as sub-components and scored our reviewed material
on this basis.
First, we coded all main messages within the studies referring to the
topics of theWarsaw Framework. Coding was carried out using the sig-
naling tool in Acrobat Reader. In parallel we copied the relevant texts
into an MS Excel table assigning it to columns for the respective topics.
Based on overview literature (e.g. Angelsen et al., 2012) and the topics
formulated in theWarsaw Framework (Table 2) we then deducted pol-
icy relevant statements/questions. The formulation of statements/
questions is an iterative process that reflects the feedback loops in qual-
itative content analysis. The final statements/questions are presented in
Table 4.
2.5. Analytical steps
Qualitative content analysis is amixedmethod inwhich quantitative
components gain particular importance when generalization of the re-
sults is required (Mayring, 2014). We defined our content analysis
units as a five level Likert scale reaching from 1 (fully agree) to 5
(completely disagree). In a second step we then analyzed the coded
texts and for each study answered to the statements/questions “on be-
half” of the authors. Having key expressions in mind (Table 3) we thus
interpreted the conclusions of the studies according to the scale.
Converting thematic analysis into Likert scales constitutes a data trans-
formation based on an intensity scale (Castro et al., 2010). A number of
constraints related to qualitative content analysis are mentioned in lit-
erature. Mayring (2000) mentions that the method is not appropriate
if the research question is highly open-ended, explorative or variable,
which was not the case, as we had theWarsaw Framework to structure
and define our categories. Kohlbacher (2006) points to the fact that
“replicating a mixed method package is hardly possible”, which is true
and might be a constraint in our study. Therefore, and in order to at
least make our decisions and interpretations transparent we copied
key statements in the reviewed studies related to each topic into a single
table (Supplementary material, Table B). However, this table should be
used with care as single and isolated sentences mostly transport
shortened messages and cannot replace the full understanding of the
studies. Elo et al. (2014) mention the possible failure to develop a
complete understanding of the context. This is a general problem of
qualitative content analysis, which we aimed to overcome by thorough
reading of the text and discussions in the research team. Here, we
tried to produce an interpretation based on expert knowledge and
a best possible understanding of the texts. The saturation of data
which is referred to by the same authors was not a constraint in our
case, as the material was predefined based on our literature selection
criteria.
3. Results
The results chapter starts with overarching study findings and iden-
tifies sub-topics. In the sub-sections, findings within single topics are
considered in more detail.
The most frequently raised questions address drivers of deforesta-
tion and tenure questions; they are tackled in 65%, respectively, 59%,
of the studies. In contrast, conclusions on permanence and leakage
were not provided in any of the reviewed literature (Table 4, Fig. 3).
Hosonuma et al. (2012) and Romijn et al. (2012) focus only on very se-
lected topics, whereas other studies like Sills et al. (2014); De Oliveira
et al. (2014) and Minang et al. (2014) provide a broader view with an-
swers to 63%, respectively, 58% of the statements. Not surprisingly, as
based on several studies, theCIFORGCSproject provides scores for near-
ly all statements.
Overall, there were more negative scores (32 “no” answers in Fig. 3)
than positive ones (22 “yes” answers in Fig. 3). The status and imple-
mentation of activities under REDD+ specific topics like financing and
benefit sharing, REDD+ institutions and monitoring systems were per-
ceived rather negatively (listed on top in Fig. 3). Technical REDD+
topics like reference emission levels and permanence and leakage,
were hardly tackled at all in the studies. Topics that are not REDD+spe-
cific, like tenure rights, participation, conservation and biodiversity, as
well as consideration of project specific drivers received more positive
ratings (listed at the bottom part of Fig. 3).
There were no systematic differences in results and conclusions be-
tween bottom-up and top-down studies. However, the number of stud-
ies and of topics covered inmost studieswas too low to analyze possible
differences statistically.
3.1. Finance
Three studies present expertise with results-based financing. All
three studies consistently disagree whether this financial mechanism
plays a central role of at present. Sunderlin et al.'s (2014) “doubt
about its centrality” summarizes the general perception. Of 329 projects
assessed globally by Simonet et al. (2014), only 21% are at present en-
gaged in carbon transactions. With four out of 23 projects (=17.4%)
selling carbon credits, the share is comparable for the CIFOR GCS sites
(Sills et al., 2014). Also most jurisdictions studied are currently driven
by official development assistance (ODA) and not by results-based pay-
ments (Fishbein and Lee, 2015). The low sharesmay partly be due to the
fact that the projects need more time to develop the framework at the
ground level. This is reflected by the fact that a larger share of projects
is expecting to sell credits in the future: this applies to 53% of the 329
globally assessed projects and 78% of the GCS projects. Nevertheless
and in general, the authors of the studies remain noncommittal as con-
cerns a possible future role of conditional payments. The hope “that ap-
plying conditionality at a higher scale, outside of site boundaries, will
make sense” (Sunderlin et al., 2014) is countered by the perception
from the jurisdictional projects as in general this “ambitious scale great-
ly raises the bar on the challenges” (Fishbein and Lee, 2015).
3.2. Institutions
Only one publication (Minang et al., 2014) identifies clear institu-
tional responsibilities, whereas four other studies taking a look at insti-
tutional development are rather skeptical. 59% of the studies do not deal
at all with these issues. Goers Williams (2013) shows that readiness
proposals did not identify specific next steps to establish mechanisms
for coordination and coherence of proposed new REDD+ bodies with
existing forest sector institutions. Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2014) report
“serious shortcomings in effective horizontal, cross-sectoral coordina-
tion mechanisms” in nearly all countries. Within the jurisdictions stud-
ied, institutional arrangements were in many cases still not clear or
created. However, jurisdictional approaches were seen as a platform
to involve at least local governments and to stimulate institutional
development (Fishbein and Lee, 2015).
3.3. Monitoring and scales
In the five studies that tackle National Forest Monitoring Systems
(NFMS) including Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) sys-
tems, the status of the monitoring systems was either not satisfying or
unclear. Based on ongoing and recent REDD+ projects Joseph et al.
(2013) offer a more positive conclusion, whereas the critical results of
Romijn et al. (2012) are based on all non-Annex I countries in a de
facto pre-REDD+ situation. Technical cooperation was generally seen
as a promising opportunity to improve the situation. However, De
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Fig. 3. Summary of answers to different statements. Scores on afive level Likert scale from1 (fully agree) to 5 (completely disagree)were summarized: 1 and2— yes; 3— indifferent; 4 and
5 — no. Topics are sorted from those with strongest disagreement to strongest agreement.
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Oliveira et al. (2014) point to the fact that “the MRV component of
forest–carbon initiatives generally involves external agencies and
consultants” which can create a dependency.
At present there are obviously no clear options for bridging project
and national scales in jurisdictional monitoring systems. Sills et al.
(2014) identify scale as one of the largest uncertainties, as the link be-
tween local project based systems and the national scale is not at all
clear. The IPCC guidelines have been developed for generating national
greenhouse gas inventories. But on the project level guidelines of carbon
certifiers play an important role. Related to the scales problem, the
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) to date provides the only defined stan-
dard for nesting scales in jurisdictional approaches. Also, a number of
projects are engaged with a government entity on integrating project
baselines with regional efforts (Goldstein et al., 2014). However, these
are individually negotiated solutions and there is no harmonized
approach under UNFCCC.
3.4. Safeguards
Safeguards include a number of topics that we evaluated separately.
3.4.1. National forest program, international conventions and agreements
Only one study (Jagger et al., 2014) reports on dialogs with national
forest programs. This positive report is based on projects in three
countries.
3.4.2. Governance and tenure rights
From the broad range of aspects included under a definition of mod-
ern governance (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014), tenure rights are themost
widely studied factor in our review. Tenure questions are high on the
agenda in most projects but perceptions of tenure seem to be case spe-
cific. Tenure rights are one of the most pressing and influential factors
for the complete REDD+ process among the CIFOR GCS projects
(Sunderlin et al., 2014) and most of these projects “have not yet
succeeded in creating a secure tenure foundation for REDD+ activities”
(Sills et al., 2014). The survey by Fishbein and Lee (2015) is more
positive, as their interview partners “suggested it is not always the
most difficult challenge that a jurisdiction faces” and for De Oliveira
et al. (2014) the “cases presented no apparent conflicts coming from
land tenure.” Independent of the status of tenure, REDD+ projects are
obviously helping populations to clarify tenure rights.
3.4.3. Indigenous people and stakeholder consultation
The necessity to involve and empower indigenous people as well as
to enable stakeholder participation is widely perceived and taken into
account in REDD+ projects. A majority of projects obtain local popula-
tions' free, prior, and informed consent (Lawlor et al., 2013) or inform
them through a participatory rural appraisal (Simonet et al., 2014).
However, the level of participation seems to be mostly inadequate.
People “are rarely involved in decision-making and project design”
(Simonet et al., 2014), individuals and communities lack “detailed infor-
mation about project risks and opportunities” (Lawlor et al., 2013), and
“many participatory processes are reduced to a few workshops”
(De Oliveira et al., 2014). With respect to the REDD+ approach, project
developers seem to be reluctant to propagate it too actively being afraid
to raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled (Sills et al., 2014).
3.4.4. Permanence and leakage
Avoidance of the risks of reversals (permanence) and actions to re-
duce displacement of emissions (leakage) are not considered in any of
the reviewed studies.
3.4.5. Social safeguards and benefit sharing
Social safeguard reporting seems to be neglected in most REDD+
projects. De Oliveira et al. (2014) point to the fact that there are simply
“too many social and environmental safeguards and different
organizations use different processes to guarantee the safeguards.”
This limited internal attention is in conflict to external information de-
mands, because there are clear expectations on poverty alleviation
and nature conservation linked to carbon projects. One third of all
REDD+ projects worldwide are certified by a social standard, which il-
lustrates the “importance of having a social label to sell in the voluntary
market” (Simonet et al., 2014). Goldstein et al. (2014) point to the fact
that “buyers demand to know the ‘story’ behind the offset”.
There is no clear picture on livelihood co-benefits. These are com-
plex and difficult to design, implement and monitor, as they “encom-
pass different scales, a large and varied body of stakeholders and
heterogeneous conditions on the ground” (Sills et al., 2014). For many
projects, “it is simply too early to assess whether they have produced
material benefits for communities” (Lawlor et al., 2013). Socio-
economic benefits that are mentioned by Simonet et al. (2014) are
mostly not provided as co-benefits of the REDD+ procedure but
through input-based and ODA-related finance in the same project.
As concerns benefit sharing, procedures were neither defined nor
implemented inmost cases.Many countries had several alternative pro-
posals on the table, e.g., one for national and several others for projects
(Luttrell et al., 2013).
3.4.6. Biodiversity
Conservation, as well as species and watershed protection play an
important role in many REDD+ projects. This is partly due to the fact
that many of them were former conservation projects that developed
a “new” REDD+component later on. About 30% of the globally analyzed
projects are thus located in a protected area. Climate is presented as the
main objective of only 14% of the projects, far behind conservation
(35%) (Simonet et al., 2014). There were forest protection activities at
20 of the 23 CIFOR GCS sites (Sunderlin et al., 2014). Twenty percent
of carbon dioxide equivalents certified byVCSwere fromprojects devel-
oped within a land area that was certified by the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) (Goldstein et al., 2014).
3.5. Reference emission levels, reference levels
There is not much evidence on the status or lessons learned from
previous activities on reference (emission) levels in the reviewedmate-
rial. Murdiyarso et al. (2012) detected large capacity gaps for develop-
ing reference levels and Joseph et al. (2013) complain about
“ambiguity in methodological guidelines on how to set reference emis-
sion level in REDD+ projects”.
3.6. Drivers
The awareness of and the need to take specific drivers for deforesta-
tion and degradation into account is reflected in most studies, with 11
out of 17 studies offering summarizing results or drawing dedicated
conclusions. The ranking and importance varies between the studies.
Hosonuma et al. (2012) give a widely accepted summary stating that
“commercial agriculture is the most important driver of deforestation,
followed by subsistence agriculture. Timber extraction and logging
drives most of the degradation, followed by fuelwood collection and
charcoal production, uncontrolled fire and livestock grazing”.
4. Discussion
Given the broad range of REDD+ topics included in the Warsaw
Framework, and the policy focus of our review, we concentrate the dis-
cussion on politically controversial issues like financing and benefit
sharing, tenure rights, and co-benefits (see subsections). Topics for
which we perceive no controversial discussions in recent literature are
not discussed. This applies for stakeholder participation (Gebara,
2013; Awono et al., 2014; Lawlor et al., 2013), institutional responsibil-
ities (Kanowski et al., 2011) integration of REDD+programswith other
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policies (Nepstad et al., 2014; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Robiglio
et al., 2014) and safeguard reporting (Arhin, 2014). Our discussion starts
with general thoughts on REDD+ projects and ends with methodolog-
ical considerations.
4.1. How much REDD+ is in the projects?
The core principles of REDD+ are financial compensation for the
consequences of avoided deforestation and degradation by developed
countries. They are based on a set of novel mechanisms and tools that
include result-based financial transfers, specific monitoring systems,
dedicated institutions, reference levels as benchmarks for emission re-
ductions, permanence of the reductions and avoided emission displace-
ment (leakage) in order to guarantee for climate effectiveness (UNFCCC,
2013). Our review shows either negative experience or low implemen-
tation and negligence of these REDD+ core topics in most of the
reviewed studies. Specifically, results-based financing has been imple-
mented to a rather low extent and most authors remain undecided on
its future potential. Responsible institutions were rated as being hardly
operational. The authors acknowledge the development of monitoring
systems as proceeding slowly. Astonishingly, reference levels were
only discussed by the CIFOR GCS and one additional study. Leakage
and permanence were not dealt with at all. Based on our review it is
hard to answer why these core themes of the REDD+ approach were
not covered in the multitude of projects. It seems that either the volun-
tary standards applied are clear in this respect or that the topics are not
perceived to be of high relevance on the project level.
In addition to these specific REDD+ related topics, the Warsaw
Framework includes tenure rights, participation, livelihood and biodi-
versity co-benefits as well as specific drivers of deforestation. These
may be rather “old”, but nevertheless urgent development topics, well
known from integrated conservation and development projects
(ICDP) and numerous other global initiatives. Surprisingly, these topics
received greater attention and/or more positive ratings in the reviewed
studies than specific REDD+ topics like benefit sharing and results-
based financing. Is REDD+ at the ground level consistently just a new
framework to tackle these issues? How much REDD+ really remains
beyond the safeguards and co-benefits? Is the program just old wine
in new skins? Positively spoken, fears voiced by Buizer et al. (2014)
whereby REDD+ would displace progress on such topics by focusing
on measurability of carbon stocks do not seem to be substantiated.
For effects on tenure rights, participation, biodiversity and drivers
there is evidence for some positive effects in the so-called REDD+
projects. But the studies provide hints that these effects are not neces-
sarily due to REDD+ components of the projects which are obviously
not (yet) operational in many cases. Simonet et al. (2014) note that
socio-economic benefits are mostly not provided as co-benefits of the
REDD+ procedure but through ICDP inputs in the same project. Thus,
the reviewed studies reveal that in addition to creating new financing
and accounting tools, REDD+ obviously offers a platform to advance
classical development issues.
4.2. No breakthrough for results-based financing
There is no doubt that the global financial potential falls short of
what has originally been expected andwhat would be needed to imple-
ment the REDD+ approach in the original extent. Norman and
Nakhooda (2014) report on pledges of US$8.7 billion for the period be-
tween 2006 andMarch 2014, but with the pace of new pledges slowing
after 2010. After the COP in Lima 2014, pledges to the Green Climate
fund passed the US$10 billion mark. In contrast, the Eliasch Review
had assumed “that the finance required to halve emissions from the for-
est sector by 2030 could be around US$17–US$33 billion per year”
(Eliasch, 2008). Specifically, after 2011, there was a strong decline
of project starts (Simonet et al., 2014) which is in line with a decline
of donor financing to recipient countries after 2011 (REDD+
Partnership, 2013).
This global situation has direct implications for the project level. The
uncertainty has potentially prevented the broad implementation of
results-based financing (Sunderlin et al., 2014). But on the other hand,
and in the absence of success stories from the ground level, the reluc-
tance of donor countries may be understandable. As long as the lessons
learned from the pilot projects, related to conditional payments are neg-
ative it might be hard to mobilize the funds needed.
4.3. Benefit sharing systems need to be country specific
The scientific debate on incentive systems within the countries is
controversial with different proposals being elaborated and argued for
(Skutsch et al., 2011; Skutsch et al., 2013; Balderas Torres and Skutsch,
2012; Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012; Pfund et al., 2011; Vatn and Vedeld,
2013). It is obviously left to the countries to develop, test and imple-
ment own systems and these will certainly be country specific. Ha
Hoang et al. (2013) present an example with substantial results based
financing components for Vietnam, whereas Maraseni et al. (2014) for
Nepal is an example proposing to shift away frommarket-based incen-
tives to input-based support.
4.4. Land tenure is always essential
With regard to land tenure, an important global change in land use
rights has been observed globally since the 1980s, with a number of
countries granting new tenure rights to communities living in and
around forests (Larson, 2011; Sunderlin, 2011; Agrawal, 2007). Also,
the relevance of secure tenure for REDD+ has been mentioned fre-
quently (Corbera et al., 2011; Resosudarmo et al., 2014; Karsenty and
Assembe, 2011). The studies in this review confirm that REDD+
projects are intrinsically interwovenwith national tenure situations, be-
cause on the one hand, REDD+depends on secure tenure rights and, on
the other hand, may have a potential to foster ongoing tenure clarifica-
tion and security. Lawlor et al. (2013) find this is an “important, trans-
formational effect that projects can have — and likely more enduring
than carbon payments”. But on the other hand, REDD+ cannot “replace
broader, national programs for land tenure reform” (Larson et al., 2013).
In such national programs REDD+will have to competewith other land
use forms, which bears additional challenges (Brockhaus et al., 2012).
4.5. No clear picture on socio-economic and biodiversity co-benefits
Non-carbon benefits were discussed intensively at the most recent
UNFCCC session in Bonn (Leonard, 2015), probably based on a wish to
tackle additional immediate challenges like poverty and conservation
issues within the existing framework. However, the question of wheth-
er and in how far REDD+ projects provide socio-economic or biodiver-
sity co-benefits can simply not be answered by this review, as many
projects are mixtures of biodiversity, socio-economic and carbon com-
ponents. But given the complex and slowly proceeding development
and implementation of REDD+, the integration of additional biodiversi-
ty modules in REDD+ programs (Gardner et al., 2012) or a specific
decoupling of biodiversity services (Potts et al., 2013) seems challeng-
ing. Project proponents and national REDD+ managers should be
aware of trade-offs between carbon and biodiversity or poverty (Potts
et al., 2013; Phelps et al., 2012; Pistorius and Reinecke, 2013;
Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012, Lawlor et al., 2013).
4.6. Real change needs to be transformational
Transformational change is a keyword emphasized in the reviewed
studies (Murdiyarso et al., 2012; Sunderlin et al., 2014; Brockhaus et
al., 2014b; Fishbein and Lee, 2015) and probably the only basis on
which sustainable development, including reduced emissions, can
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take place. (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012) define transformational
change as a “shift in discourse, attitudes, power relations, and deliberate
policy and protest action that leads policy formulation and implementa-
tion away from business as usual policy”. Babon et al. (2014) list “more
transparent and participatory policy processes, functioning multi-
stakeholder governance arrangements, attention to equity and a review
of existing or planned policies that enable deforestation” as more oper-
ational aspects of transformational change. The results of our study
show that many of these components have not been satisfactorily im-
plemented in REDD+ projects. Beyond these single components a fun-
damental change in perception, values and attitudes seems to be
essential for real change (Hauser, 2014). Ownership (OECD, 2005) is an-
other core condition. Within the reviewed papers, De Oliveira et al.
(2014) report that “funding and the idea of forest–carbon projects
[was] in all cases from international or outside organizations”. Such fi-
nancingmay probably stimulate and support, but not automatically im-
plement, transformational change. It also supports earlier findings
showing globally that REDD+ was primarily steered and influenced
by donor countries (Gallemore and Munroe, 2013).
4.7. Can project experience provide recommendations for the
national level?
Project level experience with REDD+ is an important efficiency
check for REDD+ and we consider a review of existing experiences as
necessary and essential. However, transferring project experience into
policy recommendations has to consider that most of the reviewed
projects are self-proclaimed REDD+ projects, with differing REDD+
definitions and rather following certification standards and NGO guide-
lines but not necessarily the formal UNFCCC Warsaw Framework.
UNFCCC, in contrast, has been designed for national scales and imple-
mentationwill differ fromproject applications. Our approach to validate
project experience by differentiating between top-down and bottom-
up conclusions could not add clarity here as the number of top down
studies was too low. The ultimate reality check can thus only be based
on the implementation which is hoped to be definitely launched in
Paris 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015).
The representativeness of the projects needs to be questioned. Selec-
tion criteria either tend to prioritize project areas which are more prom-
ising for earning carbon credits or simply rely on existing projects. De
Oliveira et al. (2014) explicitly mention that, “one reason for the inexis-
tence of conflicts in the projects may have been that the proponents
may have had as criteria to choose areas for the initiative where there is
no land tenure conflict.” Lawlor et al. (2013) study CCBA certified projects
only and the study has good scores for tenure and participation. But it
may be assumed that these CCBA projects are best case scenarios and
most likely not representative for all non-Annex I countries. Sills et al.
(2014) evaluate the representativeness of theCIFORGCSprojects by com-
paring key features to the full set of REDD+ projects given by Simonet
et al. (2014), but the representativeness of the latter remains open.
Many projects did not explicitly compare their observed outcomes
to a reference scenario when reporting their impacts. The CIFOR GCS
project is the only one that explicitly assesses and reports control data,
but only for one of the GCS studies (Sunderlin et al., 2014).
5. Conclusions and outlook
Based on a review of 17 multinational studies we show that imple-
mentation of REDD+ in readiness phases and projects on the ground
level is proceeding rather slowly. Project experience is not convincing
for key topics such as ‘results based finance’, ‘institutions’, ‘incentives’,
‘monitoring systems’ and ‘jurisdictional approaches’ or is hardly report-
ed in the case of ‘reference levels’, ‘leakage’ and ‘permanence’. There is,
however, progress in classical development topics such as ‘tenure
rights’, ‘participation’ and ‘biodiversity’.
Despite substantial international efforts and support, the develop-
ment of REDD+ on the ground has in many cases not yet succeeded
in acquiring results-based financing. Also the future potential and role
of such financing mechanisms remains open. Some projects claim that
they need more time to develop these mechanisms from a bottom-up
approach. However, signals from the political process under UNFCCC
are also required in a top-down approach. Especially in the context of
the upcoming COP in Paris, this is essential to encourage further devel-
opment and implementation. Stronger financial commitments and a re-
lease of funds for national implementation of REDD+would thus have a
stimulating effect for activities on the project level.
The positive effects of REDD+ activities on ‘tenure clarification’ and
‘participation’ and to some extent also on ‘socioeconomic co-benefits’
and ‘biodiversity’ can partly be attributed to the positive legacy of previ-
ous project phases under official development assistance. We conclude
that through these ‘safeguards’ REDD+ initiatives are, on the one hand,
successfully linked to essential development topics. However, on the
other hand, there is slow progress in core REDD+ aspects. This implies
the danger that initiatives are losing the carbon storage and emission
reduction focus evenwhen they are sailing under the REDD+ flag. Har-
monized safeguard reporting and impact assessments are needed to
disentangle effects of REDD+ activities and mostly older, input-based,
project components.
Climate efficiency can only be ensured if ‘permanence’ of the emis-
sion reduction is guaranteed and ‘leakage’ is avoided. These issues
were hardly considered in the reviewed studies, indicating that they re-
quire stronger attention in the projects and probably also in the subse-
quent national implementation. Whereas there is a clear methodology
in the context of accreditation for the voluntary carbonmarket, it is un-
clear how these issues are tackled in numerous self-proclaimed REDD+
projects. In order to link projects to sub-national (and in the future also
to national) levels, jurisdictional approaches need to be further elabo-
rated and clear guidance would also be needed under UNFCCC on how
to account, monitor and share benefits across scales. Specifically for
‘benefit sharing’ it became clear that country specific-solutions need
to be elaborated and one-size-fits-all approaches are not desirable.
‘Monitoring systems’ remain a crucial backbone for REDD+. The studies
show that technical MRV cooperation also between countries of the
South is promising and should be further supported. The broad range
of topics touched by REDD+ calls for improved cross sectoral coordina-
tion between ‘institutions’, specifically as institutional developmentwas
reported to be weak in most reviewed articles.
Research in the REDD+ arena is complex with consequently high re-
quirements on availability, transparency and reliability of data sets. Its
geographical scope is global and it needs to be interdisciplinary due to
the wide range of topics. Most of the reviewed studies focused only on
a small number of selected REDD+ topics. Our review is restricted to
transnational studies, leaving aside the huge amount of information
which we showed to be publicly available from various sources for
over 300 projects (Supplementary material, Table A). It remains a re-
warding challenge to elaborate on these specifically with approaches
going beyond summarizing descriptions. From a methodological point
of view, it might be challenging to consider how to use such a large
“found sample” (Overton et al., 1993) in order to derive reliable and
valid results.
Only one of our studies used reference scenarios (Sunderlin et al.,
2014), which is essential to show the effects of REDD+ and which
should be considered for additional studies. More research is needed re-
lated to what we called ‘top down’ approaches, i.e. national activities,
such as readiness phases, impacts of REDD+ strategies, or hopefully in
the near future related to payments for verified emission reductions
on national level in final REDD+ phases. Only then can we learn about
impact and possible success of REDD+ in complex reality and not
only in the laboratories of single projects.
A number of reviewed studies underline the relevance of transfor-
mational change if REDD+ is to have sustained effects. On the long
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term such change leads away from business-as-usual scenarios and
must be accompanied by a fundamental shift in perception, values and
attitudes. Transformational change is hardly measurable and therefore
rightly not included in the Warsaw Framework. Nevertheless, it is an
important topic for both science and practice. Transformational change
is evidently necessary for the idea of REDD+ to be translated into prac-
tice on a scale that makes a difference.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2015.11.003.
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A B S T R A C T
Good forest governance is a prerequisite for sustainable forest management and the successful implementation of
initiatives that aim to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. The necessity for good governance is high in
Zambia´s Miombo ecoregion, which is characterised by persistent deforestation that also threatens forest-de-
pendent livelihoods. Zambia has adopted policies and initiatives to improve forest governance. We use the
Governance of Forests Initiatives (GFI) indicator framework from the World Resource Institute in 24 commu-
nities in the Miombo ecoregion to examine Zambia´s status in this respect. The Wilcoxon rank test is applied to
compare the de facto governance performance between different arrangements with differing tenures and re-
strictions to forest access and use. We employ factor analysis to test the applicability of the GFI framework based
on community perceptions and cluster analysis to examine whether patterns of community clusters reflect the
governance structure of the provincial local government administration. Comparative results show low mean
scores for governance indicators, which do not differ significantly between arrangements. This indicates a weak
de facto forest governance performance across arrangements, specifically characterised by an inadequate en-
forcement of rules and restrictions on use, insufficient institutional financial, human and technical capacities and
unsatisfactory participatory land use planning and forest policy-making processes. We recommend support for
financial and technical institutional capacities combined with coordination mechanisms to permit the satisfac-
tory enforcement of forest rules. Frequent monitoring, apprehension and graduated sanctions are proposed as
part of the rule enforcement procedures. Stringent de jure requirements coupled with capacity building for
participatory land use planning and public policy participation also need to be adopted. This would also con-
tribute towards achieving targets for Zambia´s climate change response strategy, national development plan
2017–2021 and REDD+preparedness phase. The factor analysis largely confirms the GFI framework’s suit-
ability for governance analysis on the ground since factors generally mirror GFI indicators. However, because de
facto governance processes sometimes do not precisely reflect thematic areas of the framework, we warn against
the use of single indicators to exclusively represent a thematic area. Similarly, specific attention has to be paid to
customary rules and institutions when applying the GFI framework because compared to the framework, the
respective aspects are more clearly differentiated on the ground. Cluster analysis reveals a high variability of
governance processes within and across provinces. Decentralization measures should take into account clusters
that may in some cases follow administrative levels or in other cases go beyond the established administrative
boundaries. Specifically, initiatives to integrate customary structures into the decentralized governance structure
should take these regional differences into account.
1. Introduction
Globally, forests are under enormous pressure from deforestation
and forest degradation. Approximately 7.6 million hectares of forest are
lost annually, especially in the poorest tropical regions (FAO, 2015).
Deforestation is a result of several factors, many of them related to poor
forest governance (Eliasch, 2012; Umemiya et al., 2010; Kanninen
et al., 2007; Kaimowitz, 2012), which has failed to regulate anthro-
pogenic pressures. Deforestation is linked to increased greenhouse gas
emissions (Seymour and Busch, 2016), the loss of a functioning forest
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ecosystem (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003), and the dete-
rioration of socio-economic conditions, particularly in Africa with its
more than 160 million forest-dependent households (FAO, 2018). There
is thus a need for improved forest governance, especially since gov-
ernance is considered a precondition for sustainable forest management
and for the successful implementation of global initiatives such as Re-
ducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+),
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) (Pettenella and Brotto, 2012)
and forest landscape restoration (Mansourian, 2016).
The necessity for improved forest governance is high in countries
like Zambia, which has alarmingly high deforestation rates with around
0.63 % annual forest loss between 2000 and 2018 (Hansen et al., 2013;
Global Forest Watch, 2018). The greatest loss is reported in the Miombo
ecoregion, the most extensive forest type in Zambia, covering 45 % of
the total land area (Matakala et al., 2015). The Miombo is characterized
by the dominance of Brachystegia, Julbernardia and Isoberlinia tree
species (Matakala et al., 2015). The woodlands are of significant eco-
nomic importance, providing a variety of ecosystem goods and services
essential for human wellbeing including firewood, charcoal, timber and
non-timber forest products (Turpie et al., 2015). The ecosystems are
experiencing considerable deforestation due to charcoal production,
firewood collection and clearing for farming (Kalinda et al., 2008).
Deforestation not only threatens the livelihoods of rural Zambians, who
derive nearly 44 % of their income from the Miombo forest ecosystem
goods and services (Kalaba, 2013), it also undermines Zambia´s com-
mitment towards the Aichi biodiversity targets, i.e. to reduce biodi-
versity loss through deforestation and forest degradation by 25 % by
2020 (MLNREP, 2015).
Several definitions are proposed for governance. In general, recent
definitions understand governance as a broad and comprehensive
concept that goes far beyond governments. Common governance defi-
nitions all denote rules/structures, actors and processes/practices
(Mansourian, 2017; Larson and Petkova, 2011; Broekhoven et al., 2012;
Giessen and Buttoud, 2014; Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012). A widely
accepted forest governance definition “comprises a) all formal and in-
formal, public and private regulatory structures, i.e. institutions con-
sisting of rules, norms, principles, decision procedures, concerning
forests, their utilisation and their conservation, b) the interactions be-
tween public and private actors therein and c) the effects of either on
forests” (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014). Since it is difficult to cover all
aspects within the methodology of one study, while simultaneously
maintaining scientific rigour, the definition can be adapted to reflect
the relevant aspects (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014). As our study does not
reflect on effects on forests, we define forest governenace as the “norms,
processes, instruments, people and organizations that control how
people interact with forests” (Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012). The con-
cept of “forest governance” is operationalized by several indicator fra-
meworks. They include the “framework for assessing and monitoring
forest governance” of the Food and Agriculture Organization (Kishor
and Rosenbaum, 2012), the “natural resource governance framework
assessment guide” of the International Union for Conservation of
Nature (Campese, 2016), and the “governance of forest initiatives in-
dicator framework” of the World Resource Institute (Davis et al., 2013).
While these frameworks do not offer direct inferences on the economic,
ecological and social outcomes of governance systems, they provide a
comprehensive understanding of governance processes that is likely to
contribute to improvements in the quality of decision-making and im-
plementation (Rauschmayer et al., 2009). The Governance of Forest
Initiative (GFI) indicator framework is widely recommended for forest
governance assessments given its comprehensive coverage, providing a
series of indicators for analysing different dimensions of forest gov-
ernance systems (Agung et al., 2014; Brito et al., 2009). Although pri-
marily practise-oriented, we hypothesize that the the GFI framework
builds on aspects necessary for applying the normative concept (Giessen
and Buttoud, 2014) as a scientific analytical approach, i.e value ju-
degments on desirable conditions within a methodological framework
to provide recommendations towards selected ends. Thus, it permits the
integration of scientific and practical aspects and provides added value
to real world challenges. Moreover, while previous models underscore
either actors (Hardin, 1968) or rules/institutions (Goodin, 1996;
Ostrom, 1990) as the theoretical basis, the GFI framework, with its
practise-oriented approach, is able to integrate both aspects (Arts et al.,
2014) as, based on theoretical foundations of the governance concept, it
includes agency and structure components (Fischer et al., 2020). It
emphasiszes the diversity of actors, the links between formal and in-
formal practises and the rules that shape governance (Davis et al.,
2013).
A few scientific studies have utilized the GFI framework to quanti-
tatively analyze progress towards proposed governance improvements:
Agung et al. (2014) and Pettenella and Brotto (2012) analyse the im-
pact of REDD+ readiness on forest governance in Indonesia and the
successful features for REDD+project organizations, respectively.
Such progress needs to be assessed specifically for communities with
diverse forest governance arrangements. This implies the need to sci-
entifically test the applicability of the proposed indicators on the basis
of community perceptions. Community perceptions can indicate the
extent to which governance structures are legitimated by community
members (DeCaro and Stokes, 2013). Community perceptions have also
been found to correlate with local compliance with rules for common
pool resource management (Jenny et al., 2007). Furthermore, com-
munity perceptions may capture the de facto reality that exists on the
ground, which was found to differ substantially from the fact-based de
jure notions of laws (Kaufmann et al., 2011). Although perception-
based measures have been criticized as reflecting factors other than
governance, such as economic performance or poverty (Kurtz and
Schrank, 2007), Kaufmann et al. (2007) found this notion does not
withstand empirical scrutiny.
Several African countries including Zambia have adopted policies
and initiatives that take the importance of forest governance into ac-
count. In Zambia, the revised decentralization policy of 2013 provides
for the devolution of decision-making power, functions, responsibilities
and resources to the provincial, district and sub-district levels to im-
prove the quality of service delivery at the sub-national level, including
forest management (GRZ, 2002). Zambia also developed a national
strategy for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
tion (REDD+), which integrates strengthening forest governance in the
preparatory phase (Matakala et al., 2015). Zambia´s National devel-
opment plan 2017–2021 similarly proposes improved forest governance
as part of its strategies towards achieving sustainable forest use
(Ministry of National Development Planning, 2017). The country has
also developed strategies for the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kalaba et al.,
2014), all of which contribute to sustainable development goal 15 on
sustainable forest management (United Nations, 2015). Moreover,
Zambia´s Forest Act of 2015 and Forest Policy of 2014 provide for the
establishment of diverse forest governance arrangements. These range
from (i) hierarchical command and control systems in state-owned
National Forest Reserves and National Parks to (ii) participatory ar-
rangements with restrictions of forest use and management in state-
owned Local Forest Reserves, and Game Management Areas, to (iii)
inclusion of communities, customary institutions and private entities
into forest conservation initiatives in customary and private forests
(GRZ, 2015a, 2015b). However, there has been almost no comparative
examination of the governance status within these diverse arrange-
ments. Given the co-existence of customary and formal institutions,
with overlapping jurisdictions and operating within parallel customary
and formal legislation (GRZ, 2015a, 2015b), it is imperative to under-
stand how interrelationships amongst these distinct structures of au-
thority shape forest governance outcomes in Zambia. As hypothesised
by several scholars (e.g. ANDERSON et al., 1998; Rescher, 1993),
conflicts between overlapping regulations and institutions are often
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inevitable. As this is likely to have implications on governance progress,
knowledge about forest governance performance in Zambia is crucial
for the further development of policy in the context of legal and in-
stitutional pluralism, which is typical for many African countries in the
post-colonial era.
1. Aims
This study aims to contribute to a more robust understanding of
forest governance assessment tools and governance structures and
purposes to identify the possible influence of overlapping formal and
customary administrative structures on de facto governance.
Methodologically, we aim to draw conclusion on the applicability of the
GFI framework at a community level. The study addresses three key
research questions: (i) How does forest governance differ across dif-
ferent governance arrangements with differing tenure and restrictions
to forest access and use? (ii) Given the broad and very comprehensive
understanding of forest governance, does the GFI framework help to
differentiate distinct aspects of forest governance based on the per-
ception of the local population? (iii) Can communities be clustered into
distinct groups of similar governance conditions? If so, does the pattern
of community clusters reflect the governance structure of the provincial
local government administration? By answering these questions, we
aim to draw conclusions on the strengths and weaknesses of different
restriction regimes as instruments of national policy implementation on
the ground in communities, which are influenced by customary and
governmental rules and actors.
1.2. Forest administrative structure in Zambia
Zambia´s forest administration has been decentralized to provide
citizens with more authority and power in decision-making at the local
level. The central government agency with a legal mandate to manage
forest resources is the Forest Department of the Ministry of Lands and
Natural Resources. Forest department is responsible for formulating and
reviewing all legislation related to forest management in addition to co-
ordinating its implementation (Chileshe, 2001; Ministry of Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources, 2009). The sub-national govern-
ment levels are structured into the provincial, district, and sub-district
administration units i.e. area and ward (Fig. 1). Provincial and district
units are responsible for formulating and enforcing by-laws, and facil-
itating the proper and smooth administration of forest estate, in ac-
cordance with the forestry policy and existing legal framework
(Chileshe, 2001; Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Re-
sources, 2009). The district unit is additionally responsible for pro-
viding extension services, collecting revenues from the sale of forest
products, the enforcement of regulation through licences and patrols,
managing forest woodlots and plantations and coordinating and mon-
itoring lower administrative levels (Chileshe, 2001). Currently, Zambia
has 10 provinces and 117 districts, each comprising a district council,
which is the main policy and decision-making body at the district level.
At the sub district level, the council is represented by the Area Devel-
opment Committees (ADCs). The ADCs are democratically elected, local
governance structures that ought to work together with members in
each ward to develop natural resource plans and participate in the
management thereof (GZR, 2015). Although the ADCs are theoretically
the official focal point of local collective action for the improvement of
the environment and livelihoods on customary lands, these governance
structures in reality appear to be dysfunctional and are not viewed as a
political administrative unit in some communities (Mfune, 2013).
There is a strong customary administrative structure operating in
parallel to the aforementioned political administration within each
district that is guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia
(Mason-Case, 2011). Customary administration is made up of 73 tribes
headed by 240 chiefs, 8 senior chiefs and 4 paramount chiefs, who
delegate rights and responsibilities to headpersons and sub-chiefs
within their jurisdictions (Mason-Case, 2011). Traditional leaders are
mandated to administer customary lands based on local traditions.
Traditional leaders determine land use, access and user rights on cus-
tomary land. The political administration often has little authority over
traditional administration and must engage in consultations with tra-
ditional institutions before undertaking any activities on customary
lands.
In practice, however, the central government is unwilling to relin-
quish power over protected forests to local governments (Mfune, 2013).
Moreover, local government´s financial, human and technical capacity
to manage open forests is limited. Furthermore, local government´s
involvement in the governance of customary forests is constrained by
the contradicting land tenure policies (Chikulo, 2009). While the Local
Government Act of 1991 gives the district council a mandate to plan
Fig. 1. Administrative units of central, local and traditional government in Zambia´s decentralised forest governance structure (Chileshe, 2001, Ministry of Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources, 2009).
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and lead the management of customary forests, the Land Act of 1995
places the administration of these lands under customary authority.
Besides, customary authorities sometimes challenge the authority of the
sub-district governance structures (Mfune, 2013).
1.3. Zambia´s forest governance arrangements
The forest governance arrangements of Zambia are grounded in the
land reform of 1924, dating back to the colonial period. During this
period, land in Zambia was demarcated into crown and native reserve
land, designated for exclusive use by Africans and European settlers,
respectively (Van Loenen, 1999; Brown, 2005). The chiefs administered
forests on native reserves based on customary law. In contrast, forests
on crown land were administered by the British colonial government
based on formal law (Brown, 2005). At independence, customary land
administration was sub-ordinated to formal law, which previously only
applied to crown land. However, the method of customary land alie-
nation continued under customary law. Following Zambia’s in-
dependence in 1964, crown land was converted to state land and sub-
sequently administered by the Ministry of Lands (Brown, 2005).
Zambia currently has various forest governance arrangements under
the responsibility of different institutions, across different tenure cate-
gories and with differing access and use restrictions (Table 1). The
majority (65.7 %) of Zambia´s forest is on customary land as either
individual or communal forests. These either have or lack cultural
norms, such as graveyard forests, which are governed by chiefs and
their representatives including village headpersons and sub-chiefs
under customary law (GRZ, 2015a; Kalinda et al., 2008). Under formal
law, the commercial use of forest products without a licence on cus-
tomary lands is restricted, although access and subsistence use are not
(GRZ, 2015a). Other forests (23.7 %) in Zambia are located on state
lands. State forests include National and Local Forest Reserves, ad-
ministered by the Forest Department (GRZ, 2015a; Kalinda et al.,
2008), as well as National Parks and Game Management Areas, ad-
ministered by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (GRZ,
2015b). Under formal law, access to and use of forest resources in state
forests is restricted, except with special permits. Private forests also
exist on state lands, which constitute 10.6 % of the total forest area.
These are owned by registered individuals or companies through lea-
sehold tenure.
2. Methods
2.1. Study sites and site selection
The study was conducted in the Miombo woodland, which is the
major forest type in Zambia, and employed a nested design to capture
the diversity of communities in the Miombo ecoregion. Three pro-
vinces, namely Copperbelt, North Western and Eastern were selected to
represent different socio-economic and demographic conditions as well
as different forest cover and deforestation contexts (Table 2). North
Western is characterised by a low population density of 6 persons/km2
(Central Statistical Office, 2010), high forest cover (81.1 %) and low
rate of forest loss (0.43 % annually) between 2000 and 2018 (Global
Forest Watch, 2018), mostly from unsustainable timber extraction
(Shakacite et al., 2016). According to the same sources, Eastern pro-
vince has a medium population density of 31 persons/km2, low forest
cover (50.4 %) and a relatively low rate of forest loss (0.48 % annually)
between 2000 and 2018 (Global Forest Watch, 2018), mostly from
small scale crop farming. Copperbelt is characterised by a very high
population density of 63 persons/km2, a medium to high forest cover
(76.6 %) and high rate of forest loss (1.3 % annually) between 2000 and
2018, mostly from charcoal production.
Four landscapes each of 12*12km, with typical land-use, socio-
economic, demographic and biophysical attributes and a distinct tra-
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each of the three provinces, thus a total of 12 landscapes. Two com-
munities within each landscape were selected for the study, thus a total
of twenty-four communities (Fig. 2). Areas of distinct de jure govern-
ance arrangements, representing different tenure and restrictions to
forest access and use, were identified a priori within the communities
through scoping visits to the traditional headperson´s offices and forest
department maps. Five types of governance arrangements were iden-
tified:
i State forests with restrictions to access and use
ii Individual customary forests with no restrictions to access and use
iii Communal customary forests with no restrictions to access and use
iv Communal customary forests with cultural restrictions to access and
use
v Private forests with use decided by the registered land owner
2.2. Governance indicator assessment
The study relies on the Governance of Forests Initiatives framework
of the World Resource Institute. The GFI framework provides a com-
prehensive diagnostic tool that covers six core governance issues in
forestry. These are: 1) forest tenure, 2) land use planning, 3) forest
management, 4) forest revenues, 5) cross-cutting institutions and 6)
cross-cutting issues, denoted as thematic areas (Davis et al., 2013). The
framework assesses these governance areas through a set of detailed
indicators, each specified by five elements of quality that are rated on a
scale of pre-coded statements, ranging from lack of good governance to
good practice.
The GFI framework recommends that the indicators should be
“adapted based on contextual factors such as scale of assessment, type
of forest biome, or ownership regime” from the large multitude of
governance aspects covered. After a thorough literature analysis, cou-
pled with a pre-test workshop conducted with 15 community partici-
pants in Zambia, we selected at least one indicator from each of the
thematic areas, choosing those that reflect pertinent issues in Zambia´s
Table 2
Description of demographic, forest cover and deforestation attributes of study
provinces (Global Forest Watch, 2018; Central Statistical Office, 2010;
Shakacite et al., 2016).
Attributes Copperbelt North Western Eastern
Forest area (%) 76.6 81.1 50.4












Fig. 2. Locations of the study provinces, landscapes and communities in Zambia. Landscapes are labelled according to the chiefdoms within which they are located.
Sources: Tree Areas (ESA, 2017), main populated places (SERVIR, 2015), main roads (Center for International Earth Science Information Network et al., 2013) and
Research Forest Reserves (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2016).
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forest governance. We finally selected 19 quantitative governance in-
dicators covering all thematic areas of the GFI and adapted them to the
Zambian context as follows:
• Thematic area “forest tenure”: (1) recognition and protection of
tenure rights
• Thematic area “land use”: (2) formal land use planning.
• Thematic area “forest management”: (3) implementation of land use
strategies and plans, administration of licences for (4) timber, (5)
charcoal and, (6) non-timber forest products, implementation of (7)
reforestation, (8) forest protection and conservation, (9) payment
for ecosystem services, (10) sustainable, forest-based livelihood
programs and enforcement of (11) formal and (12) customary forest
laws.
• Thematic area “revenues”: (13) forest revenue distribution and, (14)
implementation of benefit sharing mechanisms.
• Thematic area “cross-cutting institutions”: capacities and effi-
ciencies of (15) central, (16) local government, (17) non-govern-
ment organizations and (18) customary institutions
• Thematic area “cross-cutting issues”: (19) public participation in
policy-making.
Each indicator was specified by five elements of quality (Appendix
A)
Mapping of the governance arrangements on the ground and de
facto scoring of governance elements of quality was carried out through
focus group discussions. Mapping was essential to create an awareness
of the different governance arrangements and to ensure correct spa-
tially differentiated subsequent scoring for the different arrangements.
Scoping visits were conducted in each landscape to organise the focus
group discussions. These enabled the establishment of contacts to re-
presentatives from all communities and major stakeholder groups.
Focus group discussions were carried out in all 24 communities, each
with fifteen key stakeholder representatives including sub-village lea-
ders, customary leaders and forest committee representatives.
Participants comprised men, women, young people and long-term
members of the community. During the focus group discussions, map-
ping was carried out on print outs of high-resolution Google satellite
images of approximately 80*120 cm for the period November 2017 and
October 2018. Prior to mapping, participants were asked to discuss the
categories of governance arrangements within their community based
on tenure, use restrictions and formal and customary institutions. When
participants could distinguish between arrangements, they were tasked
to map out the boundaries of each arrangement in their community.
The mapping produced seventy three de facto governance polygons
from the twenty four communities: 24 individual customary forests
without access and use restrictions, 22 communal customary forest
without access and use restrictions, 10 state forests with access and use
restrictions, 8 communal customary forests with cultural access and use
restrictions (in this case norms) and 9 private forests (Appendix B).
In the governance assessments, focus group participants were asked
to discuss and agree on governance scores that were assigned to each of
the governance polygons as Likert scores (Likert, 1932) on a scale from
0 (not present), 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) per element of quality
(Appendix A). Likert scales transform qualitative data to quantitative
data (Flynn et al., 1990). This permits the reliable integration of in-
formation across observations or cases (Kirk et al., 1986). Moreover,
although criticized for producing ordinal data, Likert scales have been
found to provide interval data that is suitable for parametric statistical
analysis (Parker et al., 2002). It was not possible to establish contacts to
private landowners to a meaningful extent, thus we could not score
governance on private land. The Likert scores of all five elements of
quality per indicator were aggregated as an arithmetic mean in order to
derive indicator values for each of the governance polygons. All qua-
litative comments made for the governance scores were also noted.
2.3. Data analysis
A non-parametric, Wilcoxon rank test was applied to determine
whether governance quality differed between the restricted state, non-
restricted communal customary, non-restricted individual customary
and culturally restricted communal customary arrangements. This test
is recommended for comparing mean ranks, when the assumption of
data normality is violated (Bridge and Sawilowsky, 1999). Since the
data remained skewed, even when a log transformation was performed,
we applied this test.
We applied factor analysis (FA), using principal component fac-
toring and varimax rotation methods, to examine the relationships
between the elements of quality, indicators and thematic areas of the
GFI framework. FA tests whether hypothesized constructs are re-
presented by the measured variables by identifying variables that are
correlated with each other (Byrne, 2016). Our aim here was to examine
whether the factors reproduce the hypothesised relationships between
the different elements of quality, indicators and thematic areas of the
GFI. The eigenvalue criterion (> 1) was used to determine the number
of factors. Based on recommendations from Comrey and Lee, 2013, only
those variables with loadings of 0.5, -0.5, or greater were considered
significant items, and thus good indicators of a factor. To confirm
whether the resulting factors represent their postulated measurement
variables, we performed a bivariate correlation analysis between the
loadings of the assigned factors and the respective mean Likert scores of
the corresponding indicators. Coefficients (r) range between +1 and
−1, where 1 is the total positive linear correlation, 0 is no linear cor-
relation, and −1 is total negative linear correlation (Bewick et al.,
2003). Furthermore, low p-values below the significance level of 0.05
indicate that relationships are statistically significant (Bewick et al.,
2003). To determine whether the correlated variables formed a reliable
scale that effectively measured the factors, Cronbach’s reliability ana-
lysis was also conducted. Coefficients (α) range from 0 to 1, with values
over 0.7 indicating a reliable measure of the underlying concept
(Nunnally and Bernstein, 1967; Kline, 2013). Only when indicators
belonging to the same GFI thematic area were loaded on the same
factor did we conclude that these indicators actually reflect the the-
matic areas of the GFI framework.
We used a hierarchical cluster analysis based on the factor scores
from the preceding factor analysis to identify patterns in governance
performance of communities. Hierarchical clustering, unlike other
clustering procedures, does not require a pre-specified number of
clusters (Kaushik and Mathur, 2014). Accordingly, it was appropriate
for this study, which was aimed at exploring the likelihood for the
emergence of clusters. Moreover, by using the factor scores, we wanted
to avoid any potential multicollinearity, which could result in an
overrepresentation of variables (Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014). In parti-
cular, we ran the Ward criterion with Euclidean distances, which is
often recommended as the best method for detecting group structures in
data (Lassar and Kerr, 1996). Communities falling within the same
cluster were interpreted as reflecting similar governance conditions. As
data on factor scores were not distributed normally, a non-parametric
Wilcoxon rank test was used for the comparison of clusters. Conversely,
the data on mean factor scores were distributed normally so that the
Student t-test was used for the comparison of clusters. A principal
component analysis (PCA) was also performed to determine whether
community clusters reflect the provincial governance structure. PCA
results were visualised using a score plot showing the distribution of
community clusters along the two principal components that con-
stituted the largest variations. The closer the communities were to-
gether on the score plot, the more similar their performance was related
to the two principal components. Additionally, when all of the com-
munities from one province were grouped exclusively in the same
cluster, it was inferred that provincial administrative structures de-
termine patterns of community clusters, thus forest governance per-
formance, and vice versa. All of the analyses were conducted using JMP




3.1. Forest governance quality
Sixty four governance polygons were mapped and scored with
governance indicators in 24 communities. Of the 19 selected indicators,
only eight were present in all governance arrangements (Table 3). Only
these could be used to calculate comparable mean governance scores
(Table 4). All of these indicators represent different thematic areas of
the GFI framework, namely: thematic area “forest tenure”; (1) re-
cognition and protection of tenure rights; thematic area “land use”; (2)
formal land use planning; thematic area “forest management” (3)
formal law enforcement and (4) customary law enforcement; thematic
area “cross-cutting institutions” (5) central government, (6) local gov-
ernment and (7) traditional institutions; thematic area “cross-cutting
issues” (8) public participation in policy-making.
Other indicators from the thematic area “forest management”, in-
cluding administration of timber (88 %) and charcoal licences (72 %) as
well as protection and conservation (28 %), were only applicable in a
lower proportion of polygons (Table 3). However, since at least one of
these indicators could be measured for each polygon and these all re-
present procedures for regulating forest use, they were grouped into
one indicator referred to as forest use restrictions, which in this case
reflects forest conservation measures. Forest use restrictions then con-
stituted the ninth indicator in the comparative assessment.
The remaining indicators were only present in specific polygons and
Table 3
Summary of selected indicators per thematic area and proportion of governance polygons in which indicators are present. Indicators highlighted in green are present
in all governance polygons (N=64).
Table 4
Summary of mean governance scores for different indicators per thematic area and type of governance arrangement. Indicators highlighted in green are present in all
arrangements. Mean scores 0 = non−existent; 1= very low; 2= low; 3= average, 4= high, 5= very high. Different superscript letters indicate means that differ
significantly between arrangements at p<0.05, using the non−parametric Wilcoxon rank test. CC= non−restricted communal customary forest; State = restricted
state forest; CI= non−restricted individual customary forest; CTP= culturally−restricted communal customary forest, No indicates the number of polygons with
observations.
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thus not comparable across arrangements (Table 3). These indicators
were nevertheless taken into consideration in the computation of the
final mean governance score (Table 4).
Overall, mean governance as the mean value of the nine governance
indicators that were applicable in all arrangements, was very low, with
values between 1.2 and 1.5, and did not differ significantly between
arrangements (Table 4). Of the nine fully comparable indicators, only
tenure rights recognition and protection consistently scored above the
average Likert score of 3. Tenure rights recognition and protection
moreover, scored significantly higher in the customary than in state
arrangements. The governance aspect of forest use restrictions, which
in this case reflects conservation measures, scored significantly higher
in the arrangements with cultural use restrictions than in those devoid
of cultural restrictions. Other fully comparable indicators of formal land
use planning and formal law enforcement, central government capa-
cities and effectiveness scored significantly higher in state than in the
customary arrangements. Public participation is forest policy formula-
tion was completely absent in all arrangements.
Taking all indicators into account, including those only present in
specific sites, state arrangements (with more indicators present) had
significantly higher mean governance scores than customary arrange-
ments (with less indicators present) (Table 4). The individual, site-
specific indicators did not differ significantly between arrangements
even though they led to higher mean governance scores in all the ar-
rangements in which they were present.
A comparative analysis of the elements of quality in governance
arrangements revealed that gender equity was significantly lower in
individually-owned customary forests compared to state and communal
customary arrangements (Appendix C). Apprehension, compliance and
monitoring of customary law was significantly lower in state than
customary forests.
3.2. Relationships between the GFI thematic areas, indicators and elements
of quality
Factor analysis resulted in seven main factors that together explain
76.5 % of the variation. The first three factors, which together explain
52.58 % of the variation, are characterized by loadings of five elements
of quality (Table 5). The first factor, accounting for 18 % of the var-
iance, correlated primarily with the indicator of formal law enforce-
ment from the thematic area “forest management”. The second factor,
constituting 17.6 % of the variance, correlated primarily with the in-
dicator of formal land use planning from the thematic area “land use”.
The third factor, which explained 17 % of the variance, was highly
correlated with the indicator of customary law enforcement from the
thematic area “forest management”.
Each of the remaining four factors was characterized by loadings of
a few (less than five) elements of quality (Table 5). Those elements
allow the following interpretation of the meaning of these factors: the
fourth represents central government capacities and effectiveness from
the thematic area “cross-cutting institutions”; the fifth, traditional in-
stitutions capacities and effectiveness, thematic area “cross-cutting in-
stitutions”; the sixth, local government capacities and effectiveness,
thematic area “cross-cutting institutions” and the seventh, tenure rights
enforcement, thematic area “forest tenure”. Moreover, some elements
of quality loaded on different thematic areas than those they were
hypothesised to represent i.e. factor five comprised tenure rights re-
cognition from the thematic area “forest tenure” and traditional in-
stitution capacities and effectiveness from the thematic area “cross-
cutting institutions”.
A bivariate analysis that related the factor loadings to the respective
mean Likert scores of the assigned indicators showed significant cor-
relations between the first three factors and the respective indicators.
The r coefficients are 0.96 for factor one and the mean score of the
indicator of formal law enforcement, 0.95 for factor two and the mean
score of the indicator of formal land use planning and 0.94 for factor
three and the mean score of the indicator of customary law enforce-
ment. Cronbach´s reliability analysis confirmed that the elements of
quality, which correlated with the first three factors, formed reliable
measures for these underlying dimensions, with α coefficients of 0.92
for formal law enforcement, 0.89 for formal land use planning and 0.92
for customary law enforcement (Table 5).
Other elements of quality representing use restrictions (thematic
area “forest management”), public policy participation (thematic area
“cross-cutting issues”) and several institutional capacities including
human resource, financial and scientific and technical information (all
thematic area “cross-cutting issues”) did not load whatsoever (Table 5)
3.3. Patterns of governance clusters for forest frontier communities in
Zambia´s Miombo
Cluster analysis was carried out based on all the factor scores for
governance attributes related to the communities. It allowed the iden-
tification of four main clusters of communities in which perceptions of
forest governance conditions were similar. Similar groupings of com-
munities were also revealed by the PCA results computed on the basis of
the two principal components that constituted the largest variations,
i.e. formal law enforcement, 20.9 %, and land use planning, 18.3 %
(Fig. 3).
Cluster one, which is the smallest, comprises one community from
North Western province. The cluster shows the highest score in formal
land use planning and the highest overall mean factor score. Cluster
three, which is the second smallest, comprises two communities, both
from North Western province. These communities score significantly
higher in formal law enforcement. Cluster two, the second largest, is
composed of nine communities, mainly from North Western and
Copperbelt provinces. The largest cluster, four, comprises 12 commu-
nities, mainly from Eastern and Copperbelt provinces. Communities in
clusters two score significantly higher in central government capacities
and effectiveness and tenure rights enforcement than those in cluster
four (Table 6). Moreover, the results show a weak provincial grouping
of communities since communities from the same province (Eastern)
only fall exclusively in the same group in one of the cases, cluster four.
4. Discussion and implications
5.1. Forest governance quality
Our results show low mean scores for governance indicators. This
implies weak de facto governance in the Zambian Miombo forests. This
is in line with the findings of scholars (Musole and Chunda-Mwango,
2018; Kalaba, 2016; Vinya et al., 2011) in Zambia and Gumbo et al.
(2018) elsewhere in the Miombo, who report weak forest governance
characterized by the unsatisfactory implementation of relevant rules
and governance processes on the ground. This is remarkable, especially
following the propitious de jure governance reforms in Zambia´s forest
sector that embrace decentralization (Ministry of Tourism Environment
and Natural Resources, 2009), the demarcation of restricted forest re-
serves (GRZ, 2015a) and participatory forest governance. Our results
may suggest that existing strategies have remained largely at a rhetoric
policy level, with hardly any influence on forest management on the
ground. In Zambia´s strategy for REDD+, the improvement of gov-
ernance is a key issue within the preparatory phase as a basis for in-
centive-based mechanisms (Matakala et al., 2015). However, up to now
the REDD+ strategy has only been implemented to a limited extent
(Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and Ministry of National
Development Planning, 2019). The weak enforcement of forest rules is
mentioned as constituting the underlying driver of deforestation in the
tropics (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014; Kanninen et al., 2007; Stickler
et al., 2017; Umemiya et al., 2010). Moreover, weak forest governance
is linked to the failure of mechanisms that aim to address deforestation
and forest degradation (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014). In this regard, our
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results indicate the necessity of strengthening the implementation of
forest rules and governance processes at the local level (Pettenella and
Brotto, 2012).
We find that forest governance quality does not differ significantly
between the restricted state and non-restricted customary arrange-
ments, when comparable indicators are used. This challenges common
assumptions that de jure state control and its associated restrictions are
likely to result in better de facto governance compared to customary
governance, with more open access and fewer use restrictions (Ferraro
et al., 2013; Hardin, 1968) and vice versa (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001;
Ostrom, 2008). In fact, the satisfactory enforcement of rules combined
with good institutional capacities is likely to produce better governance
performance on the ground (Brenes et al., 2018; Agrawal et al., 2014;
Ostrom, 1993; Hayes and Persha, 2010; Ostrom, 2009). Despite the
distinct policy interventions, forest rules in Zambia are hardly enforced
due to the absence of adequate financial and human institutional
Table 5
Results of factor analysis showing relationships between GFI framework thematic areas, indicators and elements of quality (N=64). Factor loadings> 0.5
(highlighted in red) imply that variable correlated highly with the factor. Cronbach's α > 0.7 implies a reliable measure of the underlying indicator.
Fig. 3. Patterns of community clusters along two principal components (N= 64). The colour indicates cluster assignment based on cluster analysis. The symbol
indicates the Province.
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capacities (Kalaba, 2016). In light of that, the results affirm the need to
increase the financial and human capacities of relevant institutions, as
this is likely to improve their rule enforcement capabilities.
The higher mean governance score in state than in customary ar-
rangements when site-specific indicators are considered to some extent
reveals the de facto implications of contradicting land tenure policies in
customary lands. While Zambia´s local government act authorises state
institutions to manage customary forests, the land act places the ad-
ministration of these forests under customary authorities, creating
ambiguous responsibility and institutional tension (Chikulo, 2009). In
the absence of effective institutional coordination and appropriate ac-
countability mechanisms (Kalaba, 2016), the situation may constrain
the implementation of non-legally binding governance processes on
customary lands, including reforestation and livelihood programs.
These processes drive the higher overall mean governance scores on
state land. Moreover, as the same processes were implemented by non-
government organizations and private enterprises, the results might
mirror the role of non-state institutions in improving forest governance,
which was also remarked by (Turner et al., 2014; Hayes and Persha,
2010) in the tropics. In this respect, the results indicate the necessity for
legal reforms to address the inconsistencies in institutional mandates
coupled with augmented formal support for the non-state institutions in
Zambia´s forest sector. An alternative interpretation, in line with re-
commendations by Williams, 2011, is that merely relying on mean
governance values can be deceptive, as these varied greatly depending
on the indicators under consideration. In agreement with (Dwyer et al.,
2008; Turner et al., 2014), the findings imply the need to systematically
understand the organisation and context of governance processes,
especially when discussing policy implications.
The relatively high scores for tenure rights recognition, particularly
on customary lands, mirror the de jure, de facto discrepancy vis-à-vis
the security of tenure on customary lands in Zambia. Whereas cus-
tomary land is the least secure de jure option due to an absence of
formal documentation to prove the landholders´ de facto rights
(Mulolwa, 2016; Bojang and Ndeso-Atanga, 2013), similar to other
studies (Stickler et al., 2017; Jain et al., 2016), our results indicate that
people in Zambia feel secure in their rights to customary forests. De-
spite the absence of any formal documentation, de facto customary
tenure may be more socially legitimated and thus more dominant than
de jure tenure (Payne and Durand-Lasserve, 2012). As customary for-
ests account for the largest proportion of forests in Zambia, this result is
promising, especially as tenure security is acknowledged to foster sus-
tainable use, efficient forest investment behaviour (Irwin and
Ranganathan, 2007) and the desire of local people to protect their
forests from encroachment (Larson et al., 2010; Mayers and Vermeulen,
2002). Besides, tenure security is reputed to lessen conflicts resulting
from overlapping claims of ownership between different formal and
customary institutions (Robinson et al., 2018). Nonetheless, de jure
requirements for formal documentation could further strengthen cus-
tomary tenure security.
The differences in scores for central government institutions and
formal processes of land use planning and law enforcement between the
state and customary forests again reflect the de jure weakness vis-à-vis
formal processes in customary forests. While Zambia´s Urban and
Regional Planning Act of 2015 recommends formal land use planning,
the activity is not strictly required on customary lands. Furthermore,
although formal institutions are legally mandated to manage all forests,
the control of customary forests is largely enshrined in customary laws,
which are articulated by the traditional institutions and lack systematic
procedures (Kalinda et al., 2008). Moreover, since the customary in-
stitutions occasionally challenge the authority of local government ac-
tors (Mfune, 2013), their willingness to enforce formal governance
processes on customary lands is likely to lessen. Formal activities are
also constrained by the inadequate implementation of forest manage-
ment plans and strategies and the poor monitoring of illegal activities
due to inadequate funds and staff (Kalaba, 2016). Since formal land use
planning and law enforcement are crucial for regulating unsustainable
forest use (McDermott et al., 2010; Kaimowitz, 2012), it is imperative
to establish legally binding requirements for these processes on cus-
tomary lands. Additionally, augmented support for human and financial
capacities and coordination amongst institutions could foster greater
enforcement exercises (Kalinda et al., 2008).
The differences in scores for use restrictions between the culturally-
restricted forests and those not restricted by traditions demonstrate the
role of traditional values and norms in promoting forest conservation,
as has been reported by other scholars too (Colding and Folke, 2001;
Jimoh et al., 2012). The results indicate the need to reinforce tradi-
tional norms within prevailing forest governance arrangements as they
reflect locally important cultural values of forest resources, and are
likely to foster voluntary compliance with access and use restrictions,
even in the absence of effective law enforcement systems. This could be
strengthened by a greater harmonization of state and customary
structures within the existing decentralization system in order to lessen
opposition during the implementation of pertinent forest governance
processes in Zambia´s Miombo.
The differences in gender equity between the individually-owned
customary forests and other arrangements (state and communal) reflect
the actual de jure inconsistency in women´s control over and ownership
rights to individual forestland. While Zambia´s statutory law recognizes
men and women equally in terms of property rights, i.e. access, use and
ownership of forestlands, customary law, which dominates the dis-
tribution of rights to forestlands, discriminates women’s ownership and
control rights (Spichinger and Kabala, 2014; Machina, 2002). As these
rights shape the opportunities and constraints that women face in se-
curing their livelihoods (Daley, 2013), it is essential to support their
enforcement in the more socially legitimated, de facto forest tenure
systems.
The finding that the apprehension, compliance with and monitoring
of customary law was significantly lower in state-owned than in cus-
tomary forests once more echoes the unsatisfactory decentralization
process that was also highlighted by (Mfune, 2013; Chikulo, 2009). The
forest policy and act provide for the participation of customary
Table 6
Summary of mean factor scores for each community cluster. Different superscript letters indicate means that are significantly different between clusters at p<0.05
(N=64).
Factors Assigned factor meaning Statistical test Mean factor score by community clusters
Cluster 1 (N=1) Cluster 2 (N=9) Cluster 3 (N=2) Cluster 4 (N=12)
1 Formal law enforcement Non-parametric Wilcoxon rank test −0.47B −0.39B 1.48A −0.07B
2 Formal land use planning 3.57A −0.24A −0.36A −0.13A
3 Customary law enforcement 0.96A −0.02A 1.24A −0.23A
4 Central government capacity and effectiveness 0.08AB 0.58A 1.16A −0.48B
5 Traditional institutions capacity and effectiveness 0.18A 0.16A −0.45A 0.17A
6 Local government capacity and effectiveness 0.13A 0.20A 0.13A −0.12A
7 Tenure rights enforcement 0.77AB 0.64A −0.53AB −0.41B
Mean overall factor score Student´s t- test 0.74A 0.13B 0.38AB −0.18C
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institution in the management of state forests through Joint Forest
Management programs. However, analogous to other studies in Zambia
(Bwalya, 2007), there is no real recognition of traditional leader´s
rights to make fundamental decisions in state forests. The Forest De-
partment still has complete control and approves all the important
decisions, including apprehending and penalizing forest lawbreakers.
The scenario leads to the under-utilization of the customary institu-
tion´s capacity to contribute to sustainable forest management. This is
particularly true given that the traditional leaders are socially re-
cognized as legitimate arbitrators, including forest offenses (Bwalya,
2007). The situation conforms the need to better integrate customary
structures into the decentralized governance structure and to
strengthen their capacity to participate in forest management.
4.2. Relationships between the GFI thematic areas, indicators and elements
of quality
The results show that the framework explains 76.5 % of the var-
iance. This demonstrates that the GFI indicator set is a valuable tool to
describe overall governance on the ground, as was highlighted by Davis
et al. (2013). We find that each factor reflects a distinct indicator of the
GFI framework, either exclusively, i.e. the first three strongest factors,
or to a certain degree, i.e. the remaining four factors. This may imply
that the GFI framework distinguishes underlying de facto governance
processes in Zambia´s Miombo, underscoring its fitness in this respect.
The distinct first and third factor demonstrate that formal and cus-
tomary laws issues are independent factors in the Zambian forest gov-
ernance context, along with central government, local government and
traditional institutions (Kalinda et al., 2008; Caron and Fenner, 2017).
This implies that merely outlining governance themes, i.e. laws and
institutions, can be misleading, particularly in the context of over-
lapping customary and formal laws and institutions, as is the case in
Zambia. In line with Williams, 2011, we recommend specifying and
differentiating between formal and customary governance legislation
and institutions.
Some indicators that are posited to characterize similar thematic
areas load as separate factors. This may imply that thematic areas at a
higher hierarchical level are not precisely reflected by the de facto
governance processes or functions of the different GFI indicators across
the Zambian Miombo. This indicates that thematic areas might be
useful to categorize different indicators. However, they are not always
mechanisms of distinct governance functioning, as they can comprise
different independent indicators.
The first three factors, i.e. formal law enforcement, formal use
planning and customary law enforcement, are consistently loaded by
elements of quality of the same indicators. This could indicate the
overlapping nature of the respective elements, which were not easily
distinguishable by participants. The detailed assessment through five
elements of quality could be simplified to reflect the most relevant
processes
The results show an association between customary institutions and
tenure rights recognition, both of which were loaded on the fifth factor,
contrary to the GFI postulations. In Zambia, customary institutions are
legally mandated and socially legitimated to drive the recognition of
tenure rights, especially on customary lands (Payne and Durand-
Lasserve, 2012; GRZ, 2015a; Caron and Fenner, 2017). Because similar
situations are likely in several other African countries that have cus-
tomary land governance structures, such as Botswana, Mozambique and
Tanzania (Knight, 2010), we recommend adapting the GFI indicators to
suit the local governance context. This can be ascertained through
scoping visits and a review of the existing legal framework.
4.3. Patterns of governance clusters for forest frontier communities in
Zambia´s Miombo
In the cluster analysis, we identified four main community clusters.
The existence of varied clusters reflects different governance ap-
proaches amongst communities, generally differentiated by the pro-
cesses of formal and customary law enforcement and land use planning.
The community in cluster one is characterized by high scores for
formal land use planning. Unlike in other communities, participatory
land use planning on customary land within this community has been
executed through a collaboration between the United Nations
Development Programs (UNDP), Global Environmental Facility (GEF),
Forest Department and the traditional leaders. Since this community
had the highest mean factor/governance score, the result again un-
derscores the significance of participatory land use planning in im-
proving de facto governance.
Communities in cluster three had high scores for formal law en-
forcement, which might result from the presence of timber concessions
in these communities. This finding is consistent with that of
NG’ANDWE et al. (2015), who report a comparatively higher enforce-
ment of forest use restrictions by the Forest Department in forests with
timber concessions than in those without in Zambia. This is mainly
because the concessionaires usually provide transportation and other
resources for the forest officers to conduct forest inventories, con-
sultation with the communities and monitoring of the concession.
It is notable that cluster two mainly comprises communities from
North Western and Copperbelt and cluster four, from Eastern and
Copperbelt. As these are the largest clusters, as distinguished clearly by
the loadings of several factors, the results might indicate that govern-
ance processes of North Western and Eastern are generally distinct,
while in Copperbelt we can find patterns from both regions. This
finding might reflect a de facto variation in the coordination between
customary and formal institutions across the different regions. Zambia´s
provincial officials operate under the same forest policy and legal fra-
mework that assigns the same general rights and responsibilities to all
local governments (Ministry of Tourism Environment and Natural
Resources, 2009). At the lower levels, provincial officials are required
to harmonise with the customary institutions to facilitate the enforce-
ment of forest laws and the proper administration of forest estates, in
line with the forestry policy and existing legal framework (Chileshe,
2001; Ministry of Tourism Environment and Natural Resources, 2009).
In Eastern province, communities reported recurrent conflicts over
forest ownership between customary and formal institutions. This
might explain the very low scores for central government capacities and
effectiveness and tenure rights enforcement that differentiate the
Eastern communities, in cluster four, from those in cluster two, from
North Western and Copperbelt. The result confirms the necessity for
consistency in the integration of customary structures into the decen-
tralized governance structure, taking into account regional and local
differences.
5. Conclusion and recommendations
Our data show low mean scores for governance indicators, implying
weak de facto governance in Zambia´s Miombo forests. Various forest
governance arrangements with differing tenure as well as access and
use restriction exist de jure. However, our results show that they lack
the implementation of relevant rules (customary and formal) and
governance processes on the ground, particularly concerning land use
planning, forest use restrictions and public participation in forest policy
formulation. In addition, there are inadequate financial, technical and
human institutional capacities to enable effective enforcement pro-
cesses. As weak governance is linked to forest loss, the results may
partly explain the persistent deforestation in Zambia´s Miombo. In light
of that, the increased enforcement of forest rules and use restrictions
comprising regular monitoring, apprehension and graduated sanctions
for law breakers is recommended. This can undoubtedly be strength-
ened by the establishment of robust coordination mechanisms between
customary and formal institutions, coupled with better support for their
financial, human and technical capacities. Participatory land use
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planning and policy formulation processes are needed. This would also
contribute towards achieving the targets of Zambia´s national climate
change response strategy and the national development plan
2017–2021. These national initiatives propose the integration of
strengthened forest governance to combat climate change and promote
sustainable forest use, although without specific operational measures
for its implementation (Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural
Resources, 2010; Ministry of National Development Planning, 2017).
Moreover, the REDD+ strategy proposes the same governance mea-
sures, but again without specific details of their implementation
(Matakala et al., 2015). In the light of a controversial general discussion
on the success and future of REDD+and the applicability of results-
based payments in international forest policy (Angelsen, 2017; Fischer
et al., 2016; Fletcher et al., 2016), and taking into account critical
voices that have been raised against REDD+ in other countries such as
Uganda and Nepal (Dawson et al., 2018), we conclude that REDD+ can
be promising. However, it should certainly not overshadow Zambia´s
own national initiatives mentioned above.
We have shown that formal and customary rules and institutions are
clearly differentiated on the ground. This justifies the fact that Zambia´s
legislation, including the constitution, recognizes and takes into ac-
count the importance of customary rules and institutions. Our findings,
however, imply the possibility of conflicts between customary and
formal institutions resulting from overlapping claims on customary
forest management. As this is likely to impede the execution of perti-
nent governance processes, we recommend legal reforms to address the
inconsistencies in institutional mandates and the coherent integration
of customary structures and cultural values into the decentralized
structure. We believe that the recognition of customary tenure rights
and use restrictions actually work quite well, despite the absence of any
formal documentation. Nevertheless, de jure requirements for formal
documentation that also takes gender issues into account could further
strengthen these rights.
We found the GFI framework to be a very useful tool for assessing
governance processes on the ground since the factors generally mirror
GFI indicators. However, because de facto governance processes in
some cases do not precisely reflect thematic areas of the framework,
and as a factor analysis reveals several distinct factors, we warn against
the use of single indicators to exclusively represent a thematic area.
This is not intended by the authors of the GFI framework, but could be
the pragmatic interpretation of users in the field. As the local setting
may have some influence on the relationships between certain elements
of quality, we suggest adapting the elements to suit the local context
and also refining these to reflect the most relevant governance pro-
cesses.
Our statistical analysis reveals clusters of distinct governance within
and across provinces. Specific processes have a differing relevance
within or across such different spatial jurisdictions. Examples include
forest concessions that influence governance processes, especially in the
North Western, or unclear tenure situations that influence the broader
governance situation in the Eastern province, whereas Copperbelt
communities are more diverse and cannot be assigned to specific
clusters. This highlights the need to improve and streamline de facto
and de jure governance factors beyond the established administrative
boundaries. This should be taken into account in the design of co-
management strategies as well as in jurisdictional and landscape ap-
proaches. Communities that are part of different governance pattern
clusters within the same province may need different policy measures.
Initiatives to integrate customary structures into the decentralized
governance structure are required across all of the different governance
clusters, though different coordination mechanisms may be needed
between customary and formal institutions.
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Appendix A
Description of elements of quality by indicators and thematic area
Thematic area Indicator Elements of quality
Forest tenure 1.Tenure recognition Recognition. Most individual and communal rights-holders have their rights recognized and recorded
Demarcation. Most individual and communal forestlands have boundaries demarcated
Enforcement. Infringements (violation) of rights are addressed quickly and fairly
Gender equity. Rights registered to individuals or households are often registered in the name of women, jointly or
individually
Customary tenure. Minimal conflict exists between customary forest tenure systems and statutory systems on the ground
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Land use 2. Land use planning Procedure. Land use decisions are taken in a formally-established process
Transparency. Planning process is transparent and procedures are clearly defined
Opportunities for participation. Communities or entitled individuals have the chance to participate in land use planning
processes
Representation. Representatives in land-use planning processes reflect a range of community perspectives, including women
and different socioeconomic classes
Capacity to engage. Representatives in land-use planning have the information and skills to effectively engage and participate
in land-use planning processes
Forest manage-
ment
3.Strategies and plans Coordination. Implementing agencies/persons/enterprises effectively coordinate when performing their roles and responsi-
bilities
Timeliness. Implementation takes place according to the timeline specified by the plan/strategy
Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring of impacts and effectiveness
Transparency. Land-use plans and monitoring reports are publicly disclosed on a regular basis
Review. Plans and strategies are reviewed and updated regularly
Licences: Procedural clarity. Clear administrative procedures regulate the obtaining of licenses and permits
4. Timber Transparency. Application status can be tracked
5. Charcoal Accessibility. The process for acquiring a license or permit is not prohibitively complicated and expensive
6. Non-timber forest products Timeliness. Licenses and permits can be obtained in a reasonable time and within the time prescribed
Implementation. Licenses and permits are honoured during harvesting and transport of forest products
7. Reforestation programs Procedures. Stakeholders understand the procedures and terms of the program, including planting sites and species, duration
as well as associated benefits and responsibilities
Coordination. The implementing agency coordinates the implementation by establishing clear agreements with people and
organizations
Capacities. Communities have been capacitated to implement the program
Benefits. Participants have received compensation as agreed
Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring to ensure compliance and effectivity
8. Protection and conservation Demarcation. Boundaries of protected or conservation forests areas are clearly demarcated.
Use restrictions. Stakeholders clearly understand the timeframe and what activities are allowed and not allowed within the
protection or conservation area
Enforcement. Implementing agencies are aware of and effectively coordinate the performance of their roles and
responsibilities
Penalties. Stakeholders understand penalties for failing to comply with the rules of the arrangement
Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring of impacts and effectiveness
9. Payment for Ecosystem
Services Programs
Procedures. The procedures for establishing PES have been made clear to the stakeholders
Coverage. PES schemes have been established on the ground.
Benefit sharing. The schemes for benefit sharing have been jointly decided, understood and accepted by the stakeholders
Protection. The protection of the forests providing these ecosystem services has been put in place
Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring
10. Forest-based livelihood pro-
grams
Procedures. Stakeholders clearly understand the procedures for setting up sustainable livelihood projects.
Coordination. Government agencies coordinate and provide support in implementing and sustaining projects
Resources. Forest resources are adequate to sustain livelihoods
Facilities. Credit facilities and capacity building were made available to local communities
Benefits. Community members receive shares and benefits equitably
Law enforcement: Apprehension. Violators are apprehended and brought to trial by concerned authorities
11. Formal law Consistency. Assigned penalties are generally consistent with the law and appropriate given the nature of the offense
12. Customary law Compliance. Penalties are served or are paid in full in a timely manner
Monitoring of compliance. Compliance with penalties is monitored and further legal action is taken in cases of non-
compliance
Transparency. Information about penalties and their state of compliance is publicly disclosed
Revenues 13. Revenues Fairness. Fees collected are reasonable and the basis of computation is understood.
Transparency. Field staff generate comprehensive and accurate records of all fees collected and these are made available to
the public.
Awareness. The government takes action to ensure that non-governmental “payers” are aware of their obligations.
Timeliness. Fees are collected in a timely manner.
Monitoring. Regular monitoring evaluates whether appropriate fees are collected as agreed
14. Benefit-sharing mechanisms Participation. Community has participated in the design of local benefit-sharing arrangements.
Compliance. Benefits are delivered in accordance with the agreed terms set out in relevant legal or project documents
Awareness. Community members are aware of benefits received and obligations associated with these benefits
Fairness. The type and extent of benefits are fair and appropriate
Monitoring. Regular monitoring evaluates whether benefits as agreed have reached intended recipients
Cross-cutting Ins-
titutions
Capacities and effectiveness Knowledge and skills. Institutions capacitated with up to date knowledge and skills to play an active role in forest
management
15. Central government Human resources. Institutions capacitated with an adequate number of staff to play an active role in forest management
16. Local government Financial resources. Institutions capacitated with sufficient financial resources to play an active role in forest management
17. Non-government organiza-
tions
Scientific and technical information. Institutions capacitated with relevant scientific and technical information to play an
active role in forest management
18. Customary institutions Effective. Institutions are effective in implementing forest management objectives
Cross-cutting is-
sues
19. Participatory policy-making Awareness. Community members are notified in due time of policies to be developed, reviewed and revised that are relevant
for land use in their community
Platforms. Platforms are provided for multi-stakeholder participation in policy-making
Representation. Policy-making platforms allow the participation of key representatives from the different forestry sectors
Effectiveness. Facilitation methods allow key stakeholders to participate actively in the process
Transparency. The stakeholders are informed of the results of policy engagements
Appendix B
Summary of governance polygons by arrangements and community within each landscape and province. Landscapes named by the name of
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chiefdom in which they occur. CC=non-restricted communal customary forest; State= restricted state forest; CI= non-restricted individual cus-
tomary forest; CTP= culturally restricted communal customary forest
Provinces Landscapes Community name Type of governance arrangement
CI CC State CTP Private
Copperbelt Z1: Shibuchinga Chitanshi ✓ ✓ ✓
Kalobwe ✓ ✓
Z2: Lumpuma Fibangula ✓ ✓
Kambaya ✓ ✓
Z3: Nkambo Mbotwa Central ✓ ✓
Mwambachimo ✓ ✓ ✓
Z4: Mushili Michinka ✓ ✓
Chinondo ✓ ✓ ✓
North Western Z5: Chizera Kashima East ✓ ✓ ✓
Matushi West ✓ ✓ ✓
Z6: Mushima Shungulu ✓ ✓ ✓
Kabanda ✓ ✓ ✓
Z7: Chibwika Chibwika Central ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Lwamukunyi ✓ ✓ ✓
Z8: Sailunga Kamayanda ✓ ✓
Katambi ✓ ✓ ✓
Eastern Z9: Nyampadde Nsamba Sokolole ✓ ✓
Nyakachonko ✓ ✓ ✓
Z10: Mumbi Lwezi ✓ ✓ ✓
Minga Chisoyo ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Z11: Nyalugwe Mwansanika ✓ ✓ ✓
Ntazia ✓ ✓ ✓
Z12: Ndakke Kamono ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sichibende ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Total 12 24 24 22 10 8 9
Appendix C
Summary of mean governance scores for the elements of quality with significant results using the non−parametric Wilcoxon rank test at
p< 0.05. Mean scores: 0 = non−existent; 1= very low; 2= low; 3= average, 4= high, 5= very high. Different superscript letters indicate means
that differ significantly between arrangements. CC= non−restricted communal customary forest; State = restricted state forest; CI= non−-
restricted individual customary forest; CTP= culturally restricted communal customary forest (N=64)
Thematic area Indicator Elements Mean score by governance arrangements
CC (N=22) CTP (N=8) CI (N=24) State (N=10)
Forest tenure Tenure rights recognition Gender equality 4.9A 5.0 A 3.5B 4.9A
Forest management Informal law enforcement Apprehension 1.1A 2.4A 0.6A 0.0B
Compliance 1.9A 1.9A 1.9A 1.0B
Monitoring 1.9A 1.9A 1.8A 1.0B
Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104866.
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A B S T R A C T   
Weak forest governance is posited as a key underlying driver of deforestation and forest degradation, but em-
pirical evidence of this linkage is scarce. Many related studies capture the de jure (legal) conditions and miss out 
the de facto (implementation practices on the ground), particularly when considering the proximate drivers and 
other factors of deforestation. However, this is central for identifying the specifics of governance for curbing 
deforestation and forest degradation. We analyse the influence of de facto governance quality on deforestation, 
accounting for proximate drivers and other factors using stepwise regression. We further compare deforestation 
rates and drivers across different governance arrangements with differing institutions, tenure and forest access 
restrictions using Wilcoxon tests to derive conclusions for promising policy instruments that address defor-
estation. Data for the analysis were obtained through participatory mapping, focus group discussions and 
geographical information systems. To generate empirical evidence, 238,296 ha of land were mapped within 24 
communities spanning three provinces, Copperbelt, North-Western and Eastern, in the Zambian Miombo. 
Regression results revealed that de facto governance quality has some effect but proximate drivers particularly 
charcoal production, crop agriculture and proximity to roads explain most of the deforestation patterns in the 
Zambian Miombo. Those drivers seem hardly affected by the weak governance processes. Since scores of gov-
ernance quality were in general low and hardly varying, we conclude that in our case they were too weak to 
show effects on the proximate drivers. Only the governance indicator ‘local government capacity and effec-
tiveness’ although still weak, was significantly linked to low deforestation rates. Comparative results further 
showed that restricted arrangements (state and traditionally restricted) exhibit lower deforestation than non- 
restricted arrangements (communal, forests with overlapping community claims, private and individual cus-
tomary forests). But while crop agriculture was negligible, forest resource extraction was still substantial in 
restricted state forests, indicating a higher possibility for forest degradation instead. Although private and in-
dividual customary forests had higher tenure security, they showed higher deforestation rates than communal 
and state arrangements. This challenges the notion that tenure security alone guarantees successful forest 
conservation. Our results suggest that governance can only affect deforestation drivers positively above certain 
thresholds. This needs to be further complemented by specific measures such as sustainable production systems, 
incentives and alternative livelihoods to regulate the proximate and other underlying drivers of deforestation.   
1. Introduction 
1.1. Deforestation in the Zambian Miombo 
Deforestation and forest degradation are threats to biodiversity, 
ecosystem functioning and well-being of millions of humans who derive 
their livelihoods from forests (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003,  
FAO, 2018, Naeem et al., 2016). This is particularly important in Africa, 
with the largest annual rate of net forest loss at 3.9 million ha, between 
2010 and 2020 (FAO, 2020) and is projected to increase by 4% by 2030 
(d'Annunzio et al., 2015). With Africa's forests linked to the rural li-
velihoods of over two-thirds of its population and 70% of its 
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households'energy requirements (FAO, 2018), it is imperative to curb 
deforestation and forest degradation on this continent. 
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the countries with relatively weak 
forest cover e.g. Madagascar, Ivory Coast and Nigeria and those pre-
dominated by dry forests e.g. Zambia exhibit higher deforestation rates 
than the humid forest-rich countries e.g. Congo and Gabon (Rudel, 
2013; Mayaux et al., 2013). In Zambia, although available estimates 
differ due to methodological differences (Kamelarczyk and Gamborg, 
2014), studies report escalating deforestation and forest degradation. 
According to Phiri et al. (2019a) the annual rate of deforestation in 
Zambia ranged from 0.54% to 3.05% between 1972 and 2016, higher 
than reported by FAO (2015) at 0.3%. Similarly, according to Global 
Forest Watch (2019), the mean annual tree cover loss rate of the 
country, considering a 30% tree cover threshold, increased from 0.22% 
to 0.54%, when comparing the 2000–2009 and the 2010–2018 periods. 
Forest loss is likely to adversely impact the functioning of the Zambian 
Miombo woodland, the major forest type in the country. 
The Miombo woodland is the most extensive dryland forest eco-
system in SSA, covering about 2.7 million km2 (Gumbo et al., 2018;  
Frost, 1996). Characterized by the dominance of Brachystegia, Julber-
nadia and Isoberlinia species (Matakala et al., 2015), the Miombo is one 
of the five global biodiversity hotspots (Mittermeier et al., 2003), har-
bouring about 8500 higher plant species (Frost, 1996), 54% of which 
are endemic (Rodgers et al., 1996). Additionally, on average the 
woodland sequesters between 0.5 and 0.9 tons of carbon per hectare 
annually (Chidumayo, 2014; Williams et al., 2008), contributing to 
global climate change mitigation. Further, over 100 million rural 
people directly rely on Miombo's timber and non-timber forest products 
for income (Gumbo et al., 2018; Bradley and Dewees, 1993). Despite its 
importance, deforestation and forest degradation persist in the Miombo 
(Vinya et al., 2011; Chomba et al., 2012; Kalinda et al., 2008), weak-
ening its ability to provide forest ecosystems goods and services 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003). 
1.2. Drivers of deforestation in the Zambian Miombo 
Many studies report small scale crop agriculture as a key proximate 
driver of deforestation and forest degradation in SSA and accordingly 
Zambia (Phiri et al., 2019b; Mayaux et al., 2013; Curtis et al., 2018). 
Timber logging, infrastructure extension, charcoal production, fire-
wood collection and livestock grazing are also notable proximate dri-
vers of forest loss in SSA (Kissinger et al., 2012; Hosonuma et al., 2012). 
The underlying drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in SSA 
are demographic/population pressure, economic, technological, gov-
ernance and socio-cultural factors (Geist and Lambin, 2001; Rudel, 
2013). Amongst the underlying drivers, mostly population density/ 
growth is linked to deforestation and forest degradation in SSA 
(Mayaux et al., 2013; Rudel, 2013; DeFries et al., 2010) because it is 
interrelated with increased demand for agricultural land and forest 
products (Rademaekers et al., 2010). 
An equally important underlying driver is weak forest governance, 
with 90% of the SSA countries in the reduced emissions from defor-
estation and degradation (REDD+) readiness phase, including Zambia, 
linking it to the detected forest loss (Kissinger et al., 2012). Weak 
governance fails to limit unsustainable anthropogenic forest use activ-
ities, which also constitute the proximate drivers of deforestation and 
forest degradation (Geist and Lambin, 2001). Forest governance 
“comprises all formal and informal, public and private regulatory 
structures i.e. institutions consisting of rules, norms, principles, deci-
sion procedures, concerning forests, their utilization and their con-
servation, the interactions between public and private actors therein 
and c) the effects of either on forests” (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014). In 
Zambia, the Miombo included, forest governance is characterized by 
weak institutions that fail to adequately enforce forest policies, rules 
and regulations, weak policy and insecure and unclear land tenure 
(Nansikombi et al., 2020; Gumbo et al., 2018; Kalaba, 2016). Because of 
this situation, there is demand for improved governance solutions in 
Zambia's Miombo forests (Gumbo et al., 2018; Dewees et al., 2010;  
Stickler et al., 2017). 
1.3. Research gap 
Although improved forest governance is posited a prerequisite for 
reducing deforestation and forest degradation in the Zambian Miombo 
(Matakala et al., 2015; Gumbo et al., 2018; Kazungu et al., 2020), there 
is limited understanding of the specifics of governance that are likely to 
foster successful outcomes (Umemiya et al., 2010). Moreover, as gov-
ernance attributes are only part of the underlying drivers (Geist and 
Lambin, 2001; Hosonuma et al., 2012), it is necessary to account for the 
role of the proximate and other drivers in governance-deforestation 
relationships. Specific governance attributes that have been linked to 
forest conservation are tenure security (Robinson et al., 2014), land use 
planning (Nolte et al., 2017), participatory policy processes (Wright 
et al., 2016), law enforcement (Nugroho et al., 2018; Tacconi et al., 
2019) and government, non-government and customary institutions 
(Banana et al., 2001; Ostrom, 2009). Likewise, included are the diverse 
arrangements that indicate the tenure (Holland et al., 2014; Robinson 
et al., 2014), access and use restrictions (Pfaff et al., 2014), and the 
institutions with the responsibility for forest management (Lund et al., 
2009). In Zambia, these range from (i) restricted command and control 
arrangements in state-owned National Forest Reserves and National 
Parks, (ii) participatory arrangements with restrictions of forest use and 
management in state-owned Local Forest Reserves, and Game Man-
agement Areas, to (iii) inclusion of communities, customary institutions 
and private entities into forest conservation initiatives in customary and 
private forests (GRZ, 2015a; GRZ, 2015b). However, not in all cases 
these governance attributes are equally supportive of forest conserva-
tion (Wehkamp et al., 2018; Bray et al., 2008). Besides, different studies 
underscore differing institutional arrangements i.e. communal (Rights 
and Initiative, 2018; Oldekop et al., 2019), private (Koyuncu and 
Yilmaz, 2013b; Koyuncu and Yilmaz, 2013a) and state (Dudley and 
Stolton, 2010; Wilshusen et al., 2002), as optimal policy options for 
effective forest conservation. The mixed results imply the necessity for 
further studies in this respect, also recommended for the Zambian 
Miombo by Nansikombi et al. (2020). 
Understanding governance-deforestation relationships has also be-
come a priority topic in the global deliberations on forests e.g. New 
York declaration on forests (United Nations Climate Summit, 2014). 
The subject has as well received growing attention in the recent global 
environmental change research (Umemiya et al., 2010; Wehkamp et al., 
2018; Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004; Li and Reuveny, 2006; Abman, 
2018). However, the respective studies use rather general than forest- 
specific governance indicators such as corruption democracy, voice and 
accountability, political stability, violence and rule of law. Although 
they provide valuable insights, general governance indicators may 
capture broader phenomena and mask the effects of forest-specific 
governance aspects on deforestation (Kishor and Belle, 2004; Wehkamp 
et al., 2018). Besides, in absence of reliable governance data at the local 
scale (Secco et al., 2014), most studies are conducted at the national 
scale and only capture the de jure (legal) conditions. As de jure notions 
have been found to differ substantially from the de facto, reality that 
exists on the ground (Agarwala and Ginsberg, 2017; Kaufmann et al., 
2007; Ribot, 2003), such studies fail to account for variations from 
differential implementation of forest policy and institutional reforms on 
the ground (Wehkamp et al., 2018; Puyravaud, 2003). 
1.4. Aim/research question 
We examine the influence of forest governance quality on defor-
estation in the Zambian Miombo, accounting for the proximate drivers 
and other factors. We aim to identify the specifics of forest governance 
with potential for reversing deforestation trends in the Miombo. We 
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also aim to highlight more clearly the potential implications of tackling 
underlying drivers, herein governance challenges, without adequate 
consideration for the proximate drivers and vice versa. This is relevant 
for Zambia's initiatives for reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (Matakala et al., 2015) and climate change strategies 
(Ministry of Tourism Environment and Natural Resources, 2010), which 
propose improved forest governance to curb forest loss. We additionally 
compare deforestation across diverse governance arrangements with 
differing institutions, tenure and restrictions to forest access and use, 
aiming to develop conclusions for promising policy instruments for 
addressing deforestation on the ground in the Miombo. 
We address three research questions. (i) How does the annual rate of 
deforestation vary between diverse forest governance arrangements 
with differing institutions, tenure and restrictions to forest access and 
use? (ii) Which are the proximate drivers and other factors that influ-
ence deforestation rates in the Zambian Miombo? (iii) Does governance 
quality explain deforestation patterns if considered in addition, and if 
yes, which specific governance attributes play a significant role? 
We employ a research approach that combines participatory map-
ping, focus group discussions, and geographical information systems 
(GIS) to collect data and use the comparative statistical approach 
(Wilcoxon test) and stepwise multiple regression models for the analysis: 
1.5. De jure forest governance arrangements in Zambia 
Zambia has diverse forest governance arrangements, under the re-
sponsibility of different institutions, across different tenure categories 
and with varying access and use restrictions (Appendix A). 23.7% of 
forests in Zambia occurs on state land, administered by either the 
Department of National Parks and Wildlife or Forest Department (GRZ, 
2015b). Under the formal law, access and use of forest resources on 
state forests is restricted except with special permits. 65.7% forest oc-
curs on either individual or communal customary lands, governed by 
chiefs and their representatives (GRZ, 2015a; Kalinda et al., 2008). 
Under the formal law, commercial use of forest products without a li-
cense on customary lands is restricted although access and subsistence 
use are not (GRZ, 2015a). Private forests (10.6% of the total forest area) 
also exist on state lands.These are owned by registered individuals or 
firms through leasehold tenure (GRZ, 2015a, Kalinda et al., 2008). 
2. Conceptual framework 
The post-colonial concept of steering decision-making and admin-
istration of forests specifically in developing countries focussed on 
governments that exercised authority through state agencies (Peters 
and Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 2007). Starting in the 1980s and due to 
overexploitation, corruption and policy failure associated with state 
agencies, there was a transition from an entirely state-driven to multi- 
actor governance (Arts, 2014). The contemporary governance concept 
recognizes forest governance as broader than governments, covering 
many actors in society including civil society, communities and the 
private sector (Agrawal et al., 2008; Arts, 2014; Mwangi and Wardell, 
2012). Taking into account the definition of Giessen and Buttoud 
(2014), we conceptualize governance as being based on (A) multiple 
actors and (B) formal and informal rules of forest-related decisions and 
their implementation (Fig. 1). In addition to these two components, we 
take into account (C) interactions amongst actors and (D) interactions 
between actors and rules and (E) the effects of either on forests to 
compose a comprehensive governance framework (Giessen and 
Buttoud, 2014; Davis et al., 2013; Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012). Be-
cause it is difficult to cover all these components within the metho-
dology of one study, while simultaneously maintaining scientific rigour, 
it is recommended to focus on certain components (Giessen and 
Buttoud, 2014). In this study, we explicitly analyse the effects (E) of 
institutions, rules and their interactions on deforestation at the local 
level, where implementation processes occur in practise (de facto). 
Governance arrangements (Appendix A) are specific expressions 
and combinations of these basic governance components and constitute 
key spatial units of assessment in governance studies. 
To assess the quality of rules, and institutions/actors and their in-
teractions we use a set of governance indicators (Section 3.2.4) from the 
Governance of Forests Initiative (GFI) framework of the World Resource 
Institute (Davis et al., 2013). Like in other governance assessment fra-
meworks (de Graaf et al., 2017; Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012;  
Worldbank, 2006), these indicators reflect compilations of operational 
aspects that were found to be relevant for forest governance. The GFI 
framework groups the relevant issues into six thematic areas: 1) forest 
tenure, 2) land use planning, 3) forest management, 4) forest revenues, 
5) crosscutting institutions and 6) crosscutting issues (Davis et al., 
2013). The indicators are clustered according to these thematic areas. 
Although the GFI framework is primarily practise-oriented, the in-
dicators capture the different components of the above described 
theory-based governance concept (Davis et al., 2013). 
Weak forest governance is an underlying driver i.e. a fundamental 
force that underpins the proximate drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation (Geist and Lambin, 2001; Turner et al., 1993; Hosonuma 
et al., 2012). Therefore, we incorporate the role of proximate drivers of 
deforestation (Fig. 1). Proximate drivers are human activities that di-
rectly affect the forest (Geist and Lambin, 2001, Turner et al., 1993,  
Hosonuma et al., 2012). They include agricultural expansion, wood 
extraction and infrastructure extension (Vinya et al., 2011; Armenteras 
et al., 2017; Geist and Lambin, 2001). We also account for other factors 
that work as catalytic attributes, leading to changes in human-en-
vironment conditions i.e. slope and size of the forest. Other important 
underlying drivers of deforestation in SSA are also considered i.e. de-
mographic/population density (Mayaux et al., 2013), economic and 
socio-cultural drivers (Geist and Lambin, 2001; Kissinger et al., 2012). 
3. Materials and methods 
3.1. Study area and site selection 
The study was conducted in the Zambian Miombo woodland. Three 
provinces, Copperbelt, North-Western and Eastern (Fig. 2) were se-
lected to represent different socio-economic and demographic condi-
tions as well as different forest cover and deforestation contexts 
(Table 1). North-Western is characterized by a low population density, 
estimated at 8 persons/km2 in 2017 (WorldPop, 2018), high forest 
cover (71%) with a tree cover larger than 30% in 2010 (Global Forest 
Watch, 2019), and unsustainable timber extraction as the main driver 
of deforestation (Shakacite et al., 2016). Medium to low deforestation 
rates have been observed, with an annual average tree cover loss of 
0.30% between 2013 and 2017 (Global Forest Watch, 2019). According 
to the same sources, Eastern province has a medium population density, 
estimated at 38 persons/km2 in 2017, low tree cover (14%) and a re-
latively low rate of tree cover loss (0.40% annually) between 2013 and 
2017, mostly from small-scale crop agriculture. Copperbelt is char-
acterized by a very high population density, estimated at 76 persons/ 
km2 in 2017, medium to high tree cover (60%), and high rate of tree 
cover loss (1.16% annually) between 2013 and 2017, mostly from un-
sustainable charcoal production. 
Within each of the three provinces, four landscapes of approxi-
mately 150km2 each were selected, thus a total of 12 landscapes 
(Fig. 2). These landscapes corresponded to twelve distinct traditional 
administration units (chiefdoms), each with typical land-use, socio-
economic, demographic and biophysical attributes of their respective 
province (Fig. 2). Within each landscape, two communities were se-
lected for the study, thus a total of 24 communities. A community, 
constitutes a group of people living together who share natural re-
sources and are tied together by local traditions, rules and values under 
the leadership of a section head/sub-chief (Twumasi and Freund, 1985;  
Madzudzo et al., 2013). 
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3.2. Data sources and preparation 
3.2.1. Participatory mapping exercises and focus group discussions (FGD) 
Focus group discussions (FDG) (O. Nyumba et al., 2018) were carried 
out to conduct governance assessment and participatory mapping ex-
ercises aiming to identify the locally perceived, de facto, governance 
arrangements and land use patterns. Focus group discussions were car-
ried out in all 24 communities, each with 15 key stakeholder re-
presentatives including sub-village leaders, customary leaders and forest 
committee representatives. Participants comprised men, women, youth 
(18–30 years), and long-term members of the community. This enabled 
broad representation of decision makers and social groups in the com-
munity. Despite the fact that FGDs are perception-based methods, they 
capture the reality that exists on the ground, which differs from the fact- 
based notions of laws (Kaufmann et al., 2011). Participatory mapping 
(Martin et al., 2012) was essential to create awareness on the focus 
governance arrangements and to ensure that subsequent governance 
assessment was done in a spatially consistent manner. The participatory 
mapping exercises were carried out between November 2017 and Oc-
tober 2018, using recent colour print outs of high-resolution Google 
Earth satellite images of approximately 80*120 cm. 
3.2.2. Classification and delineation of governance arrangements 
In the participatory mapping exercise, while making reference to 
the de jure categories of governance arrangements in Zambia, partici-
pants were asked to distinguish and delineate the de facto arrangements 
within their community using the satellite image print outs. Outcomes 
of these exercises were summarized into five categories, taking into 
account the local conditions including the institutions with the re-
sponsibility for forest control, tenure and access and use restrictions. 
These are (i) state forests with restrictions to access and use, (ii) com-
munal customary forests with traditional restrictions to access and use, 
(iii) communal customary forest without restrictions to access and use, 
(iv) individual customary forests with no restrictions to access and use 
and (v) private forests with use decided by the registered landowner. 
The polygons of the mapped governance arrangements within each 
community were subsequently digitized using QGIS (illustrated in  
Fig. 3, Map 3). 
The participatory mapping exercises from the 24 communities and 
subsequent digitization resulted in 70 identified de facto governance 
arrangements. The arrangements specify the institutions with the re-
sponsibitity to control forests (state, community and private), tenure 
(customary and state) and access and forest use restrictions (restricted 
and non-restrcited), at the level of implementation (de facto). They 
constitute 6 state forests with access and use restrictions, 8 communal 
customary forests with traditional restrictions to access and use, 22 
communal customary forests without restrictions to access and use, 24 
individual customary forests with no restrictions to access and use and 
10 private forests. As polygons of some governance arrangements were 
overlapping between neighbouring communities co-existing in the 
same landscape, we created an additional category of arrangement re-
ferred to as “forests with overlapping community claims”. This category 
constituted 21 cases in the 24 communities raising the number of 
polygons to 91. The forest governance arrangements were used as units 
of analysis because they represent the lowest level of forest governance 
in Zambia (Kalinda et al., 2008; GRZ, 2015a). 
3.2.3. Classification and delineation of main land use types 
FGD participants were asked to delineate land use patterns in their 
community using a classification based on Di Gregorio and Jansen 
(2005) as a reference, also taking into account the local conditions. 
Overall, 11 main land use classes (Appendix B) could be distinguished 
and spatially delineated during the participatory mapping exercises. 
These were also digitized using QGIS (Fig. 3, Map 2). 
3.2.4. Other governance attributes: governance indicators 
In addition to the categories of governance arrangements (Section 
3.2.2), the GFI indicators were included as governance attributes. The 
GFI framework recommends that from the large multitude of govern-
ance aspects covered, the indicators should be “adapted based on 
contextual factors such as scale of assessment, type of forest biome, or 
ownership regime.” After thorough literature analysis coupled with a 
pre-test workshop in Zambia, we selected at least one indicator from 
each of the thematic areas (see Section 2), choosing those that reflect 
pertinent issues in Zambia's forest governance. Altogether we selected 
19 quantitative governance indicators covering all thematic areas of the 
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework underpinning the study analysing the effects of de facto forest governance, proximate and other factors on deforestation in the 
Zambian Miombo. Adapted from (Geist and Lambin, 2001; Mayaux et al., 2013; Kissinger et al., 2012), with governance components adapted based on (Giessen and 
Buttoud, 2014; Arts, 2014). 
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GFI and adapted them to the Zambian context as follows:  
• Thematic area “forest tenure”: (1) recognition and protection of 
tenure rights  
• Thematic area “land use”: (2) formal land use planning.  
• Thematic area “forest management”: (3) implementation of land use 
strategies and plans, administration of licences for (4) timber, (5) 
charcoal and, (6) non-timber forest products, implementation of (7) 
reforestation, (8) forest protection and conservation, (9) payment 
for ecosystem services, (10) forest-based livelihood programs/pro-
jects and enforcement of (11) formal and (12) customary forest laws.  
• Thematic area “revenues”: (13) forest revenue distribution and, (14) 
implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms.  
• Thematic area “crosscutting institutions” capacities and efficiencies 
of (15) central, (16) local government, (17) non-government orga-
nizations and (18) customary institutions.  
• Thematic area “cross-cutting issues”: (19) public participation in 
policy-making. 
Each selected indicator was specified by five elements of quality, rated 
on a scale of pre-coded statements, from lack of good governance to good 
practice (Appendix C). In the FGD, participants were asked to discuss 
Fig. 2. A Map showing the locations of the study provinces, districts, landscapes and communities in Zambia in the Southern part of Africa. Landscapes are labelled 
according to the chiefdoms within which they are located. Sources: Tree Areas (ESA, 2017), Main populated places (SERVIR, 2015), Main roads (OpenStreetMap, 
2020) and Research Forest Reserves (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2016). 
Table 1 
Description of the demographic, economic, socio-cultural, forest cover and deforestation attributes of the study provinces. Sources: Forest cover and deforestation 
rates (Global Forest Watch, 2019), Population density estimates (WorldPop, 2018), Main drivers of deforestation (Shakacite et al., 2016), Poverty incidence (Central 
Statistical Office, 2018). Dominant ethnicity and share of urbanized population (Central Statistical Office, 2016).       
Attributes Zambia Copperbelt North-Western Eastern  
Forest cover (2010) (Tree cover  > 30%) 30% 60% 71% 14% 
Deforestation rates High High Medium-Low Medium-Low 
(Mean annual tree cover  > 30% loss 2013–17) −0.52% −1.16% −0.30% −0.40% 
Population density 2017 (people/km2) 22 76 8 38 
Poverty incidence (%) – 30.80 66.40 70.00 
Urban share of the population (%) 41.80 83.00 27.20 12.20 
Dominant ethnicity – Bemba Luvale Chewa 
Main driver of deforestation – Charcoal production Timber extraction Small-scale farming 
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(based on their experiences) and agree on scores for governance perfor-
mance, which was assigned as a Likert score (Likert, 1932) on a scale from 
0 (not present), 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) to each element of quality 
(Appendix C) within each of the governance arrangements. Likert scales 
constitute data transformation from qualitative to quantitative form (Flynn 
et al., 1990). This permits the reliable integration of information across 
observations or cases (Kirk et al., 1986). Moreover, although criticized for 
producing ordinal data, Likert scales have been found to provide interval 
data, suitable for parametric statistical analysis (Parker et al., 2002). Likert 
scores of all five elements of quality per indicator were aggregated as the 
arithmetic mean in order to derive indicator values for each of the gov-
ernance arrangements. The governance scores for the overlapping ar-
rangements were generated as the arithmetic mean of the scores assigned 
by both communities for the given arrangement category. We further 
calculated the mean (aggregated) score of all governance indicators for 
each governance arrangement in addition to the governance scores of the 
19 GFI indicators. All qualitative comments that were given for the 
governance scores were noted. It was not possible to establish contacts to 
private landowners to a meaningful extent; thus we could not score gov-
ernance on private forests. Accordingly, the 10 private arrangements and 
one overlapping arrangement with private claims were excluded from the 
later analysis where governance indicators were needed. 
3.2.5. Deforestation 
Deforestation was used as the dependent variable in our statistical 
analysis. The average annual rate of tree cover loss was used as a proxy 
for the annual rate of deforestation relying on data from Hansen et al. 
(2013) as provided by Global Forest Watch (Global Forest Watch, 2018). 
Similar to related studies in Africa (Potapov et al., 2012; Zabala, 2018;  
Venter et al., 2018), Hansen et al. (2013) provide tree cover and change 
estimates for the study period. The data consists of 30 m ground re-
solution tree cover maps, based on Landsat's satellite imagery for the 
entire globe, and allows calculating extent and change of tree cover 
globally. We calculated the average annual rate of tree cover loss (%) 
Fig. 3. Results of the participatory mapping exercise for the two communities (Lwamukunyi and Chibwika Central) of the landscape in chiefdom Chibwika 
(Mwinilunga District, North-Western Province); showing: basemap based on Google Imagery used for digitalization (Map 1), digitized main land use types (Map 2) 
and digitized governance arrangements (Map 3). 
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using a 30% tree cover threshold for each individual governance ar-
rangement within our 24 communities for a five-year period previous to 
the fieldwork (2013–2017). Visual validation using Google Earth and 
Bing Maps suggested 30% as a reasonable threshold to estimate forest 
cover in our landscapes. Tree cover does not necessarily correspond to 
forest cover, and can be also related to plantations or trees outside forest. 
3.2.6. Proximate drivers and other underlying drivers and factors 
The proximate and other drivers of deforestation were included as 
control variables to enable a realistic examination of the relationship be-
tween the different governance attributes and deforestation. Eight vari-
ables represented potential proximate drivers: i) timber, ii) charcoal, iii) 
pole and iv) firewood use indicated wood extraction; v) livestock grazing 
and vi) percentage of area under crop agriculture characterized agri-
cultural pressure; vii) distance to the road and viii) percentage of build-up 
area denoted infrastructure expansion (Table 2). Two variables, slope and 
area of governance arrangement, represented other factors. Amongst the 
other underlying drivers, we considered population because it is strongly 
linked to deforestation in SSA (Mayaux et al., 2013; Rudel, 2013; DeFries 
et al., 2010). However, the population estimates from WorldPop (2018), 
the data with the best precision for our study period 2017, are mostly 
accurate at larger spatial scales and disaggregation would give biased re-
sults. For the rough estimation of its influence, we estimated the total 
population in 2017 per governance arrangement (N = 91) and established 
its correlation with the selected infrastructure variables using the Spear-
man's correlation (Appendix D). Similar to (Burgess et al., 2007; Shoshany 
and Goldshleger, 2002; Stamber et al., 2016), population was strongly 
correlated with distance to roads and percentage of build-up area. Those 
variables were included in the model. Economic and socio-cultural drivers 
e.g. poverty incidence, level of urbanization and ethnicity were accounted 
for in the differences across the provinces (Table 1). Accordingly, we in-
tegrated provincial dummies in our analysis. 
Data on extraction of charcoal, firewood, timber and poles and li-
vestock grazing were obtained through the same focus group discussions 
as already described in Section 3.2.1. First, participants were asked to 
discuss and distribute 100 pebbles between benefits based on their im-
portance to the community. Subsequently, they were tasked to locate the 
land use classes (generated in Section 3.2.3) from which each benefit is 
gained on the map. For each governance arrangement, we computed the 
degree of extraction/use per benefit as a ratio of the community's as-
signed pebble score, compared to the size (hectares) of the land use 
polygon that offers the benefit, expressed as a proportion of the size 
(hectares) of governance arrangement in which the land use polygon is 
located. Forest use by people other than community members is mainly 
captured in the arrangements with overlapping community claims. 
Data on slope were derived from the SRTM 90 m Digital Elevation 
Database v4.1(Jarvis et al., 2008). Distances to roads were computed from 
the nearest point of a delineated and digitized governance polygon using 
open street map data extracts. Provincial boundaries were computed from 
the Zambia boundary map for Africa 2007 and percentages of crop and 
built-up area from the ESA CCI land cover map 2016. The sources of data 
and units of measurement for each variable are summarized in Table 2. 
3.3. Data analysis 
3.3.1. Comparative analysis of governance arrangements 
To determine whether forest governance quality, the average an-
nual rate of deforestation/tree cover loss and the proximate and other 
drivers of deforestation differed between the governance arrangements 
we applied non-parametric Wilcoxon rank tests since the assumption of 
data normality was violated (Bridge and Sawilowsky, 1999). 
3.3.2. Regression models 
We applied stepwise multiple regressions to analyse linkages be-
tween deforestation, governance attributes, proximate and other dri-
vers. Our stepwise regression model had the form: 
= + + + …+ +Y B B X B X B Xk k0 1 1 2 2
Here, Y is the dependent variable, average annual rate deforestation 
between 2013 and 2017; X1, X2….Xk predictors; B's, the parameters 
estimates or regression coefficients and ε, error. The error, ε is assumed 
to follow a normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2 for any 
values of predictors. 
We used the backward elimination method to determine the set of 
optimal predictors. Backward elimination is appropriate for selecting 
those factors that contribute most strongly to the regression model 
when the number of variables is high (Hocking, 1976), as was the case 
in this analysis. Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) was used to judge the 
importance of variables (Motulsky and Christopoulos, 2004). A varia-
tion inflation factor set limit < 2.5 was used to confirm the absence of 
multicollinearity between the predictors in the model (Craney and 
Surles, 2002). 
We specified two models in our analysis, both using the average annual 
rate of deforestation between 2013 and 2017 as the dependent variable. 
The models differed in the initial variables that constituted the predictors. 
In the first model, only the proximate and other drivers constituted the 
predictors. The second model added governance attributes (governance 
indicators and arrangements) to the predictors of the first model. 
Due to the absence of governance data for the private (10) and 
overlapping arrangements with private claims (1), only 80 of the 91 
observations were included in the regression analyses. A non-para-
metric Kruskal Wallis test was conducted to compare the annual rate of 
deforestation between the excluded and considered observations. The 
test verified the absence of elimination bias from the exclusion of the 
private and overlapping arrangement with private claims. Results 
(Appendix E) revealed that the mean annual rate of tree cover loss did 
not differ significantly between the excluded and considered observa-
tions with a p-value of 0.75. 
Although we initially selected nineteen governance indicators, we 
only used nine in our second model, as the rest were not applicable in all 
study sites and communities (see details in Table 3). The regression 
model with indicators that are applicable in all sites enabled better 
comparison across all study sites and communities. Of the nine recurrent 
indicators, only eight were present in all governance arrangements. 
The dependent variable, average annual rate of deforestation was 
found positively skewed via a Shapiro-Wilk test with a p-value <  
0.0001. It was thus transformed with a square root function to ensure 
normal distribution (Freeman and Tukey, 1950; Thacker and Bromiley, 
2001). To ensure comparability of units all observations for the pre-
dictors were standardised (Dytham, 2011). All analyses were executed 
using JMP software (SAS Institute Inc., 2017). 
3.3.3. Model validation 
Shapiro-Wilk tests were applied to the residuals generated by the models 
to verify conformity to the assumptions of normality (Dytham, 2011). To 
verify whether the multiple regression models conform to the assumption of 
homoscedasticity (Hayes and Cai, 2007), we applied Bartlett's test for 
homogeneity of variances by comparing the residuals across two categories 
of predicted values, generated by a median split (Bartlett, 1937). 
4. Results 
4.1. Governance performance across arrangements 
The mean (aggregated) scores of the nine governance indicators 
applicable for all sites, which were also included in the second re-
gression model, were very low, with values between 1.23 and 1.51 per 
governance arrangement (Table 3). 
As regards to the single indicators, only the indicator of tenure 
rights recognition scored consistently above the average Likert score of 
3 in all arrangements. Tenure rights recognition scored significantly 
higher in the customary than in state arrangements. Conservation and 
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use restrictions also scored above the average Likert score of 3 in the 
traditionally restricted communal customary forests. This score differed 
significantly from that in the arrangements lacking traditional use re-
strictions, which consistently scored below the average Likert score of 3 
(Table 3). The indicators of formal land use planning and formal law 
enforcement scored significantly higher in the state than in the cus-
tomary arrangements. Most of the individual indicators did not show 
significant differences between governance arrangements. 
4.2. Variation of proximate drivers and other factors across governance 
arrangements 
The restricted state arrangements and forests with overlapping commu-
nity claims were located the furthest from roads of all arrangements (Table 4). 
Charcoal, pole and firewood use was greatest in the forest with overlapping 
claims, as shown by the high mean scores (Table 4). Mean scores for timber 
extraction and livestock grazing were highest in the restricted state arrange-
ments (Table 4). Percentages of crop and built-up area were highest in the 
non-restricted individual customary arrangements (Table 4). 
4.3. Average annual rate of deforestation across governance arrangements 
The restricted arrangements (state and traditional) showed a con-
siderably lower deforestation rate than the non-restricted arrangements 
(Table 5). Deforestation rate was lowest in the traditionally restricted 
communal forests. The forests with overlapping community claims 
showed a relatively lower deforestation rate than other non-restricted 
arrangements (Table 5). Deforestation rates were highest in the 
Table 2 
Description of variables for analysing linkages between deforestation, forest governance, and proximate and other drivers. I indicates that the indicator pre-
dominantly represents the governance component on interactions amongst actors or between actors and rules, R, rules and Inst, institutions.      
Variable description Indicator Measurement unit Data source  
Dependent variable 
Deforestation Average annual tree cover loss 
2013–2017 
Percentage Global Forest Watch (Hansen et al., 2013)  
Predictor variables 
Underlying drivers    
Governance attributes    
I Tenure rights recognition and protection Likert score Focus group discussions 
I Land use planning Likert score Focus group discussions 
I Implementation of land use strategies 
and plans 
Likert score Focus group discussions 
R Timber license administration Likert score Focus group discussions 
R Charcoal license administration Likert score Focus group discussions 
R Non-timber forest products license 
administration 
Likert score Focus group discussions 
R Protection and conservation Likert score Focus group discussions 
R Formal law enforcement Likert score Focus group discussions 
R Customary law enforcement Likert score Focus group discussions 
I Implementation of benefit-sharing 
mechanisms 
Likert score Focus group discussions 
I Implementation of forest-based 
livelihood programs/projects 
Likert score Focus group discussion 
I Forest revenue administration Likert score Focus group discussions 
Inst Central government capacities and 
effectiveness 
Likert score Focus group discussions 
Inst Local government capacities and 
effectiveness 
Likert score Focus group discussions 
Inst Customary government capacities and 
effectiveness 
Likert score Focus group discussions 
Inst Non-government organizations 
capacities and effectiveness 
Likert score Focus group discussions 
I Public policy participation Likert score Focus group discussions  
Aggregated governance indicator Likert score Focus group discussions  
Type of governance arrangements Dummies Focus group discussions  
Control variables 
Proximate drivers    
Wood extraction Timber extraction Area weighted pebble 
score 
Focus group discussions  
Poles extraction Area weighted pebble 
score 
Focus group discussions  
Charcoal production Area weighted pebble 
score 
Focus group discussions  
Firewood extraction Area weighted pebble 
score 
Focus group discussions 
Agriculture expansion Percentage area under crop agriculture Percentage Africa ESA CCI land cover maps  
Livestock grazing Area weighted pebble 
score 
Focus group discussions 
Infrastructure extension (Correlated with 
estimated total population) 
Distance to the road Metres Open street maps (https://download.geofabrik.de/).  
Percentage of built-up area Percentage Africa ESA CCI land cover map (http:// 
2016africalandcover20m.esrin.esa.int/). 
Other factors Mean slope Degrees SRTM for the globe (Jarvis et al., 2008)  
Area of governance arrangement Hectares Participatory mapping & digitization 
Economic and socio-cultural drivers (differ 
between provinces) 
Region/province Dummies Zambia boundary maps for Africa 2007 
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individualized arrangements (private and customary individual). The 
private forests exhibited a lower deforestation rate than the individual 
customary forests (Table 5). 
4.4. Proximate and other drivers of deforestation in the Zambian Miombo 
In both models, three proximate predictors (distance to the road, 
percentage of area under crop agriculture and charcoal production) 
were statistically significant (Table 6). 
As indicated by the magnitude of the regression coefficients, per-
centage of area under crop agriculture, with the highest magnitude, was 
the proximate driver with the strongest influence on the annual rate of 
deforestation. Charcoal production and distance to the road followed 
respectively. 
Percentages of area under crop agriculture and charcoal production 
were positively related with the rate of deforestation, i.e. the higher the 
percentage of area under crop agriculture and the higher the production of 
charcoal, the higher the rate of deforestation. On the other hand, location 
further from roads was associated with lower rates of deforestation. 
Regarding the other factors (Model 2), two regional dummies (Eastern 
and North-Western) were statistically significant (Table 6). Eastern and 
North-Western regions, as compared to the reference regional dummy of 
Copperbelt, were associated with lower rates of deforestation. 
4.5. Influence of governance on deforestation and its proximate and other 
drivers 
The regression which includes governance attributes (Model 2), 
showed a slightly higher adjusted coefficient of determination of 50.0% 
than the model without governance attributes (Model 1), whose ad-
justed coefficient of determination was 43.3% (Table 6). 
The comparison between the two models (Table 6) indicates that the 
Table 3 
Mean governance scores by indicators, thematic area and arrangement. Mean 0 = non-existing; 1 = very low; 2 = low; 3 = average, 4 = high, 5 = very high. 
Arrangements not connected by the same letter are significantly different at p  <  0.05 with non-parametric Wilcoxon test. S = restricted state forests; CTP = 
traditionally restricted communal customary forests; CC = non-restricted communal customary forests; CI = non-restricted individual customary forests; OC = 
forests with overlapping community claims. N = 80. NA implies not applicable at the site. Component Inst predominantly captures institutions, R, rules and I, 
interactions amongst actors or between actors and rules.               
Thematic area Indicator Mean score by governance arrangement  
S CTP CC CI OC 
Component 
assessed 
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean  
Forest tenure Tenure rights recognition & protection I 6 3.28B 8 4.08A 22 3.85AB 24 4.08A 20 3.91AB 
Land use Formal land use planning I 6 0.58A 8 0.00B 22 0.23B 24 0.21B 20 0.50AB 
Forest management Implementation of land use plans and strategies I 3 1.79 - NA - NA - NA - NA  
Conservation and use restrictions (includes mean scores of 
timber, charcoal licences protection and conservation) 
R 6 1.63B 8 4.23A 22 1.28 B 24 1.43B 20 1.43B  
Non-timber forest products licence administration R 1 2.17A - NA 1 2.17A 1 2.17A 1 2.17A  
Implementation of reforestation program I 2 2.20A - NA - NA 2 2.90A - NA  
Implementation of forest-based livelihood program/projects I 1 3.00A - NA 3 2.28A 6 3.14A 5 2.48A  
Implementation of payment of ecosystem service program I - NA - NA - NA - NA - NA  
Formal law enforcement R 6 2.03A 8 0.50BC 22 1.04ABC 24 0.49C 20 0.79B  
Customary law enforcement R 6 0.58A 8 1.98A 22 1.59A 24 1.41A 20 1.49A 
Revenues Implementation of benefit sharing mechanisms I - NA - NA - NA - NA - NA  
Forest revenue administration I 3 2.28A - NA 9 1.67A 10 2.08A 8 1.84A 
Crosscutting institutions Central government capacities & effectiveness Inst 6 1.92A 8 1.34A 22 1.65A 24 1.66A 20 1.57A  
Local government capacities & effectiveness Inst 6 0.02AB 8 0.06AB 22 0.07B 24 0.07B 20 0.16A  
Customary institutions` capacities & effectiveness Inst 6 1.54A 8 1.39A 22 2.20A 24 1.76A 20 1.69A  
Non-government organizations capacities and effectiveness Inst 2 3.30A - NA 3 3.53A 3 3.53A 4 4.00A 
Crosscutting issues Public policy participation I 6 0.00A 8 0.00A 22 0.00A 24 0.00A 20 0.00A  
Mean Governance score (aggregated for the 9 indicators 
applicable in all sites)  
6 1.29A 8 1.51A 22 1.32A 24 1.23A 20 1.28A  
Final mean governance score (aggregated for all 19 indicators)  6 1.98A 8 1.53A 22 1.47A 24 1.68A 20 1.68A    
Table 4 
Comparative results of proximate and other drivers of deforestation across governance arrangements in all 24 communities using unstandardized parameters. 
Arrangements not connected by the same letter are significantly different at p  <  0.05 with non-parametric Wilcoxon test. State = restricted state forests; CTP = 
traditionally restricted communal customary forests; CC = non-restricted communal customary forests; CI = non-restricted individual customary forests; OC = 
forests with overlapping community claims. N = 80.        
Attributes Mean value by type of governance arrangement 
State CTP CC CI OC  
Number of observations 6 8 22 24 20 
Area (hectares) 2,933.89AB 882.83C 3017.13B 5,158.03A 706.96C 
Distance to road (metres) 2,095.27AB 118.84B 549.17B 0.00C 995.12A 
Built up-area (%) 0.02AB 0.01AB 0.00 B 0.05A 0.00B 
Mean slope (degrees) 2.82AB 4.35A 2.69AB 2.30B 3.61AB 
Percentage of crop area (%) 8.34B 18.11AB 13.30B 23.31A 11.40B 
Charcoal extraction (area weighted pebble score) 2.35AB 0.03C 1.97B 2.04B 4.93A 
Timber extraction (area weighted pebble score) 5.28A 0.45B 1.94A 1.25A 3.25A 
Pole extraction (area weighted pebble score) 2.68 BC 0.15C 3.28 B 2.34 B 6.83A 
Firewood extraction (area weighted pebble score) 5.90B 0.47C 8.16 B 8.39B 18.37A 
Livestock grazing (area weighted pebble score) 2.00A 0. 25A 1.85A 1.71A 1.64A    
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regression coefficients of the proximate drivers -(i) distance to the road, 
(ii) percentage of area under crop agriculture and (iii) charcoal pro-
duction- remained significant when governance attributes were in-
troduced in the analysis. The same coefficients only decreased slightly 
with the introduction of governance attributes i.e. -0.131 to −0.112 for 
distance to the road, 0.167 to 0.155 for percentage area under crop 
agriculture and 0.152 to 0.146 for charcoal production. 
The regression coefficient of regional dummy for Eastern increased 
from −0.270 to-0.322, while that of North-Western became sig-
nificantly negative with the introduction of governance attributes in the 
analysis. 
Only two governance attributes, (i) local government capacity and 
effectiveness and (ii) customary institution's capacity and effective-
ness, were retained in the model 2, which includes governance 
(Table 6). Local government capacity and effectiveness showed a 
significant negative association with the rate of deforestation i.e. ef-
fective local government institutions, with adequate capacities were 
associated with lower rates of deforestation. On the other hand, al-
though not statistically significant, customary institution's capacity 
and effectiveness were positively related to deforestation i.e. effective 
customary institutions, with adequate capacities were associated with 
higher rates of deforestation. Other governance indicators and the 
arrangements, were not statistically significant and discarded in the 
backward elimination. 
Table 5 
Average annual rate of tree cover loss between 2013 and 2017 across governance arrangement. Arrangements not connected by the same letter are significantly 
different at p  <  0.05 when non-parametric Wilcoxon test is applied. N = 91 using unstandardized variables.     
Governance arrangement Average annual rate of tree cover loss between 2013 and 2017 (%)  
Number of observations Mean  
Restricted state forests 6 0.29 BC 
Traditionally restricted communal customary forests 8 0.04C 
Non-restricted communal customary forests 22 0.54 B 
Forests with overlapping community claims 21 0.42 B 
Non-restricted individual customary forests 24 0.73 A 
Private forests 10 0.57 AB 
Table 6 
Stepwise multiple regression results showing linkages between annual rates deforestation, de facto forest governance indicators and arrangements, proximate and 
other drivers. * Implies parameter estimates are significant at 95% confidence interval using standardised variables; n/s, non-significant variables discarded in the 
backwards selection;— shows variable not included in the model, N = 70. Copperbelt is chosen as a reference dummy since it represents the region of highest 
deforestation (Global Forest Watch, 2019).      
Variable type Predictor Model 1 
No governance attributes; only proximate and other 
factors 
Model 2 
Adds governance attributes (indicators & 
arrangements) 
Coefficients (Standard error) Coefficients (Standard error)   
Intercept 0.536* (0.037) 0.475* (0.041) 
Proximate Distance to road −0.131* (0.036) −0.112*(0.035)  
Percentage of area under crop agriculture 0.167* (0.039) 0.155* (0.040)  
Charcoal production 0.152* (0.036) 0.146* (0.037)  
Timber extraction n/s n/s  
Pole extraction n/s n/s  
Firewood extraction n/s n/s  
Livestock grazing n/s n/s  
Percentage of built-up area n/s n/s 
Other factors Slope n/s n/s  
Area of arrangement n/s n/s  
Eastern region (Yes) −0.270* (0.041) −0.322* (0.049)  
North-Western region (Yes) n/s −0.167* (0.059)  
Copperbelt region (Yes) Reference dummy Reference dummy 
Governance Local government capacity and effectiveness – −0.077* (0.037) 
Indicators Customary institutions capacity and 
effectiveness 
– 0.092 (0.046)  
Central government capacity and effectiveness – n/s  
Tenure rights recognition and protection – n/s  
Land use planning – n/s  
Conservation and use restrictions – n/s  
Formal law enforcement – n/s  
Customary law enforcement – n/s  
Public policy participation – n/s 
Governance Restricted state forests – n/s 
arrangements Traditionally restricted communal customary 
forests 
– Reference dummy  
Non-restricted communal customary forests – n/s  
Non-restricted individual customary forests – n/s  
Forests with overlapping community claims – n/s  
R-squared 0.462 0.544  
Adjusted R-squared 0.433 0.500  
Shapiro-Wilk p-values 0.13 0.12  
Bartlett's P value 0.69 0.40  
Number of observations 80 80 
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5. Discussion and policy implications 
5.1. Deforestation rates and drivers across governance arrangements 
The restricted arrangements (state and traditional) exhibited lower 
deforestation rates than the non-restricted arrangements. Similar to 
(Nolte et al., 2013; Andam et al., 2008; Ferraro et al., 2013), this result 
supports the narrative that restrictions on forest access and use lead to 
lower deforestation than the approaches that permit consumptive use. 
However, restrictions have been found to increase illegal extraction in 
the areas with limited livelihood alternatives (Amoah and Wiafe, 2012;  
Mackenzie et al., 2012; Shova and Hubacek, 2011) and are costly to 
implement (Pfaff et al., 2017). Thus, augmented support for alternative 
livelihoods and institutional capacities could improve the enforcement 
of restrictions in forest-reliant communities. 
The very low deforestation rate in the traditionally restricted forests 
demonstrates the importance of traditional norms and taboos in pro-
moting forest conservation (Li, 2018; Furusawa, 2016; Lingard et al., 
2003). The finding also supports the assumption that shared beliefs 
shape actor behaviour towards forest conservation (Sabatier, 2019;  
Sabatier, 1999). Together with overlapping claims areas, traditionally 
restricted communal customary forests, with ancestral burial sites, had 
the smallest mean areas (Table 4) and also constitute a very small 
proportion of Zambia's forests. However, even in the absence of effec-
tive enforcement mechanisms, given the strong cultural value attached, 
under the assumption of shared beliefs, there is voluntary compliance 
with the traditional access and use restrictions (Handavu et al., 2019). 
Even so, given the upsurge in the marginalization of cultural norms and 
beliefs following immigration and modernization (Infield et al., 2018), 
protecting existing traditional norms should be part of the initiatives 
that promote forest conservation in Zambia. 
In the state forests, the low deforestation rates may besides the re-
strictions, be attributed to remoteness (Table 4), which renders them 
less attractive for crop agriculture, given the high transport-related 
transaction costs (Pujiono et al., 2019). Moreover, although still weak, 
state forests scored better in land use planning, which is associated with 
sustainable forest use (McDermott et al., 2010; Kaimowitz, 2012). 
Particular aspects of law enforcement i.e. fining and confiscation of 
illegal timber and charcoal (Tacconi et al., 2019; Davis et al., 2013) 
were also reported more prevalent in the state forests. But, whereas 
crop agriculture was negligible, similar to findings by (Kazungu et al., 
2020), forest resource extraction (timber, charcoal and poles) was 
substantial in state forests, indicating a higher possibility for forest 
degradation instead. 
Compared to other non-restricted arrangements, forests with over-
lapping community claims showed relatively lower deforestation rates. 
Although charcoal, poles and firewood extraction was considerable, the 
forests with overlapping community claims were less subjected to crop 
agriculture. This is perhaps because of remoteness and the accom-
panying transport-related transaction costs (Stifel and Minten, 2008). 
Nonetheless, the prevalence of forest resources makes them attractive 
for extraction, which when unregulated may cause degradation. Be-
sides, while they presently go unnoticed by the communities involved, 
overlapping ownership claims reflect unclear resource boundaries. This 
presents potential conflicts and a challenge to exclude unauthorized 
users (Ostrom, 2008; Ostrom and Benjamin, 1993). In this regard, land 
use planning that clarifies community resource boundaries together 
with joint management strategies and conflict resolution measures 
would guarantee long-enduring common forest resources of neigh-
bouring communities. 
The non-restricted communal forests showed lower deforestation 
rates than the non-restricted individual forests (customary individual 
and private). In the communal, contrary to the individualized ar-
rangements, customary leaders and community members have jointly 
established collective rules to regulate the cutting of trees. According to 
community members, violators are sometimes punished with monetary 
or in-kind (goat, chicken, farm labour) fines imposed by the customary 
leaders. Collective-choice theory predicts a high likelihood for suc-
cessful common-pool resource management when individuals self-or-
ganize and collectively design their own local institutions (Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom et al., 1999). However, certain conditions should be 
fulfilled to guarantee sustainable outcomes. These include clearly de-
fined boundaries, collective decision-making processes, effective mon-
itoring, graduated sanctions, proportional equivalence between benefits 
and costs, conflict resolution mechanism, minimal recognition of rights 
to organize, and nested enterprises (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom and 
Benjamin, 1993). In Zambia, owing to limited institutional capacities, 
these conditions are hardly fulfilled in practice in the communal ar-
rangements. This might explain the considerable rates of deforestation 
in the communal forests although lower than in the private and cus-
tomary individual forests. 
The individual arrangements (customary individual and private) 
exhibited higher deforestation rates than the state and communal for-
ests. The result challenges the assumption that individual ownership is 
more efficient than other forms, given its ability to internalize the ex-
ternality that would arise from the self-interested behaviour of com-
munity members in extracting common pool resources (Kijima et al., 
2000; Gordon, 1954). In Zambia, while individualized arrangements 
permit the exclusion of other community users, forest owner's use de-
cision is barely regulated de facto due to inadequate institutional ca-
pacity. In the absence of land use planning and effective institutions, 
rational choice theory predicts a high likelihood for forest owners to 
convert forestlands to more potentially profitable alternatives such as 
agriculture, given their profit maximizing nature (Simon, 1959; Simon, 
1955; Zafirovski, 2003). Moreover, unlike in the communal and state 
forests, the law permits cultivation in the individual arrangements 
(GRZ, 2015a). The individual arrangements were also the least remote 
(Table 4) and thus, with lower transport-related transaction costs 
(Chomwitz and Gray, 1996). In this view, incentivizing forest owners 
would increase the profitability therefore, the preference for forests 
over agriculture (March and Olsen, 2010). Actually farmers in Zambia 
are willing to refrain from forest clearing if incentivized (Vorlaufer 
et al., 2017). 
The titled private forests showed slightly lower deforestation rates 
than the non-titled individual arrangements. In Zambia, private unlike 
individual customary forest owners possess legal rights to exclude other 
community members from using their forests (GRZ, 2015a; Caron and 
Fenner, 2017). Hypothetically, the ability of landholders to legally ex-
clude competing users is the core mechanism by which tenure affects 
resource use and land cover (Wong, 2004; Bayley, 2015). Thus, similar 
to (Xie et al., 2016; Holland et al., 2017), we propose formal support for 
titling on customary lands. This is likely to improve tenure security 
therefore, forest conservation. However, as shown by the still high 
deforestation rates in the private forests, tenure security alone will not 
guarantee successful forest conservation. It should be accompanied by 
effective institutions, land use planning, and incentives for avoided 
deforestation or sustainable use. 
5.2. Proximate and other drivers of deforestation in the Zambian Miombo 
The results suggest that the percentage of area under crop agri-
culture is the most important proximate predictor of deforestation in 
the Zambian Miombo. This is not surprising since scholars in Zambia 
(Phiri et al., 2019b; Vinya et al., 2011; Mwitwa et al., 2012; Handavu 
et al., 2019) and elsewhere in the tropics (Acheampong et al., 2019;  
Hosonuma et al., 2012; Ferrer Velasco et al., 2020) have reported si-
milar findings. According to community members, diminishing soil 
fertility and the accompanying reduction in crop yield force farmers to 
abandon their crop fields and open up new forest areas for agriculture. 
Community members also reported clearing of forest areas for crop 
agriculture following immigration and high birth rates. Sustainable 
agriculture intensification practices e.g. crop rotation, conservation 
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tillage and mulching (Wezel et al., 2015) could increase crop yield and 
reduce forest clearing for agriculture. 
Charcoal production also emerged as a significant predictor of de-
forestation. Differing from (Chomba et al., 2012; Ratnasingam et al., 
2014; Vinya et al., 2011), firewood and timber extraction were not 
significant. In Zambia there is a high market demand for charcoal be-
cause it is the major source of energy for cooking in the urban areas 
(Handavu et al., 2019; Gumbo et al., 2013). Charcoal also generates 
higher income than firewood (Kazungu et al., 2020). Moreover, unlike 
timber, which is mostly extracted by external private firms and, pre-
dominantly in North-Western, charcoal is produced by the community 
members in nearly all three provinces (Gumbo et al., 2013; Ngandwe 
et al., 2015). Besides, although in some cases Miombo woodlands can 
recover rapidly from the influence of charcoal production (Chidumayo, 
1993), a considerable share of forests initially cut for charcoal are 
subsequently converted to croplands, reducing the possibility for re-
covery. We propose augmented monitoring of charcoal licences to curb 
illegal production. This is less likely to adversely impact food security 
and rural incomes, with many farmers depending on agricultural in-
come and, with charcoal production predominated by the affluent 
households (Kazungu et al., 2020). Guidelines for sustainable charcoal 
production systems are also proposed given the high regenerating 
ability of the Miombo forests (Campbell, 1996). 
Our results suggest proximity to roads as another important driver 
of deforestation. Deforestation rate is higher closer to the roads than in 
distant forests. Roads open up forests for settlement, agriculture and 
wood extraction by lowering transport-related transaction costs 
(Pujiono et al., 2019; Phiri et al., 2019b; Barber et al., 2014; Laurance 
et al., 2002; Poor et al., 2019). Because roads are inevitable for eco-
nomic development through enhanced rural connectivity (Gibson and 
Rozelle, 2003) and for facilitating market access and commercialization 
of products (Luna et al., 2020), greater control over newly accessible 
forests through regular patrols is needed. 
Similar to our study categorization of deforestation contexts 
(Table 1), North-Western and Eastern regions showed lower defor-
estation rates than Copperbelt. Copperbelt is more urbanized (Central 
Statistical Office, 2016) and has a higher population density than 
North-Western and Eastern (WorldPop, 2018). High population density 
and growth implies an increasing demand for food and a corresponding 
need to convert forests to agriculture (Asongu and Jingwa, 2012). High 
population density is also associated with high demand for charcoal and 
firewood therefore, high deforestation (Collins, 1984). Actually, char-
coal productions is greatest in Copperbelt (Kalinda et al., 2008). There 
is need to promote forest restoration in Copperbelt to meet the rising 
demand for wood thus, reducing pressure on the remnant forests (Fay, 
2012). In Eastern province, with deforestation mainly caused by small- 
scale crop cultivation (Shakacite et al., 2016), we suggest promoting 
sustainable agriculture intensification. In North-Western, with defor-
estation attributed to unsustainable timber extraction (Shakacite et al., 
2016), we recommend promoting sustainable forest management. 
5.3. Influence of governance on deforestation and its proximate and other 
drivers 
There was only a small increase in the explanatory power of the 
model explaining deforestation (Table 6) when governance attributes 
were introduced in the analysis. This demonstrates that governance has 
some effect, but proximate drivers explain most deforestation in the 
Zambian Miombo. Similar to (Larson and Petkova, 2011; Tacconi, 
2007), the results suggest that improvement of forest governance alone 
does not exclusively guarantee successful forest outcomes. Measures 
that tackle governance drivers should be complemented with strategies 
that specifically tackle the proximate and other underlying drivers e.g. 
sustainable production systems, incentive mechanisms and alternative 
livelihood and poverty eradication measures. This is relevant for REDD 
+ and climate change adaptation initiatives that propose governance 
improvement to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. 
Additionally and surprisingly, proximate drivers remained at un-
changed significance levels when governance attributes were included 
in the analysis. This is perhaps because governance was hardly varying 
between arrangements and was in general very low (Table 3). Statis-
tically, it is hard to explain deforestation by a predictor that is mostly 
the same in all governance arrangements. Actually, the only governance 
indicator that was significant was amongst those that showed differ-
ences between the arrangements (Table 3). Scholars (Hayes and Persha, 
2010; Davis et al., 2013; Eklund and Cabeza-Jaimejuan, 2017; Fischer 
et al., 2020) underline the high quality of forest governance as a pre-
requisite for regulating human-induced drivers of deforestation. 
There are lower deforestation rates where local government in-
stitutions are effective and posses adequate capacities. In Zambia, local 
government institutions are responsible for developing land use plans to 
guide sustainable forest management in addition to controlling the 
extraction and transportation of forest products (Mfune, 2013). District 
local councils occasionally monitor transportation of timber and char-
coal contingent on their financial and human capacities. Similar to 
(Larson, 2002; Kaimowitz et al., 2000), the result emphasizes that 
strengthened institutional capacities (financial, human, technical) are 
vital for successful forest conservation. Besides, local government in-
stitutions represent a fundamental decentralization structure 
(Andersson and Gibson, 2004; Andersson, 2006) and thus reveal the 
potential for curbing deforestation through effective decentralization. 
Their influence might still be increased by financial and human re-
sources and the state's willingness to cede power over forest manage-
ment (Kalaba, 2016; Mfune, 2013). 
Although not significant, there are higher deforestation rates where 
customary institutions are effective and possess adequate capacities. 
Zambia's customary institutions are responsible for granting rights of 
use over customary forests to new immigrants (Mason-Case, 2011) and 
for mineral exploration (Mwitwa et al., 2011). New immigrants are 
likely to convert forests to agriculture to protect them from being re- 
allocated (Unruh et al., 2005). Moreover, the results may imply that the 
customary institutions prioritize agriculture over forest conservation 
(Lund et al., 2014), with the law permitting agriculture on customary 
lands. We suggest the need for efficient land use planning and formal 
mechanisms that hold customary institutions accountable. 
None of governance arrangements was retained in the model. This 
result is surprising given that we found distinct deforestation differ-
ences between the governance arrangements (Table 5) and that gov-
ernance arrangements have been emphasized to influence deforestation 
patterns owing to the different use restriction and ownership rights 
attached (Robinson et al., 2014). This could imply that the significant 
drivers are associated with specific governance arrangements. For ex-
ample, charcoal is mostly produced in the forests with overlapping 
community claims, whereas crop agriculture predominates the in-
dividualized customary forests (Table 4). 
The regression coefficients of the regional dummies for Eastern and 
North-Western increase, and become significantly negative, respec-
tively, when governance attributes are included in the analysis. This 
implies that the significant governance attribute, local institutions' ca-
pacities and effectiveness, is region-specific. This means that local in-
stitutions' capacities and effectiveness are different across regions and 
certainly related to deforestation in all places. In agreement with 
(Nansikombi et al., 2020), the result suggest that regional differences 
ought to be reflected in the strategies for strengthening local-level in-
stitutional capacities and effectiveness. 
6. Conclusions 
In the context of persistent deforestation posing a substantial threat 
to the existence and functioning of the dry forest Miombo biome in sub- 
Saharan Africa, we challenge the notion that improved forest govern-
ance alone will successfully halt deforestation. Our data show that 
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governance has some effect, but proximate drivers, particularly crop 
agriculture, charcoal production and road proximity explain most de-
forestation in the Zambian Miombo. We recommend complementing 
governance measures with strategies to specifically address the prox-
imate and other underlying drivers including sustainable production 
systems, incentive mechanisms and alternative livelihood and poverty 
eradication measures. This is particularly relevant for REDD+ and 
climate change adaptation initiatives that propose governance im-
provement to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. On the other 
hand, de facto governance in our data set was consistently weak, with 
hardly any variation and thus with limited statistical effects on defor-
estation and related proximate drivers. Across all analysed governance 
arrangements, scores for governance performance were mostly very 
low. This highlights the need for strengthening the implementation of 
forest laws and regulations as well as administrative reforms in Zambia. 
Our data shows noticeably high rates of deforestation, especially in the 
individualized arrangements (private and customary individual) that on 
the other hand exhibit higher tenure security. Although these are the 
arrangements with legal agricultural land use and thus explainable 
forest conversion into croplands, it challenges the notion that tenure 
security will guarantee successful forest conservation. Rather it should 
be accompanied by incentive mechanisms, effective institutions and 
land use planning to guide sustainable use and production systems. 
Restricted arrangements (state and traditional) exhibited lower defor-
estation rates than the non-restricted ones. But, while crop agriculture 
is negligible, forest resource extraction is substantial in the state forests. 
This implies that state forests are instead more susceptible to de-
gradation. The regression results show that local government institu-
tions seem to play an important role in reducing deforestation, parti-
cularly when they are functioning and with adequate capacity. On the 
other hand, while not significant, the customary institutions appear to 
exacerbate deforestation, probably because of their legal mandate, 
which permits them to allocate forest land for agriculture and mineral 
exploration. Also, this might imply that traditional institutions prior-
itize agriculture production over forest conservation. We point to the 
need for effective participatory land use planning and formal mechan-
isms that hold customary institutions accountable. However, because 
land use planning has been linked to inequitable land allocation and the 
accompanying displacement and migration of the marginalized people 
into forestlands (Bluwstein et al., 2018), it should be complemented by 
social safeguard policies to protect the local people's land rights. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Zambia's forest governance arrangements with differing tenure and restrictions to forest access and use (Kalinda et al., 2008; GRZ, 2015a; GRZ, 
2015b)       
Arrangement Access and use restrictions Tenure Administration Institutions IUCN 
Category 
% total 
forest area  
National Parks Access and use of timber and NTFPs: restricted State Department of National 
Parks and Wildlife 
IUCN II 23.7 
National Forest Reserv-
es 
Access and NTFPs use: restricted; Use of timber: regulated by license State Forest Department IUCN II 





Access: restricted; Use of timber and NTFPs: regulated by license State Department of National 





Access: restricted; Use of Timber and NTFPs: restricted Customary Traditional institutions IUCN III 65.7 
Individually owned cu-
stomary forests 
Access: Non-restricted; Commercial Timber and NTFPs use: regulated by license; 
Subsistence use of timber and NTFPs: non-restricted  





Access: Non-restricted; Commercial timber and NTFPs use: regulated by license; 
Subsistence use of timber and NTFPs: non-restricted  
Customary Traditional institutions 
Forest Department 
None 




None 10.6  
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Appendix B: Description of major land use classes from the community participatory mapping exercises    
Land use type Description Area (ha)  
Secondary forest reference-Degraded (inter-
ventions) 
Forest with anthropogenic disturbance from extraction followed by natural regeneration. 133,737.67 
Secondary forest succession Forest once completely deforested for crop agriculture and abandoned. With natural regeneration greater than or equal 
to five meters height. 
37,509.97 
Plantation forest Forest once completely deforested followed by anthropogenic regeneration 29.02 
Woody shrubland Forest once completely deforested for crop agriculture and abandoned. With natural regeneration, less than five meters 
height. 
50,035.42 
Annual croplands Land used for growing annual crops 53,672.94 
Wetlands Land consisting of marshes or swamps 13,774.13 
Roads Hard ground that is built to facilitate movement from one place to the other. 256.77 
Water bodies Rivers and lakes 9705.94 
Bare surfaces Land covered by only soil 232.67 
Settlements Land where people have established buildings 1509.06 
Grasslands Land that mostly contains grasses 3112.60  
Appendix C: Description of the governance indicators and the elements of quality by thematic areas of the GFI framework. Component Inst predominantly 
captures institutions, R, rules and I, interactions amongst actors/ between actors and rules     
Thematic area Indicator Component Elements of quality  
Forest tenure 1.Tenure rights recognition 
and protection 
I Recognition. Most individual and communal rights-holders have their rights recognized and recorded    
Demarcation. Most individual and communal forestlands have boundaries demarcated    
Enforcement. Infringements (violation) of rights are quickly and fairly addressed    
Gender equity. Rights registered to individuals or households are often registered in the names of women, jointly 
or individually    
Customary tenure. Minimal conflict exists between customary forest tenure systems and statutory systems on the 
ground 
Land use 2. Land use planning I Procedure. Land use decisions are taken in a formally established process    
Transparency. Planning process is transparent and procedures are clearly defined    
Opportunities for participation. Communities or entitled individuals have the possibility for participation in land 
use planning processes    
Representation. Representatives to land use-planning processes reflect a range of community perspectives, 
including women and different socioeconomic classes    
Capacity to engage. Representatives in land-use planning have information and skills to effectively engage and 
participate in land use planning processes 
Forest manage-
ment 
3.Strategies and plans I Coordination. Implementing agencies/persons/enterprise effectively coordinate in carrying out their roles and 
responsibilities    
Timeliness. Implementation happens according to the timeline specified by the plan/strategy    
Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring of impacts and effectiveness    
Transparency. Land use plans and monitoring reports are publicly disclosed on a regular basis    
Review. Plans and strategies are reviewed and updated regularly  
Licences: R Procedural clarity. Clear administrative procedures regulate the obtaining of licences and permits  
4. Timber  Transparency. Application status can be tracked  
5. Charcoal  Accessibility. The process for acquiring a license or permit is not prohibitively complicated and expensive  
6. Non-timber forest products  Timeliness. Licences and permits can be obtained in a reasonable time and within the time prescribed    
Implementation. Licences and permits are honoured during harvesting and transport of forest products  
7. Reforestation programs I Procedures. Stakeholders understand the procedures and terms of the program, including planting sites and 
species, duration, and associated benefits and responsibilities    
Coordination. The implementing agency coordinates implementation by establishing clear agreements with 
people and organizations    
Capacities. Communities have been capacitated to implement the program    
Benefits. Participants have received compensation as agreed   
R Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring to ensure compliance and effectivity  
7. Protection and conservation  Demarcation. Boundaries of protected or conservation forests areas are clearly demarcated.    
Use restrictions. Stakeholders clearly understand the timeframe and what activities are allowed and not allowed 
within the protection or conservation area    
Enforcement. Implementing agencies are aware and effectively coordinate to carry out their roles and 
responsibilities    
Penalties. Stakeholders understand penalties for failing to comply with the rules of the arrangement    
Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring of impacts and effectiveness  
9. Payment for Ecosystem 
Services programs 
I Procedures. The procedures for establishing PES have been made clear to the stakeholders    
Coverage. PES schemes have been established on the ground.    
Benefit-sharing. The schemes for benefit sharing have been jointly decided, understood and acceptable to the 
stakeholders    
Protection. The protection of the forests providing these ecosystem services has been put in place    
Monitoring. Implementation is subject to regular monitoring  
10. Forest-based livelihood 
programs/projects 
I Procedures. Stakeholders clearly understand the procedures for setting up sustainable livelihood projects.    
Coordination. Government agencies coordinate and provide support in implementing and sustaining projects    
Resources. Forest resources are adequate to sustain livelihoods 
H. Nansikombi, et al.   Forest Policy and Economics 120 (2020) 102309
14
Facilities. Credit facilities and capacity building were made available to local communities    
Benefits. Community members receive shares and benefits equitably  
Law enforcement: R Apprehension. Violators are apprehended and brought to trial by concerned authorities  
11. Formal law  Consistency. Assigned penalties are generally consistent with the law and appropriate given the nature of the 
offence  
12. Customary law  Compliance. Penalties are served or are paid in full in a timely manner    
Monitoring of compliance. Compliance with penalties is monitored and further legal action is taken in cases of 
non-compliance    
Transparency. Information about penalties and their state of compliance is publicly disclosed 
Revenues 13. Revenues I Fairness. Fees collected are reasonable and basis of computation are understood.    
Transparency. Field staff generate comprehensive and accurate records of all fees collected and are made 
available to the public.    
Awareness. The government takes action to ensure that non-governmental “payers” are aware of their 
obligations.    
Timeliness. Fees are collected in a timely manner.    
Monitoring. Regular monitoring evaluates whether appropriate fees are collected as agreed  
14. Benefit-sharing mechan-
isms 
I Participation. The community has participated in the design of local benefit-sharing arrangements.    
Compliance. Benefits are delivered in accordance with the agreed terms set out in relevant legal or project 
documents    
Awareness. Community members are aware of the benefits received and obligations associated with those 
benefits    
Fairness. The type and magnitude of benefits are fair and appropriate    
Monitoring. Regular monitoring evaluates whether benefits, as agreed, have reached intended recipients 
Crosscutting Inst-
itutions 
Capacities and effectiveness Inst Knowledge and skills. Institutions capacitated with up to date knowledge and skills to take an active role in forest 
management  
15. Central government  Human resources. Institutions capacitated with an adequate number of staff personnel to take an active role in 
forest management  




Scientific and technical information. Institutions capacitated with relevant scientific and technical information to 
take an active role in forest management  
17. Customary institutions  Effective. Institutions are effective in implementing forest management objectives 
Crosscutting is-
sues 
19. Participatory policymaking I Awareness. Community members are aware in a timely manner of policies to be developed, reviewed and revised 
that are relevant for land use in their community    
Platforms. Platforms are provided for multi-stakeholder participation in policymaking    
Representation. Policymaking platforms allowed participation of key representatives from the different forestry 
sector    
Effectivity. Facilitation methods allowed key stakeholders to participate actively in the process    
Transparency. The stakeholders are informed of the results of policy engagements  
Appendix D: Correlation between estimated population and variables on infrastructure development at 95% confidence interval using standardised variables. 
Coefficients (ρ) range between +1 and − 1, where 1 is the total positive linear correlation, 0 is no linear correlation and − 1 is total negative linear 
correlation. Low p-values below the significance level of 0.05 indicate that relationships are statistically significant (Bewick et al., 2003), Number of 
observations = 91    
Infratructure Variable Number of people 
Spearman (ρ) P-value  
Built up area (%) 0.4125  < 0.0001 
Distance to roads (Meters) −0.504  < 0.0001  
Appendix E: Average annual rate of deforestation 2013–2017 for the observed and included observations in the regression models. The same letter implies 
means are significantly similar at 95% significance level when non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test is applied. N = 91 using unstandardized variables     
Consideration status Number of observations Mean Standard deviation  
Included 80 0.534 A 0.644 
Excluded 11 0.520 A 0.507  
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